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Daniel C. Esty* 
INTRODUCTION 
Politicians from Speaker Newt Gingrich to President Bill Clinton, 
cheered on by academics such as Richard Revesz, are eagerly seeking 
to return authority over environmental regulation to the states.1 In the 
European Union, localist opponents of environmental decisionmaking in 
Brussels rally under the banner of "subsidiarity. "2 And in debates over 
international trade liberalization, demands abound for the protection of 
"national sovereignty"3 in environmental regulation. All of these efforts 
presume that a decentralized approach to environmental policy will 
yield better results than more centralized programs. This presumption is 
misguided. 
While the character of some environmental concerns warrants a 
preference for local control, a sweeping push for decentralized regula-
* Yale Law School and Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies; for­
merly Deputy Chief of Staff and Deputy Assistant Administrator for Policy, Planning 
and Evaluation at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. A.B. 1981, Harvard; M.A. 
1983, Oxford; J.D. 1986, Yale. - Ed. Thanks to Bruce Ackerman, Akhil Amar, Rich­
ard Andrews, Steve Charnovitz, Andre Dua, Robert Ellickson, William Eskridge, Wil­
liam Fischel, Damien Geradin, Michael Gerrard, Michael Graetz, Howard Kunreuther, 
Reid Lifset, Roberta Romano, Carol Rose, James Salzman, Josh Sarnoff, Peter Schuck, 
Peter Swire, and Jonathan Wiener for comments on earlier drafts. Thanks to Jamie Art, 
Georgie Boge, Katie Genslea, Karen Krob, Todd Millay, Shalini Ramanathan, and Will 
Wade-Gery for research assistance. 
1. See, e.g., Bill Clinton, State of the Union Address (Jan. 24, 1995), in WEEKLY 
COMPILATION OF PREsIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, Jan. 30, 1995, at 99; CONTRACT 
WITH AMERICA 133 (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994); NEWT GINGRICH, To 
RENEW AMERICA 9 (1995); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: 
Rethinking the "Race to the Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 
67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210 (1992); see also John H. Cushman, Jr., Senate Panel Votes to 
Cut E.P.A. Budget, N.Y. T!MEs, Sept. 12, 1995, at A21; Jane Fritsch, Threat to Cut 
E.P.A. Budget Reflects a New Political Shift, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1995, at A l .  
2. See, e.g., Cliona J.M. Kimber, A Comparison of Environmental Federalism in 
the United States and the European Union, 54 Mo. L. REv. 1658 (1995); Koen 
Lanaerts, The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Environment in the European Union: 
Keeping the Balance of Federalism, 17 FORDHAM INTI... LJ. 846 (1994). 
3. See Joel P. Trachtman, L' Etat C' est Nous: Sovereignty, Economic Integration 
and Subsidiarity, 33 HAR.v. INTL. LJ. 459 (1992); Steve Charnovitz, Environmentalism 
Confronts GAIT Rules, J. WORLD TRADE, Jan. 1993, at 37. 
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tion cannot be justified. Not on1y are some problems better dealt with 
on a national (or international) basis, but each environmental issue also 
presents a set of subproblems and diverse regulatory activities, some of 
which are best undertaken centrally. While the current decentralization 
rage represents thinking that has come full circle in the past thirty 
years, 4 this article urges not another 180-degree turn but rather a break 
with unidirectional conclusions about the proper governmental level for 
environmental policymaking. In trying to stabilize the "environmental 
federalism" debate,5 I argue that what is required is a multitier regula­
tory structure that tracks the complexity and diversity of environmental . 
problems. 
Part I reviews how environmental protection efforts can go awry.6 
It makes clear that under the environmental rubric falls a diverse set of 
public health and ecological harms that range widely in scope, duration, 
severity, and ease of prevention or abatement. It also shows that each 
separate regulatory problem presents a unique set of technical and ana­
lytic challenges, potential "structural" or jurisdictional mismatches en­
compassing important "choice of public" questions, and public choice 
4. From a presumption that environmental problems were largely a state or even a 
local matter, the pendulum swung in the 1960s and 1970s to a conclusion that many is­
sues required centralized policy responses. However, arguments in favor of a more de­
centralized regulatory structure have been advanced since the enactment of the first na­
tional environmental regulatory programs in the United States. See, e.g., C. Boyden 
Gray, Regulation and Federalism, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 93 ( 1983); Wallace E. Oates & 
Robert M. Schwab, Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing 
or Distortion Inducing, 35 J. Poo. EcoN. 333 (1988); Revesz, supra note 1; Harry N. 
Scheiber, American Federalism and the Diffusion of Power: Historical and Contempo­
rary Perspectives, 9 U. ToL. L: REV. 6 19 ( 1978). 
5. The term "federalism" has been ascribed more than one meaning. In some 
uses, it implies a structure of shared power among national, state and local levels of 
government. See Morton Grodzins, Centralization and Decentralization, in A NATION 
OF STATES l, 2 1  (R. Goldwin ed., 1963). But see Scheiber, supra note 4. In other con­
texts, federalism (or more particularly "new federalism") is used to suggest a govern­
mental structure with power decentralized away from national authorities. For an intro­
duction to environmental federalism, see Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: 
Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REv. 1 141 ( 1995). Given the 
current sweeping support for environmental devolution, my argument for a balance be­
tween centralization and decentralization, of necessity, devotes considerable attention to 
rebutting the claims of decentralizers. But this focus should not be mistaken for support 
of a presumption in favor of centralized regulation. 
6. Environmental policies often fall short of society's goals and expectations. But 
the argument for state-based regulation cannot rest solely on the claim that federal envi­
ronmental programs have functioned poorly. Instead, the policy flaws in federal envi­
ronmental programs must be specified and the logic of state regulation identified. In­
deed, to sharpen the focus of this article, I stipulate 'at the outset to the need for better 
environmental policy tools and strategies - especially more use of market mechanisms. 
This article thus seeks to explain how and why we suffer regulatory failures and to ex­
amine whether decentralization will ameliorate these problems. 
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concerns. Simplistic notions of regulatory reform - including attempts 
to establish a single, appropriate level of governmental intervention -
are doomed to fail. Grounded in the hard realities of environmental 
policymaking, Part I sets the stage for later arguments highlighting the 
significant degree to which current decentralization theory assumes 
away the very issues that make regulatory intervention necessary in the 
environmental domain. 
Part II describes the environmental federalism debate to date. It re­
views the political arguments made in support of national environmental 
laws in the late sixties and early seventies, including Professor Richard 
Stewart's influential 1977 articles7 advancing the theoretical case for 
federal regulation. It then turns to the abundant "second-generation" 
environmental federalism literature that questions mru.iy of the claims 
about the advantages of federal regulation that underlie "first­
generation" thinking. Building on Charles Tiebout's seminal analysis of 
jurisdictional competition, it considers the work of William Fischel, 
Wallace Oates and Robert Schwab, and the recent work of Richard 
Revesz and many others who argue that decentralized environmental 
regulation offers significant social welfare advantages over more cen­
tralized policymaking.8 Some commentators go so far as to argue that 
decentralized regulation should be considered "presumptively 
beneficial. "9 
7. See Richard B. Stewart, The Development of Administrative and Quasiconstitu­
tional Law in Judicial Review of Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from the 
Clean Air Act, 62 IowA L. REv. 713 (1977) [hereinafter Stewart, Development]; Rich­
ard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?: Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Im­
plementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE LJ. 1196, 1210-20 (1977) 
[hereinafter Stewart, Pyramids]; see also SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, Pollution and 
Federalism, in CONTROLLING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC 
LAW IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 37-54 (1995) (refining the case for reg­
ulatory federalism). 
8. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. 
EcoN. 416 (1956); William A. Fischel, Fiscal and Environmental Considerations in the 
Location of Firms in Suburban Communities, in FISCAL ZoNING AND LAND UsE 
CONTROLS 119 (Edwin S. Mills & Wallace E. Oates eds., 1975); Oates & Schwab, 
supra note 4; Revesz, supra note 1; see also WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. 
OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (2d ed. 1988); GINGRICH, supra 
note 1; Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Trade and the Environment, AM. ENTERPRISE, May/June 
1993, at 42; James E. Krier & Mark Brownstein, On Integrated Pollution Control, 22 
ENVTL. L. 119, 126-27 (1992); James E. Krier, The I"ational National Air Quality 
Standards: Macro- and MicroMistakes, 22 UCLA L. REv. 323 (1974); John Cushman, 
Senator, in Fury, Advances Regulatory Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1995, at A16. 
9. See Revesz, supra note 1, at 1253; see also GINGRICH, supra note 1, at 9. Even 
politically "moderate" groups, such as the Democratic Leadership Council, have made 
a presumption in favor of decentralization a central tenet of their reform proposals. See 
DEBRA S. KNOPMAN, SECOND GENERATION: A NEW STRATEGY FOR ENVIRON-
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Part ill critiques the second-generation orthodoxies using the theo­
retical framework developed in Part I. It begins by asking, for example, 
if we really want every state or hamlet to determine for itself whether 
polychlorinated biphenyls create additional cancer risks greater than 
lQ-6, and if so, at what cost these risks are worth worrying about. Sound 
environmental policies depend on good science, which, in tum, requires 
a level of investment in sophisticated technical analysis that many 
smaller jurisdictions are in no position to make. Given such capacity 
problems and the significant economies of scale in environmental anal­
ysis, Part ill contends that across-the-board decentralization is unlikely 
to yield better results and may court disaster by weakening the scien­
tific underpinnings of our policies. 
Part ill next makes clear that many environmental policy deficien­
cies arise from "structural failures" that occur when the scope of envi­
ronmental effects does not match the jurisdiction of the regulating au­
thority. Regulators tend to ignore extrajurisdictional harms (or benefits), 
which results in a skewed regulatory cost-benefit analysis. While some 
welfare loss .arises because states are forced to pay for nationally man­
dated levels of environmental protection that their citizens would not 
have chosen, these "internalities" . are relatively easy to fix without 
wholesale decentralization. Externalities - which occur when physical, 
economic, and psychological harms spill across jurisdictional lines -
pose a greater policy difficulty. As Part ill points out, insofar as the 
central reason for environmental regulation is to mitigate the impact of 
market failures that emerge from uninternalized externalities, drawing 
more lines on the map only multiplies the potential for transboundary 
. spillovers. 
Part ill also assesses the applicability of regulatory competition 
theory in the environmental realm and finds it limited. Many environ­
mental problems exhibit threshold effects, time lags, and uncertainties 
that obscure the benefits of addressing them, especially in contrast with 
the visible and tangible gains of economic growth and jobs. While 
economists downplay fears of a race to the bottom, politicians cannot 
escape the image, in Ross Perot's memorable words, of a "giant suck­
ing sound" as U.S. factories and jobs go down the drain to jurisdictions 
with more lax environmental standards and lower compliance costs.10 
The slow and silent accumulation of greenhouse gases leading to ell-
MENTAL PROTECTION (1996). Much of Revesz's article is more nuanced than this quo­
tation suggests, but his opening challenge and conclusion are provocatively stark. 
Revesz himself seems to have begun to back away from this position. See Richard L. 
Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341 (1996). 
10. Ross PEROT, SAVE YoUR JOB, SAVE OUR COUNTRY 41 (1993). 
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matic change and agricultural declines thirty years from now on some­
one else's political watch is far less likely to be taken seriously by poli­
ticians obsessed with today's poll numbers and next year's elections. As 
Part ill illustrates, the prospect of systematic miscalculations in the 
tradeoffs between environmental and economic goals makes the state­
versus-state competitive dynamic likely to unleash welfare-reducing 
strategic behavior rather than efficiency improvements. 
Finally, Part ill focuses on whose views should "count" in the 
policy calculus. Modem Americans have a complex community identity 
with regard to environmental issues that makes this "choice of public" 
question nontrivial. Does the Grand Canyon, for example, belong only 
to Arizonans, or is. it the birthright of all Americans? Devolution may 
neither improve the representativeness of environmental decisionmaking 
in any meaningful way nor reduce "public choice" distortions in the 
policymaking process. In making this observation, Part ill ultimately re­
casts the second-generation arguments for decentralization as a set of 
policy rationales that sometimes will be salient within an overall argu­
ment for a multilevel regulatory structure designed to obtain the issue­
specific advantages of both centralization and devolution. 
The article concludes with a call for a presumption against pre­
sumption. It suggests that the challenge is to find the best fit possible 
between environmental problems and regulatory responses11 - not to 
pick a single level of government for all problems. The optimal envi­
ronmental policy level and approach will depend on the problem
· 
at 
hand and what sorts of regulatory failures are most significant. 
I. TOWARD OPTIMAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 
Before delving into the question of what level of government is 
best positioned to address environmental issues, it is important to estab­
lish why environmental regulation12 is needed at all, what problems it 
seeks to correct, and how governmental intervention designed to im­
prove social welfare might fall short. With a clear picture of optimal en­
vironmental regulation in mind and a rrrm understanding of how policy 
11. See STEVEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982) (making a 
similar argument that social goals and regulating strategies must be aligned). 
12. My use of the tenn "regulation" should not be read to imply any preference 
for "regulations" per se (particularly not "command and control" technology man­
dates) as the means by which environmental goals are achieved. Indeed, in many cases, 
market mechanisms, such as pollution charges or emissions allowance trading mecha­
nisms, will be superior to any traditional system of regulation. As used in this article, 
the tenns "regulations" or "regulatory" thus should be read loosely to apply to all en­
vironmental policy strategies and instruments. 
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failures arise, we then can assess the relative merits of decentralized 
and centralized regulatory structures. 
A. Starting Points 
Harms to the environment represent a diverse set of physical, bio­
logical, and chemical threats to human health or to the health of ecosys­
tems on which we depend for sustenance or about which we care be­
cause of some other sociological, historical, or aesthetic reason. In 
short, such harms pose a threat to social welfare.13 This is not merely 
because environmental quality is an element of well-being, but also be­
cause environmental resources - air, water, and land - are inputs in 
all processes of production, if only as a place to dispose of waste. As a 
result, if social welfare is to be maximized by allocating resources with 
optimal efficiency, environmental resources must be valued properly in 
light of full social marginal costs.14 
As externalities, environmental harms represent a threat not only to 
allocative efficiency and social welfare maximization, but also to the se­
curity of property. While not every spillover intrudes on the spillee's 
enjoyment of his land, those that do raise an issue of property rights. 
Whether or not one believes in a natural right to a clean environment, 15 
a longstanding norm of behavior, embodied in the common law of nui­
sance, protects property owners from unreasonable and uncompensated 
13. While some ecological commentators argue that there is an independent moral 
obligation to protect the natural environment, see, e.g., ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND 
COUNTY ALMANAC (1949), I do not rely on this ethical claim, but rather on a more 
traditional utilitarian view of environmental protection as an element of quality of life 
and therefore of social welfare. In this regard, Gifford Pinchot, one of the founders of 
the American conservation movement, offers a useful definition of the goal: "the fore­
sighted utilization, preservation, anclfor renewal of forests, waters, lands, and minerals, 
for the greatest good of the greatest number for the longest time." GIFFORD P!NCHOT, 
BREAKING NEW GROUND 505 (Island Press 1987) (1947). 
14. See, e.g., BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 8; Maureen L. Cropper & Wallace 
Oates, Environmental Economics: A Survey, 30 J. EcoN. LITERATURE 675, 676 (1992). 
Value cannot, of course, be determined extrinsically from the political or regulatory pro­
cess itself. See, e.g., MARK SAGOFF, THE EcoNOMY OF THE EARTH (1988); Howard 
Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic ]!.isk Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 
89, 90 (1988). Without gainsaying the significance of the political dimension of the en­
vironmental policymaking process, I believe that disputes over the inherent value of re­
sources explain only a small fraction of the nonoptimal environmental policies in place. 
As discussed below, other failures in the regulatory process represent a far bigger 
problem. 
15. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., Bringing People Back: Toward a Comprehensive 
Theory of Takings in Natural Resources Law, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 205 (1982); see also 
JOSEPH SAX, MOUNTAINS WITHOUT HANDRAILS: REFLECTIONS ON THE NA­
TIONAL PARKS (1980). 
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spillovers.16 Our sense of justice and fairness thus is offended when pol­
lution harms go uncompensated or uncontrolled.17 
More fundamentally, efficiency cannot be discussed without estab­
lishing the boundaries of property rights, which in turn requires norma­
tive assumptions about what constitutes an environmental harm or an 
extemality.18 Does A have a right to use his land in a way that affects 
B? We generally answer this question by reference to the "reasonable­
ness" of A's activities - a definition drawn from the common law of 
nuisance and derived from community standards of normal behavior 
and land use.19 
This endpoint, however, is not entirely satisfactory. First, although 
community standards may evolve, they often lag behind knowledge 
about harms, especially in the environmental realm, where scientific un­
derstanding is constantly improving.20 Second, if an environmental harm 
16. See REsTATE:MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821-22 (1978). For a historical 
discussion of the importance of the security of property, see Carol M. Rose, A Dozen 
Propositions on Private Property, Public Rights, and the New Takings Legislation, 53 
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 265 (1996). 
17. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Eth­
ical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165, 1218-24 
(1967); see also Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational 
Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 23 (1989) 
(suggesting that the importance of "vested" rights is often underestimated in law and 
economics analysis). One can argue that utility depends, in part, on the fulfillment of 
public expectations that include preserving the sanctity of property. In this case, a good 
environmental regime protects property rights as a dimension of social welfare. Alterna­
tively, protecting property rights may be seen as an absolute good and therefore as a 
limitation on the pursuit of welfare maximization. See JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, DIS­
COURSE ON THE ORIGIN OF INEQUALITY 44 (Donald A. Cress trans., Hackett Pub­
lishing Co. 1992) (1754) ("The first person who, having enclosed a plot of land, took it 
into his head to say this is mine • . • was the true founder of civil society."); ADAM 
SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, RE:PORT OF 1762-63 (R.L. Meek et al. eds., 
1979); see also Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAMB L. 
REv. 329 (1996). In either case, the virtue of a regulatory regime depends in part on its 
success in protecting property rights. 
18. See Stephen Cheung, The Myth of Social Cost, CATO PAPER #16, Cato Insti­
tute (1980); Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 
YALE LJ. 1211 (1991); Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 22 CHEMTECH 
1 (1992) (discussing the normative underpinnings of externalities). 
19. See Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules 
and Fines as Land Use Controls, U. Cm. L. REv. 681, 729-31 (1972) [hereinafter El­
lickson, Alternatives to Zoning]; Robert C. Ellickson, Takings Legislation: A Comment, 
20 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POLY. (forthcoming 1996); see also WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, 
REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, EcoNOMICS AND POLITICS 351 (1995); Donald 
Whitman, First Come, First Served: An Economic Analysis of "Coming to the Nui­
sance," 9 J. LEG. STUD. 557 (1980). 
20. At one time, for example, lead was not known to be harmful, and normal be­
havior included allowing lead smelters "to operate without pollution controls. Once the 
harmfulness of lead emissions was established, so too I believe was the existence of an 
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spans more than one community, reliance on communal standards of 
normal behavior may be inadequate, as there may be no agreement on 
such standards between communities. Finally, the harm from environ­
mental insults often rises nonlinearly because of threshold effects. If the 
harm from the one thousandth emitter is greater than that from the first, 
economic efficiency - marginal cost pricing - demands that the later 
emissions increments be priced higher than the earlier ones.21 Thus, in 
addition to grounding property rights on community norms, which 
might be summed up as "do unto others as you would have them do 
unto you," the boundaries of reasonable activity must also be - and in 
practice are - defined by a scientifically derived "do no harm" 
principle.22 
B. The Need for Regulation 
If property rights over environmental resources were clearly de­
fined and enforced23 and the transaction costs of negotiating their 
purchase and sale were negligible, then a free market for environmental 
resources would produce environmental-harm-internalizing, welfare­
maximizing,24 fair outcomes.25 There would be no environmental 
problems to be solved, and hence no need for regulation. Private party 
infringement of the property rights of those facing spillovers from smelters, regardless 
of the fact that it might have taken some number of years for community standards to 
catch up with the evolving epidemiological understanding of lead. Of course, "elite" 
recognition of such harms is likely to lead "mass" perception of a new externality, cre­
ating policy stress such as currently exists with regard to wetlands and endangered spe­
cies protection. See, e.g., Bettina Soderbaum, Revaluing Wetlands, OECD OBSERVER, 
Feb.-Mar. 1996, at 47-50 (noting that half of the available wetlands worldwide have 
been destroyed because of the misconception that wetlands are useless). 
21. Marginal cost pricing may raise equity issues insofar as some people will per­
ceive unfairness to the extent that later polluters will be asked to pay more than earlier 
ones for the same measure of emissions. 
22. Harm here is defined as anything more than de minimis welfare loss. There 
are many examples in which property rights are delimited not by prevailing community 
standards but by the identification of harm. See, e.g., Penn Central Terminal v. City of 
New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (holding that no one has a right to use their property in 
a manner that harms others). A Calabresian principle of lodging rights in ways that 
maximize welfare also would argue for a definition of externalities derived from mea­
surable harm rather than from community behavioral norms. See GUIDO CALABRESI, 
THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND EcONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970). 
23. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 51 AM.. EcoN. 
REV. 347 (1967). 
24. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960) (ob­
serving that efficiency can be achieved regardless of who holds the property rights). 
25. "Fair" in this context refers only to the issue of respecting property rights. A 
broader fairness issue - whether the initial endowment of rights is equitable - re­
mains open and is not addressed in this article. 
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exchanges and a simple framework of tort and contract rules to ensure 
that established rights could be vindicated would define a sufficient en­
vironmental protection regime. 
Because of the nature of environmental problems, however, the 
relevant property rights are often poorly defined,26 and the transaction 
costs of negotiating their sale and purchase are frequently high.27 Both 
circumstances entail market failures and a concomitant need for envi­
ronmental regulation. The specific sources of such failures are enumer­
ated below. 
1. Technical Transaction Costs 
Some costs associated with addressing environmental harms are 
the product of technical uncertainty. Even when property rights to envi­
ronmental resources are clearly defined, the value of these resources is 
not easily reduced to monetary figures that can be compared and ex­
changed. A person holding a property right against pollution may not 
know - or be able to know - the terms on which he rationally would 
trade all or some of that entitlement. Not only are infringements of 
property rights hard to detect given the invisibility of many pollutants, 
but individuals also cannot easily judge what risks of public health or 
ecological damage are posed by pollution. Told that a particular expo­
sure creates 10-s risk of death, people do not know what value to place 
on the harm they are suffering and thus how much compensation to 
seek.28 
26. See Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strate­
gies for Common Resources, 1991 DUKE LJ. l; see also RICHARD A POSNER, AN 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (4th ed. 1992); Peter L. Kahn, The Politics of Unregu­
lation: Public Choice and Limits on Government, 15 CORNELL L. REv. 280 (1990). 
For more on the reasons why one might want property rules in some cases and liability 
rules in others, see Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability 
Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 1089 (1972); 
Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning, supra note 19; Frank I. Michelman, Pollution as a 
Tort: A Non-Accidental Perspective on Calabresi's Costs, 80 YALE LJ. 647, 667-83 
(1971); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Controlling Externalities and Protecting Entitlements: 
Property Right, Liability Rule, and Tax-Subsidy Approaches, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 
(1979); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 
CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 931 (1985). 
27. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 18, at 1215; Robert L. Rabin, Environmental 
Liability and the Tort System, 24 Hous. L. REv. 27 (1987) (discussing regulation via 
tort system); Stewart, Pyramids, supra note 7, at 1212. 
28. See MARK LANDY ET AL, THE ENVm.ONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: 
AsKING THE WRONG QUESTIONS 283-88 (1990) (arguing that environmental risks are 
very imperfectly understood); Rabin, supra note 27 (discussing problems of identifica­
tion, boundaries, and sources of environmental pollution); Palma J. Strand, Note, The 
Inapplicability of Traditional Tort Analysis to Environmental Risks: The Example of 
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Resolving such uncertainties is complicated by the diversity of pol­
lution problems and the risk of "information overload" that they create. 
Particulates in the air, organic wastes in water, and most solid wastes 
disposed of on land can be seen as "flow" pollution that degrades rela­
tively rapidly and for which the environment has some assimilative or 
absorptive capacity. Pollutants of this type pose a threat only when they 
are concentrated spatially and temporally. "Stock" pollutants; on the 
other hand, such as some radioactive materials, heavy metals, certain 
toxic chemicals, and other bioaccumulative substances, degrade much 
more slowly. Because the environment has little or no absorptive capac­
ity for these substances, they have an additive or cumulative effect that 
makes connecting particular proportions of observed harms to specific 
sources of pollution difficult. In addition, as�umptions about how much 
harm certain environmental problems cause are constantly changing as 
scientists uncover new harms, new pathways of exposure to old harms, 
new connections between emissions and public health or ecological in­
juries, and new ways to reduce the risks from environmental threats. 
Moreover, the ability of science to measure ever smaller amounts of 
pollution adds to the fluidity of environmental knowledge. 
On top of this causal complexity, individuals face the additional 
difficulty of putting an appropriate value on the harms caused by pollu­
tion. While contamination at low levels may not be harmful, many pol­
lutants exhibit threshold effects such that initial increments of emissions 
cause no harm while exposure beyond a certain point causes damage.29 
Furthermore, as epidemiologists, toxicologists, and ecologists recognize, 
for every pollutant there exists a unique dose-response function that re­
sults in a distinct pattern of deleterious effects on human health or·eco­
logical resources. 
Deriving cumulative and net harms from pollutants heightens the 
technical complexity of environmental policymaking. Many pollutants 
interact with each other and with other substances. For example, radon, 
a naturally occurring radioactive gas found in the basements of millions 
Toxic Waste Pollution Victim Compensation, 35 STAN. L. REv. 575 (1983); William D. 
Nordhaus, Locational Competition and the Environment: Should Countries Harmonize 
Their Environmental Policies 5-8 (1994) (discussion paper No. 1079, Cowles Founda­
tion for Research and Economics, Yale University) (discussing the heterogeneity of pol­
lution with respect to time, space, cost, and economic impact). 
29. Pezzey usefully distinguishes between "effluent" and "pollution," the fonner 
reflecting emissions up to the threshold of harm, the latter describing emissions beyond 
the assimilative capacity of an ecosystem. See John Pezzey, Market Mechanisms of Pol­
lution Control: "Polluter Pays," Economic and Practical Aspects, in SUSTAINABLE 
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 190 (R. Kerry Turner 
ed., 1988). 
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of homes in America, produces much more serious lung-cancer risks for 
smokers than it does for nonsmokers. Similarly, some pollutants cause 
multiple harms. For example, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) not only 
cause depletion of the ozone layer but are also greenhouse gases. A pol­
lutant may also evince both harmful and helpful effects simultaneously. 
Sulfur dioxide, for instance, causes potentially serious respiratory harm 
as a ground-level air pollutant but appears to cool the upper atmos­
phere, thus counteracting the risk of global warming. 
Technical transaction costs are driven up further by the wide range 
of exposure routes through which environmental harms arise. Environ­
mental scientists devote a great deal of effort to tracing the "fate and 
transport" of chemicals. Some pollutants, such as sulphur dioxide, 
spread relatively uniformly through the environment into which they are 
injected. Other forms of pollution, such as toxic substances disposed of 
on land, tend to concentrate geographically and mix nonuniformly with 
the surrounding environment. 
Progress in addressing the most obvious sources of pollution (the 
emissions from major factory smokestacks and effluent pipes) means 
that our residual pollution problems are more diffuse, less visible, and 
more technically challenging. As the emissions from thousands of 
smaller sources (such as bakeries, dry cleaners, and garages), "non­
point" sources (such as runoff from farms or lawns), and the cumula­
tive effects of millions of individual environmental impacts (such as 
auto emissions) become more central, the prospect of individual prop­
erty holders being able to vindicate their rights through a nonregulatory, 
contract-tort regime becomes less and less likely. 
Regulation, of course, does not eliminate these various technical 
uncertainties,30 but it does allow for broad-based scientific activities that 
benefit from economies of scale and for collectively derived best ap­
proximations about environmental harms. Regulation thereby dramati­
cally reduces technical transaction costs. 
30. There is, of course, a debate over how objective science, and thus technical 
analysis, can be. Huber argues a strong positivist line. See PETER HUBER, GALILEO'S 
REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 221 (1991). Jasanoff, in contrast, re­
jects the idea that science represents an objective reality waiting to be uncovered. See 
SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFrH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISORS AS POLICYMAKERS 
12-14 (1990). Similarly, Latin suggests that we drop the pretense that regulatory deci­
sions have a purely scientific or rational underpinning and acknowledge that they are 
also matters of political choice. See Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation and 
Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 89, 90 (1988); see also Peter A. Schuck, 
Multi-Culturalism Redux: Science, Law, and Politics, 11 YALE L. & POLY. REv. 1, 15-
16 (1993) (arguing that "the contingent, socially constructed, and validated, resource­
constrained character of scientific paradigms and propositions .. . is an important anti­
dote to the more transcendent, universal pretensions of certain conceptions of science"). 
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2. Administrative and Strategic Transaction Costs 
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Assume now that in addition to fully defined property rights over 
environmental resources, technical transaction costs are zero. The fate, 
transport, and ecological and public health effects of every pollutant are 
known to all affected parties. A second set of transaction costs that de­
rive from the dynamics of bargaining becomes evident. People do not 
arrive at tenns readily in complicated multiparty exchanges, even if a 
range of universally acceptable outcomes exists. Holding out, free rid­
ing, and other strategic actions may preclude an efficient outcome.31 
Regulation reduces these strategic transaction costs by selecting and en­
forcing preferred outcomes directly.32 In addition, regulation reduces or 
eliminates the administrative costs of negotiating an exchange of rights 
or suing to vindicate rights with respect to private parties.33 
3. Legal Uncertainty or Poorly Defined Property Rights 
Drop the initial assumption of clearly established individual prop­
erty rights over environmental resources, and a further argument for 
regulation emerges. Not only are the transaction costs of delineating 
property ·rights substantial - indeed, prohibitive in some cases - but 
the lack of established rights can also lead to direct system failures as 
non-rights-holders take advantage of the confusion to do as they please. 
31. See AVINASH Docrr & BARRY NALEBUFF, TiiINKING STRATEGICALLY 
(1991); HOWARD RAIF'FA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982); see 
also Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owner: One More Sa­
lute to Ronald Coase, 36 J.L. & EcoN. 553, 582-84 (1993). 
32. See Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining 
Property Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 24-25 (1985) (arguing that courts apply judg­
mental entitlement-determination rules in nuisance cases, in which the barriers to pri­
vate transactions would be relatively high, while they apply mechanical entitlement-de­
termination rules that facilitate private bargaining in trespass cases, in 'Yhich the barriers 
are relatively low); see also SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS, STUDY OF 
FEDERAL REGULATION, s. Doc. No. 95-91, at 7 (1978); RICHARD B. STEWART & 
JAMES E. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 198-324 (2d ed. 1978) (dis­
cussing the failure of private litigation in dealing with environmental problems); George 
J. Stigler, The Economists' Traditional Theory of the Economic Function of the State, in 
THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE 103, llO (1975); Robert Ellickson, Public Property 
Rights: A Government's Rights and Duties When Its Landowners Come Into Conflict 
With Outsiders, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 1627, 1632-43 (1979); Richard B. Stewart & Cass 
R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1193, 1236-37 
(1982). 
33. If the cost of bringing a legal action exceeds the likely recovery for an envi­
ronmental injury, the existence of the property right may be clear, but that right will not 
be vindicable due to the transaction costs. Many environmental injuries inflict small 
banns on many people such that individually no one has enough of a stake in bringing 
the harm-causer to justice to justify the legal costs involved. 
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Without clear rules, a Hobbesian state of nature takes hold.34 Polluters 
pollute with impunity, and the strong seize commonly held resources 
without restraint.35 Government failure - or, more precisely, the ab­
sence of a functioning legal regime - compounds the market failure. 
a. The Problem of the Commons. Some natural resources, such as 
the atmosphere, are inherently "public goods" and simply not suscepti­
ble to division into private property holdings.36 Other environmental re­
sources, such as national parks, while not intrinsically public, have a 
long history of being collectively "owned."37 When shared resources 
become scarce, a familiar dynamic - the tragedy of the commons -
takes hold.38 Because, by definition, individuals do not pay the full mar­
ginal cost of the public goods that they acquire, each person has an in­
centive to overconsume. Without clear property rights and allocation 
rules, the resulting overconsumption leaves the participants worse off 
then they would have been had they agreed on an appropriate resource 
division among themselves.39 Powerful individuals or groups, moreover, 
may seize disproportionate shares of limited public goods and enrich 
34. See THOMAS HOBBES. LEVIATHAN (1885). Hobbes argues generally that a 
centralized government (the Leviathan) is required to quell the decentralized "state of 
nature," which inevitably will lead to the destruction of man if not stopped. 
35. Theoretically, the state of nature favors the strong, not necessarily polluters. 
Thus, one could envision circumstances whereby, in the absence of clear property 
rights, lower-than-efficient pollution levels would result, enforced by a powerful state 
with low-pollution preferences. For example, the United States might force Mexico to 
close factories along the border although the harm suffered in the United States was 
very minor (for instance, unsightly plumes of steam). In practice, however, the unclear­
rights scenario almost always favors polluters or consumers of public goods. This result 
follows because, in the absence of property rights to which deference must be given, 
other legal norms apply - notably, the belief that "possession is nine-tenths of the 
law" and that exercising force in the absence of a clear claim of right is unseemly if not 
immoral. 
36. A property rights regime can be established for emissions into the atmosphere. 
See, for example, the sulfur dioxide (acid rain) allowance trading system set up under 
the Clean Air Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (1995). 
37. Many Americans consider their ownership interests in such resources to be 
part of the national patrimony, making privatization problematic and management as a 
public resource preferable. See, e.g., Christopher K. Leman & Robert H. Nelson, The 
Rise of Managerial Federalism: An Assessment of Benefits and Costs, 12 ENVTL. L. 
981, 1001-02 (1982); Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Com­
merce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 711 (1986). Of course, not 
all traditionally publicly held resources are created equal. It may well be that the federal 
government need not retain all of the land it currently holds. 
38. Although the understanding of this problem as the tragedy of the commons is 
relatively new, the problem of scarcity and its effect on property rights can be traced to 
Locke and Blackstone. See Rose, supra note 16, at 267-70. 
39. For the classic version of this problem, see Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the 
Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244-45 (1968); see also Gordon Tullock, Federalism: 
Problems of Scale, 6 PuB. CHOICE 19, 25-28 (1969). 
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themselves unfairly at the expense of the rights others hold to a share of 
the commons. The need for collective action to respond to this "prison­
ers' dilemma" dynamic is now well understood and represents a strong 
argui:p.ent for regulation.40 
b. The "Reasonableness" of Externalities. Even if all property is 
privately owned, disputes over environmental harms will persist. As 
noted above, when A spills something onto B's property, there will 
often be some .uncertainty over whether A has a right to emit or B has a 
right not to be polluted. Although historically the touchstone has been 
the reasonableness of the intrusion,41 property rights often will be in 
dispute because there is no bright-line definition of what is reasonable. 
Moreover, reasonable levels of pollution may evolve over time as new 
harms emerge, conditions become more crowded (and once-reasonable 
emissions intermingle with other emissions, cumulatively becoming un­
reasonable), and science advances our knowledge of harms such that 
activities that once seemed relatively innocuous are deemed harmful 
and unreasonable. Thus, even in a seemingly simple case, disputes as to 
who holds rights may arise. 
As in the case of the uncontrolled commons, the absence of clear 
property rights leads to a Hobbesian Rule of the Strong. The results 
likely will be unsatisfactory because the default rule (polluters seize the 
property rights) violates our underlying norm against uncompensated 
spillovers. Of course, the outcome in this case need not be inefficient if 
Coasian bargaining results in the pollutee paying the polluter to reduce 
emissions to an optimal level.42 But regulation may produce a superior 
40. See MANCUR OLSON, THE Lome OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC 
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965); see also JOHN STUART Mn..L, ON 
LIBERTY (Viking Penguin 1982) (1859) (observing that no function of government is 
less optional than the regulation of forests, waters, etc.). But see Demsetz, supra note 23 
(suggesting that the clarification of private property rights will help to address the col­
lective action problem). 
41. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821-22 (1978). This legal principle 
- effectively placing property rights with potential pollution victims - represents a 
powerful moral intuition that has had status as a behavioral norm for centuries. See 
Rose, supra note 16. . 
42. A real-world example of this phenomenon can be seen in the environmental 
relationship between China and Japan. China's coal burning results in considerable sul­
fur dioxide emissions that have measurable (multibillion dollar) impacts on Japan. 
Nothing prevents Japan from asserting a property right not to be disturbed by this trans­
boundary harm. See Declaration on the Human Environment: Report of the United Na­
tions Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Conference on the Human Environ­
ment, at 5, U.N. Doc. NCONF.48114/Rev.l (1972), reprinted in 11 ILM 1416 (1972); 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Conference on Environment 
and Development, at 5, U.N. Doc. NCONF.15115 (1992), reprinted in 31ILM 874, 876 
(1992). However, given that there is no mechanism for vindicating these property rights 
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outcome by establishing the boundaries of permitted behavior and 
thereby ensuring that the results are fair as well as efficient. 
The following chart summarizes the potential shortcomings of a 
common law approach to controlling environmental harms. If property 
rights are not defined or transactions costs are not low, we end up with 
economic inefficiency and welfare loss, or a violation of basic property 
rights, or both. In either case, governmental intervention offers the 
promise of improved results.43 






CHART A: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND 'TRANSACTION COSTS 
Clear Property Rights Property Rights not Clear 
- rights respected - unlear rights lead to default rule 
- bargaining produces (polluters seize property rights) 
efficient results - Coasian bargaining may nevertheless 
- no need for regulation produce efficient results 
- government intervention needed to 
ensure fair results 
- rights may not be - unclear rights leads to default rule 
vindicable (polluters seize property rights) 
- transaction costs make - bargaining to efficient results 
bargaining to efficient unlikely 
results unlikely - need regulation to achieve efficient 
- regulation may lead to more and fair results 
efficient and fair results 
C. A Typology of Environmental Regulatory Failures 
While regulatory approaches to environmental problems can im­
prove social welfare, the specific regulatory strategies undertaken often 
fall short of the optimum. To maximize utility, environmental regula­
tions must be pushed to the point - and only to the point - where the 
benefits of an additional dollar of pollution prevention or control equal 
in the international realm, any such assertion by Japan is essentially useless. As a result, 
Japan's rights effectively do not exist, and China by default claims the right to pollute. 
Japan therefore is forced to subsidize Chinese sulfur dioxide abatement through a 
"Green Aid" program aimed at getting the Chinese to install scrubbers on their power 
plants. See Peter Evans, Japan's Green Aid, CmNA Bus. REv., July-Aug. 1994, at 39-
43. 
43. Within a single jurisdiction, property rights may be relatively clear and vindi­
cable so that transaction costs become the dominant variable determining the optimal 
response to environmental harms. When, however, we move from an island jurisdiction 
to a multiple-jurisdiction world, we raise the specter of property-rights uncertainties and 
further strain the possibility that a decentralized tort- and contract-based approach to en­
vironmental harms will be adequate. 
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the costs of the activities undertaken.44 Viewed another way, "least so­
cial cost" environmental regulation should minimize the sum of pollu­
tion abatement expenditures (including regulatory costs) and losses in­
flicted by unabated pollution harms. 45 With this objective in mind, three 
broad categories of regulatory failure and welfare loss can be discerned: 
technical deficiencies, structural mismatches, and public choice 
problems. 
I.  Technical Deficiencies in Regulation 
Technical welfare losses arise for two distinct reasons. First, the in­
formation on which regulatory decisions rest can be incomplete or inac­
curate. How much acid-rain-causing S02 has been emitted may be mea­
sured incorrectly or miscalculated. Similarly, the public health or 
ecological risks arising from a particular environmental harm may be 
misunderstood or miscalculated. What level of exposure to sulfates 
causes respiratory disease? How much acid rain will cause trees to die? 
Mistakes in answering such questions represent a weakness in technical 
capacity. In such cases, more accurate data, scientific analysis, risk as­
sessment, or cost-benefit calculations would improve the technical con­
tent of regulation and thus would result in more accurate environmental 
resource pricing.46 
A second type of technical welfare loss consists of the administra­
tive costs of regulation. This set of technical costs has two conceptually 
distinct components. First, for any given level of technical capacity, 
regulatory systems may have differing administrative costs. For in­
stance, federal bureaucrats and state bureaucrats may both be able to 
44. This utilitarian goal, as discussed earlier, should be pursued subject to the con­
straint that property rights are respected. See supra text accompanying notes 15-17. 
45. For a thorough review of the economics of environmental regulation, see 
BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 8. Least social cost analysis implies that benefits and 
costs can be quantified at least roughly and then compared. As discussed supra note 30, 
some commentators argue that science is so uncertain and subjective and that individu­
als and communities vary so widely in their risk valuations that aU environmental pol­
icy decisions are political and thus that cost-benefit analyses are of limited value. Yet 
some aspects of policy analysis are objective - for example, measurements of pollu­
tion; this means that better technical analysis will reduce the scope of policy uncertainty 
and thus the sphere in which political judgment is required. 
46. It is important to realize that this category of regulatory failure is broad 
enough to encapsulate various "political" or quasi-normative incapacities, particularly 
with regard to how much value to place on policy interventions. For instance, a commu­
nity may believe that controlling a certain risk is worth on average $2 million per life 
saved. A regulator, even trying in good faith to discern the community's values, may 
not have the technical capacity to arrive at the $2 million figure. Some "technical" fail­
ures - particularly in cost-benefit analysis - will thus be hard to distinguish from 
"public choice" or political failures. See infra text accompanying notes 79-89. 
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determine what level of benzene in the air is safe to breathe and to do 
so in the same amount of time, but federal bureaucrats have higher 
wages, making the federal system more costly. Alternatively, the federal 
officials may work longer or faster, thus producing more regulatory out­
put per dollar invested, making the federal system more cost-effective 
from an administrative point of view. Second, a tradeoff exists between 
improved technical content and the costs associated with running a reg­
ulatory system that achieves greater precision. For example, although 
equating the marginal cost and benefit of pollution control for every 
person in the country on an individual basis - such as by specifying 
individualized benzene standards for the air around each household -
would minimize welfare losses associated with divergences between 
policy outcomes and individual preferences, it would come at a vast ad­
ministrative cost. Thus, additional welfare losses arise from failures to 
regulate with optimal specificity. 47 
Although technical failure can occur at any stage of the regulatory 
process,48 the effects of "early" mistakes may be compounded and 
hence more serious. Some errors will result in total regulatory failure, 
while other mistakes will affect only the level of response.49 The big­
gest errors, which occur when causal connections are misunderstood or 
when risks are misjudged by multiple orders of magnitude, are more 
likely to arise from the "technical" end of the regulatory process (such 
as faulty data collection and analysis) than from "political-technical" 
47. There is a significant body of literature that addresses the optimal specificity 
of regulations and the tradeoffs between uniform standards and regulatory diversity. See, 
e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, AN EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 367-70 (4th ed. 1992) 
(arguing that the key question is whether the benefits of particularization outweigh the 
costs); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Rulemaking, 3 J. LE­
GAL STUD. 257, 262 (1974); see also Colin Diver, The Optimal Precision of Adminis­
trative Rules, 93 YALE LJ. 65 (1983). 
48. Technical failure, as understood here, can occur simultaneously within one, 
some, or all of these elements: 
1. Problem identification 
2. Data collection 
3. Fate and transport analysis 
4. Epidemiological and ecological studies 
5. Risk assessment 
· 
6. Policy design and alternatives development 
7. Cost-benefit analysis 
8. Implementation and enforcement 
9. Evaluation 
49. For example, mistaken fate-transport or epidemiological analyses can lead reg­
ulators to target the wrong cause of harm, whereas using a $20 million figure per value 
of life saved versus the actual community value of $2 million simply results in a stan­
dard being set ten times too high. 
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activities (such as using the wrong "values" in a cost-benefit 
calculation).50 
2. Structural Mismatches 
Environmental regimes also risk structural failure unless the regu­
lating entity adds up all the costs and benefits of a proposed policy. In 
particular, if some of the cost-bearers or beneficiaries of an environ­
mental action fall outside the borders of the regulating jurisdiction, their 
interests in the policy outcome may not be taken into account.51 When­
ever the scope of an environmental harm does not match the regulator 's 
jurisdiction, the cost-benefit calculus will be skewed and either too little 
or too much environmental protection will be provided. Chart B shows 
how structural mismatches can be broken down into four basic forms: 
(1) negative externalities; (2) positive externalities; (3) internalities; and 
( 4) potential takings. 
Negative externalities result when the jurisdiction of the regulating 
entity is too small and harms accrue beyond the boundaries of the regu­
lator. When such a mismatch occurs, and external harms are disre­
garded, the cost-benefit calculation undertaken by the regulator will un­
derstate the costs of the emissions, and underregulation (too much 
pollution) results. Transboundary pollution spillovers represent the clas­
sic negative externality. Positive externalities arise when an activity, 
such as protecting a tropical forest, produces benefits that accrue be­
yond the regulating jurisdiction.52 In this case, because the regulator ig­
nores the potential welfare gains of the extrajurisdictional beneficiaries, 
too little of the public good is provided. 
50. Specifically, although disputes over the value of a human life saved might 
range across an order of magnitude and although some value clashes might even rise to 
two orders of magnitude, scientific estimates (for example, the likelihood that a certain 
chemical exposure will cause harm) often vary by many orders of magnitude and may 
even result in "directional" errors. 
51. See, e.g., John B. Braden, The Economics of Environmental Policy-Making in 
a Multi-Level Government Structure, in RECENT ECONOMIC AND LEGAL DEVELOP­
MENTS IN EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 49-74 (Filip Abraham et al. eds., 
1995). 
52. Forests, for example, provide carbon sequestration benefits that reduce the risk 
of climate change across the entire planet In addition, many forests support biological 
diversity, which benefits all humankind. For a discussion of various kinds of positive 
externalities in the environmental context, see DANIEL C. EsTY, GREENING THE 
GA'IT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND THE FUTURE 125-26 (1994). 
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CHART B: STRUCTURAL MISMATCHES 
I. Negative Extemality 
II. Positive Extemality 
III. Intemality 
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When the jurisdiction is broader than the scope of the public good 
in question, internalities may arise because majoritarian voting denies 
an optimal level of public goods to a subjurisdiction.53 Such a mismatch 
arises, for example, if a neighborhood wants to build a park and is will­
ing to pay for it, but is voted down by the other citizens of the town 
who fear higher taxes.s4 Similarly, internalities arise if a subjurisdiction 
would opt out of acquiring a particular public good but is forced to pay 
for an unwanted level of environmental protection by a decision made 
at a higher level of government. An example of this type of structural 
mismatch would be a requirement that local water suppliers install na­
tionally specified drinking-water pollution controls.ss 
The fourth type of mismatch arises when the regulating entity pro­
vides benefits broadly but concentrates costs unfairly on a narrow 
group. Assuming that the cost-bearers have done nothing to justify a 
disproportionate burden, their property rights may be infringed.56 In­
deed, the problem of a potential taking is not a structural mismatch but 
rather a question of protecting property rights against majoritarian and 
utilitarian overreaching. 
Externalities and internalities could be dealt with by clarifying who 
holds the property rights if transaction costs were low and bargaining 
could be undertaken. If, however, transaction costs are high, then regu-
53. See Mancur Olson, Jr., Strategic Theory and Its Applications - The Principle 
of "Fiscal Equivalence": The Division of Responsibilities Among Different Levels of 
Government, 59 AM. EcoN. R.Ev. 479, 482 (1969) (observing that "intemalities" exist 
when a public good reaches only a subset of the population in a jurisdiction). As Olson 
notes: "In a situation of this type and a democratic political system with voting by ma­
jority rule, the provision of a collective good for a local area will hurt more people than 
it helps, even if Pareto optimality would have required that the collective good be pro­
duced." Id. 
54. My categories of regulatory failure obviously blur at the margins. For exam­
ple, the defeated park could be seen as a case in which local preferences diverge from 
those of the broader jurisdiction. The situation could also be seen as a public choice 
problem because the welfare loss arises from a disjunction between the wishes of those 
in the subjurisdiction and the policy program imposed on them from a higher level. But 
of those I call this a structural mismatch and instead reserve the public choice rubric for 
cases in which the problem arises not as a result of a jurisdictional misalignment be­
tween the scope of a public good and the boundaries of the regulating entity, but rather 
because of distortions in the translation of the public's desires into policy within a prop­
erly defined jurisdiction. 
55. See Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3 (1994). 
56. Seizing a private property owner's land to create a public park would, for ex­
ample, constitute a taking and require compensation under the Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution. Who should be compensated and by how much is, of course, a matter of 
considerable controversy. See, e.g., FISCHEL, supra note 19; Frank Michelman, Prop­
erty, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensa­
tion" Law, 80 HAR.v. L. REv. 1165 (1967); Rose, supra note 16. 
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lation is necessary and welfare maximization requires that the jurisdic­
tion of the regulating authority - or at least the scope of costs and ben­
efits factored into the regulatory calculus - be coterminous with the 
extent of the harm to be prevented or the good to be provided. To 
achieve optimality, externalities require some form of centralization and 
internalities require some degree of decentralization. 
In general, internalities will be easier to fix than externalities. Par­
tial devolution (a tax just on the neighborhood that will benefit from the 
park) can make the scope of the costs and benefits match. Although in­
ertia must be overcome, no one has to act against his own fundamental 
interests to achieve a solution. In contrast, internalizing externalities re­
quires getting outsiders to cooperate. Insofar as those groups that are 
externalizing costs or receiving positive spillovers currently enjoy 
something for free, they have no incentive to pay.57 For example, fertil­
izer use by Massachusetts farmers greatly affects the quality of water in 
the Connecticut River. Connecticut, however, has had little success in 
getting the upstream farmers to change their behavior. Not only does 
Connecticut have no direct authority over the Massachusetts polluters, 
but the upstream farmers also balk at bearing the costs of control - in 
reduced yields or higher fertilizer-application costs - when they will 
receive little benefit. Similarly, although Americans seem quite willing 
to insist that Brazil protect its rainforests, they are much less excited 
about paying for the biodiversity, oxygen production, carbon sequestra­
tion, and other conservation benefits that they receive from Brazil. 
The need for an overarching governmental response to externalities 
does not, of course, settle the question of what sort of regulatory regime 
should be put in place. One answer is a centralized regulatory system. 
But multijurisdictional spillovers also might be addressed by collabora­
tion among decentralized governments. Whether a collaborative regime 
rather than a centralized one will be sufficient to address the collective 
action problem turns on a number of factors: (1) the existence of com­
mon environmental norms; (2) the direction of the spillovers in ques­
tion; and (3) the ease with which property rights can be exchanged or 
vindicated. 58 
At the outset, collaboration depends on the existence of common 
environmental norms that make determinations about the boundaries of 
57. Unless, of course, the externalities go both ways, in which case today's winner 
may be tomorrow's loser. This changes the game to a prisoner's dilemma and provides 
sufficient reciprocity to support collective action solutions. 
58. The problem of getting optimal interjurisdictional environmental policy 
through collaboration mirrors the difficulty of using a common law approach to address 
environmental harms in the first place. See supra text accompanying notes 23-43. 
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property rights possible. Absent, for example, an agreed-upon standard 
of reasonableness in the nuisance context across the jurisdictions in 
question, there is no basis for deciding whether an extemality exists.59 
In the terminology of game theory, there is no zone of agreement 
among the parties. 
The direction of the flow of harms will also affect the likelihood of 
achieving effective interjurisdictional cooperative policies. If spillovers 
go both ways, each party has an incentive to collaborate in the pursuit 
of collective-action solutions that establish a workable control regime. A 
limits its emissions onto B so B will control its spillovers onto A. 
When, however, the flow of harms is substantially unidirectional, the 
problem takes on a zero-sum flavor that makes collaboration much 
more difficult. If the flow is always from A to B, why should A control 
its emissions? In such nonreciprocal cases, environmental norms clash 
with other norms in ways that may make collaboration more difficult. 
For example, if the pollution flows from the stronger to the weaker 
party, the tendency of the strong to advance its own self-interest may 
override its commitment to the control of transboundary environmental 
harms.60 The United States, for instance, long refused to acknowledge 
Canadian claims about acid rain. Of course, if the harm flows from the 
weaker party onto the stronger, the no-transboundary-pollution norm is 
more likely to hold because the power relationship reinforces the envi­
ronmental rules.61 
59. To see the importance of common norms, consider the difficulty of 9-etting 
China and the United States to agree on a unified approach to the problem of climate 
change. In the negotiations, the United States might declare that transboundary emis­
sions of greenhouse gases must be controlled or compensation paid. The United States 
might cite the longstanding common law of nuisance or the "no transboundary spill­
overs" norm embodied in Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration. The Chinese, however, 
will respond that the fundamental principle must be that poor nations should be allowed 
to do what they must to develop quickly. They might cite the law of necessity or the 
"right to develop" in the Rio Declaration in support for their norm. 
60. The commitment to vague norms, such as not allowing transboundary pollu­
tion harms, may break down in confrontation with the demands of self-interest. Indeed, 
in the environmental realm, where norms are often weak or ambiguous, normative dis­
sonance is a common problem. U.S. enthusiasm for the enforcement of a no-spillover 
rule in the international domain, for example, appears to have been tempered by the rec­
ognition that the United States is a major international net polluter. Interestingly, 
China's rapid economic rise and the accompanying increase in its transboundary emis­
sions may soon put the shoe on the other foot for the United States and convert Ameri­
cans into advocates for real enforcement of the no-transboundary-spillovers norm. 
61. The unidirectional flow may result in "too much" control because there is no 
prospect of the stronger party being saddled with excess costs when the circumstances 
are reversed. Thus, for instance, Mexico agreed to install scrubbers on a number of its 
power-generating stations along the U.S. border even though the plants complied fully 
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Finally, the possibility of interjurisdictional nonregulatory collabo­
ration depends on the presence of mechanisms both for the exchange of 
property rights and for their enforcement at relatively low cost. In par­
ticular, common tort and contract rules must exist or courts must be 
willing to execute judgments from other jurisdictions. Obviously, the 
prospects of establishing this sort of legal collaboration depend greatly 
on the relationship among the jurisdictions at issue. When the entities in 
question are U.S. states, strong links make interjurisdictional coordina­
tion conceivable. When the jurisdictions cross international lines, how­
ever, the transaction costs of case-by-case collaboration are likely to be 
much higher and the probability of making such a regime work corre­
spondingly lower. Although there might be a potential zone of agree­
ment between or among the parties, the cost of finding it may be 
prohibitive. 
Regulation, of course, does not eliminate these difficulties. But the 
shift to a more centralized policy regime facilitates negotiations by fo­
cusing on general principles and rules rather than on case-specific out­
comes. Because the parties do not know their precise future environ­
mental positions, the process benefits from something of a Rawlsian 
veil of ignorance that supports principled decisionmaking.62 
If spillovers from one jurisdiction to another represent a serious is­
sue, decentralized collaborative policy responses are likely to be subop­
timal for the same reasons that common law approaches to environmen­
tal problems do not work: high transaction costs and unclear property 
rights. Whenever we create multiple regulatory jurisdictions in an at­
tempt to better tailor policies to local needs and desires, our ability to 
limit transjurisdictional pollution to an efficient level and to protect 
property rights diminishes. At the very least, the gains from reduced in­
ternalities must be offset against the losses from increased externalities. 
Agreement on the principle that externalities generally justify some 
degree of regulatory centralization does not, however, solve the policy 
problem. There remains the issue of what sorts of externalities create 
structural failures and how best to respond to them. 
with Mexican environmental laws and the only violation was of U.S. visibility stan­
dards. See EsTY. supra note 52, at 187. 
62. See ROGER FISHER & WIT.LIAM URY, GETIING TO YES: NEGOTIATING 
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (1981) (spelling out the advantages of negotiating 
about principles rather than positions). Of course, in some cases the parties do know 
their specific future positions and thus will negotiate principles with their own needs in 
mind. For example, the Chinese government cannot be expected to negotiate rules about 
climate change that fail to reflect China's heavy dependence on coal. 
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a. Physical Spillovers. Transboundary pollution represents the par­
adigmatic extemality. The physicality of the spillover and the 'tangibility 
of the harm make vivid the potential threat to allocative efficiency and 
to property rights, and clearly justify regulation if transaction costs are 
high. The more widespread the physical risks posed by a given pollu­
tant, the larger the scope of governmental activity must be to account 
for every affected property interest. Thus, the extent of the externality 
- the harm caused or benefit provided - represents a critical determi­
nant of the scale of the optimal governmental response. To be structur­
ally adequate, an environmental policy must encompass the costs and 
benefits felt by all potential victims and cost-bearers.63 
b. Economic Externalities. While physical-pollution spillovers rep­
resent the classic extemality, structural issues do not arise solely from 
the physical reach of environmental harms.64 From a utility-maximizing 
perspective, parties suffering from economic65 or psychological spill­
overs also should have their interests factored into the regulatory 
calculus. For example, if a landowner allows industries located on her 
property to forego the use of costly pollution-reducing technologies, 
other landowners may be affected. Even if the resulting pollution does 
not spill onto their land, they face a choice between adopting a similar 
policy and suffering the environmental effects, or rejecting it and suffer­
ing potential competitiveness effects. The use of environmental re­
sources in the first instance has external economic effects on other par­
ties, even when no pollution actually travels.66 
63. This matching principle is widely accepted with regard to physical spillovers. 
See OLSON, supra note 4-0, at 48, 53-57 (noting that political boundaries must be coter­
minous with the scope of a public good to ensure optimal investment in the collective 
good); see also BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 8; Revesz, supra note 1, at 1250-53; 
Stewart, Pyramids, supra note 7. 
64. Stewart, for example, identifies three sorts of externalities beyond traditional 
pollution spillovers: resource externalities (for example, wasteful consumption of re­
sources by others), preservation externalities (for example, when resources consumed in 
one jurisdiction deprive others of "nonuse values" they might have enjoyed), and com­
petitiveness externalities (for example, when states set suboptimal environmental stan­
dards due to fears of job loss and industrial dislocation). See Richard B. Stewart Inter­
national Trade and the Environment: Lessons from the Federal Experience, 49 WASH 
& LEE L. REV. 1329, 134-0-41 (1992). 
65. See EsTY, supra note 52; infra note 134 (explaining that the main impact of 
the race to the bottom is on the environmental policymaking dynamic and not on indus­
try competitiveness per se). 
66. Indeed, it was problems of this sort that motivated the first U.S. federal envi­
ronmental laws. Specifically, Senator Ed Muskie feared that Maine pulp mills, which 
were subject to relatively stringent environmental controls, might suffer in competition 
with mills in the less rigorously regulated West. See Esrr, supra note 52, at 22, for a 
legislative history of these competitiveness arguments. 
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Some commentators argue that such economic externalities are 
somehow less "real" than physical spillovers. Revesz, for instance, 
makes a theoretical distinction between "technological (or real)" exter­
nalities, such as pollution from an upwind state, and "pecuniary exter­
nalities," in which "one individual's decisions affect the financial cir­
cumstances of the other, but there is no misallocation of resources. "67 
When an increase in the number of shoes demanded increases the price 
of leather and thus affects the welfare of handbag buyers, Revesz argues 
that there is no real externality present. He claims that this is simply a 
market-clearing mechanism which is by definition welfare-optimizing, 
assuming a free market for leather, shoes, and handbags. Nevertheless, 
a range of real externalities exists that goes beyond physical pollution 
spillovers. 68 
Many pollution-control or resource-use decisions have economic 
impacts that cannot be dismissed simply as a function of welfare­
enhancing resource reallocation. California's adoption of auto emissions 
standards that exceed national requirements may reflect the fact that 
Californians stand to benefit greatly from lower emissions and to pay 
relatively little of the extra pollution control costs that will be borne 
largely by out-of-state automakers.69 In this case, there is no market 
mechanism to ensure that California's action is nationally welfare­
enhancing. Californians may pay part of the bill for their more stringent 
pollution controls through higher prices for cars, but consumers else­
where may also be forced to pay increased prices, essentially subsi­
dizing California's reduced-pollution benefits.70 In particular, we have 
no guarantee that the benefits to California outweigh the sum of the 
costs imposed both inside and outside of California. An excessively 
narrow understanding of "real" externalities, such as that provided by 
Revesz, misses such cases.71 
c. Psychological Externalities: The "Choice of Public" Issue. In 
some cases, the harm suffered by people beyond the borders of the reg-
67. Revesz, supra note 1, at 1223. In support of this distinction, see BAUMOL & 
OATES, supra note 8, at 21-23, 155-234. 
68. See Stewart, supra note 64, at 1340-41. 
69. See E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Fed­
eralization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. EcoN. & 0RG. 313 (1985). 
70. If the extra price for the "California car" were fully borne by Californians -
that is, internalized - there would be no efficiency problem, but given national market­
ing progrants and other constraints, automakers end up selling California cars at a 
discount 
71. For further arguments defining various types of economic spillovers, see Steve 
Chamovitz, Trade Measures and the Design of International Regimes, 5 J. ENVT. & 
DEV. 153 (1996). 
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ulating jurisdiction is neither physical nor economic, but rather is psy­
chological.72 Americans deplore the killing of whales in international 
waters. Europeans,. in large numbers, express outrage at the use of pain­
ful leghold traps to capture beaver and mink for furs. The welfare loss 
in these cases is undeniable. The question is whether those suffering the 
harm have a legitimate interest in the policy decision made elsewhere. 
More precisely, do they have a right to have their feelings factored into 
the policy calculus? 
Whether an extemality exists, and thus whether a regulatory pro­
cess that disregards psychological harms has failed structurally, depends 
on the reach of the property rights in question.73 If those with legitimate 
claims are ignored, the regulatory calculus will be off-kilter.74 In the 
case of public goods or resources, the question of legitimate interests 
and thus of "missing voices" among those with property rights may be 
even murkier. If a public resource belongs to us and is to be managed in 
our interests, who is "us"? 
Frequently the boundaries of an environmental resource are not 
fixed. Who, for example, holds legitimate interests vis-a-vis the Grand 
Canyon? Even if we accept that an environmental resource must be, or 
should be, publicly held and managed, there remains an issue about the 
proper management entity. Part of the current environmental contro­
versy in the United States centers not only on whether public lands and 
other environmental resources should be owned and managed privately 
as opposed to by the government, but also on the appropriate scope of 
the decisionmaking community.75 Resource managers could represent: 
72. See Richard Blackhurst & Arvind Subramanian, Promoting Multilateral Coop­
eration on the Environment, in THE GREENING OF WORLD TRADE ISSUES 247 (Kym 
Anderson & Richard Blackhurst eds., 1992); Walter PJ. Wils, Subsidiarity and EC En­
vironmental Policy: Taking People's Concerns Seriously, 6 J. ENVI'L. L. 85 (1994). 
73. Permitting unusual or irrational psychological harms to drive regulatory policy 
seems especially troubling. Beyond the property rights issue, such concerns reflect a 
fear that our regulatory decisions might be distorted by inaccurate data on psychological 
harms and a worry that psychological harms might be overstated. Indeed, without a 
"willingness to pay" mechanism to check the reality and depth of such harms, there ex­
ists a moral hazard problem of potentially significant proportions because those claim­
ing injury have little reason to report accurately on their welfare losses and much reason 
to exaggerate. Nevertheless, as Michael Gerrard notes, while fears of living near a haz­
ardous waste dump or a nuclear waste depository may be irrational, the disutility is real. 
See MICHAEL B. GERRARD, WHOSE BACKYARD, WHOSE RISK 100-07 (1994). 
74. See JOHN D. GRAHAM & JONATHAN BAERT WIENER, RISK VERSUS RISK 
230-32 (1995) (discussing the similar problem of "omitted voices" in risk analyses). 
75. Another issue is the decisionmaker's location. Some of the current public­
lands management concern reflects dissatisfaction with the concentration of day-to-day 
decisionmaking in Washington, D.C., and a belief that it would be better undertaken by 
those "on the scene." But decentralizing control to avoid micromanagement from 
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(1) the narrow class of citizens who physically use the resource; (2) 
members of the town in which the common property is located; (3) the 
citizens of the state; or ( 4) the entire country. 
Community identity is fixed in neither time nor space. Given the 
threshold effects and lag times that characterize many resource-use and 
environmental problems, the temporal dimension of environmental pro­
tection is often significant. Some of the CFCs released into the atmos­
phere in the 1980s still will be eating away the ozone layer at the end 
of the twenty-first century. Present generations may ignore or discount 
growing public health or ecological harms at the expense of future gen­
erations. 76 Spatial extensions of our sense of community also may be 
important in light of ever broader transportation networks and commu­
nication systems. People today live and work in different communities 
and sometimes even different states or countries. In addition, the mobil­
ity of society means that many people have friends, relatives, and im­
portant ties to places quite removed from their immediate surroundings. 
Moreover, many people live in several communities, states, and even 
countries over the course of their lives. All of these dimensions of mo­
bility create an expanded sense of community and therefore of political 
identity.77 As a result, "we" become "they," and vice versa. Media 
coverage of environmental news, which is increasingly national or even 
international, further expands political identity.78 
Washington and to ensure that federal authorities coordinate with state and local offi­
cials should not be confused with having central government resources managed for the 
benefit of the state in which they happen to be located. Just as federal money in New 
York banks is managed for the benefit of the national treasury and not for the welfare of 
New Yorkers, federal lands should be managed for the American public at large. As a 
separate matter, one might consider selling federal lands that do not have national 
significance. 
76. Thus, in some cases, as Edith Brown Weiss and other commentators have 
noted, the relevant political constituency should be expanded to include future genera­
tions. See EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTER­
NATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 
(1989). The problem arises because bequest motives may not be strong enough to en­
sure that the current populace adequately represents the interests of future generations. 
See, e.g., Peter A. Diamond, A Framework for Social Security Analysis, 8 J. PuB. 
EcoN. 275 (1977). But see Harold P. Green, Legal Aspects of Intergenerational Equity 
Issues, in EQUITY ISSUES IN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT 189 (Roger E. 
Dasperson ed., 1983) (arguing that the absolutism of some laws overvalues the future). 
77. My argument is not that people should be more "communitarian," but simply 
that they, as a matter of fact, perceive themselves to be part of various communities. 
See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A 
PuBLIC PHILoSOPHY (1996); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS 
OF JUSTICE 59-65 (1982). 
78. See Daphne Abeel, Ideas, The Media, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 7, 
1984, at 34; James R. Campbell, Newspapers: The Battle for Tzme, UNITED PREss 
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The relevant political community is not, of course, inexorably ex­
panding. Individuals' sense of community and political identity can 
shrink as well as expand. The claims of some self-styled constituents 
may be rejected by others as the views of outsiders. Furthermore, "dis­
tant" parties should not necessarily see th�ir preferences prevail. It is 
clear, however, that in environmental policymaking, the sphere of af­
fected interests may expand or contract depending on an evolving defi­
nition of community. Moreover, these two considerations intertwine: as 
more externalities or internalities are perceived, political identity may 
change accordingly; and as political identity changes, new structural in­
adequacies may come to light. In attempting to maximize environmental 
social welfare, we should be careful not to conclude too hastily that we 
know the precise boundaries of the appropriate community and thus 
whose costs and benefits should "count." 
3. Public Choice Problems 
Added to the problem of the right "choice of public" is the prob­
lem of public choice. The two issues are conceptually distinct. The for­
mer is essentially a matter of clarifying whose interests should count in 
the regulatory process. The latter, however, may exist even though the 
choice of public issue has been resolved, correctly or otherwise. Opti­
mal regulation depends on the public's political preferences being faith­
fully and accurately translated into policy outcomes. 
Environmental regulation has several features that generate public 
choice issues. Notably, the costs of environmental regulation are gener­
ally more concentrated and tangible than the benefits.79 Costs are often 
borne by particular industries or enterprises, and are translated readily 
into monetary terms. Benefits, however, accrue to the general public in 
!NTL., Apr. 24, 1989; Tom Curley, One Million New Readers Added in 1989, USA TO­
DAY, Jan. 8, 1990, at 13A. 
79. This asymmetry has long been recognized. See JAMES BUCHANAN & 
GORDON TuLLoCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); Bruce Ackerman, Beyond 
Carolene Products, 98 HAR.v. L. REv. 713, 723-26 (1985) (obseiving the advantage 
concentrated interests have over diffuse ones); see also Roger G. Noll, Economic Per­
spectives on the Politics of Regulation, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZA­
TION 1265 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Wtllig eds., 1989) (stating that "large, 
heterogeneous groups with relatively small per capita stakes . . .  will be disadvantaged 
relative to small, homogeneous groups with high per capita stakes"). When the reverse 
is true - that is, the benefits of controls are concentrated and the costs diffuse - the 
opposite public choice problem, a NIMBY ("not in my backyard") situation, may arise, 
resulting in systematic overregulation. See, e.g., James T. Hamilton, Missing the 
Mark(et) in Siting Hazardous Waste Facilities, 1 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL. F. 1 1  
(1991). 
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ways that are hard to discern and monetize. 80 These asymmetries in in­
fonnation and the concentration of regulatory costs and benefits may 
give rise to asymmetries of political activity and influence between pol­
luters and pollutees or between common-resource users and the public 
owners of these resources. 81 Because these asymmetries may be more 
significant at the state and local levels, 82 decentralization may represent 
a strategy to advance deregulation for the benefit of certain special 
interests. 83 
For most people, moreover, environmental quality comprises only 
a limited dimension of their welfare. Economic prosperity and material 
well-being are far more important determinants of their quality of life. 
Thus, few people vote or choose where to live on the basis of environ­
mental factors alone.84 The resulting "bundling" of issues at election 
time works against the seamless translation of the public's environmen­
tal views into environmental policy. 85 In addition, unlike taxing and 
spending decisions and the issues in some other regulatory domains, the 
public has a hard time discerning its own interests in the environmental 
realm. Simply put, people can tell if the roads or schools are meeting 
their needs, but they cannot assess the adequacy of a residue standard of 
seven parts per million for the pesticide EBDC. The more uncertain, 
technically complex, and nonintuitive the policy choice, and the greater 
the difficulty in reducing the decision to easily understood dollar tenns, 
the higher the risk of special interest distortions. 
80. Thus, the technical complexity and inherent uncertainty of environmental regu­
lation, see supra text accompanying notes 28-30, intersects with public choice problems 
to create additional regulatory failures. The particular obscurity of the political process 
in the environmental domain creates an especially wide opening for special interest in­
tervention and distortion of the regulatory process. 
81.  See Daniel A. Farber, Economic Analysis and Just Compensation, 12 INTI..  
REv. L. & EcoN. 125, 130-31 (1992) (noting that landowners have greater power than 
the public at large). 
82. See Stewart, Pyramids, supra note 7, at 1213; see also Warren L. Ratliff, The 
De-Evolution of Environmental Organization, J. LAND, REs,. & ENVTL. L. (forthcom­
ing 1997). 
83. See, e.g., ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 7, at 159-73 (arguing that the decen­
tralization thrust in the Reagan Administration represented no grand theory of optimal 
regulation but rather a simple desire to help business interests). 
84. See Joseph Kalt & Mark Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory 
of Politics, 14 AM. EcoN. REv. 279, 281-85 (1984); see also Noll, supra note 79, at 
1270-72. 
85. Bundling of issues tends to dilute the impact of any one issue. See, e.g., James 
D. Gwartney & Richard E. Wagner, Public Choice and the Conduct of Representative 
Government, in PUBLIC CHOICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 3, 10, 19 
(James D. Gwartney & Richard E. Wagner eds., 1988); Robert D. Tollison, Rent Seek­
ing: A Survey, 35 KYKLOs 575, 594 (1982). 
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The threshold effects and time lags associated with pollution exac­
erbate these problems. Governmental officials rarely are eager to pay 
the political price for spending money today to fix a problem that will 
emerge, if at all, at some future date. From a politician's perspective, 
there is little incentive to impose costly controls on greenhouse gas 
emissions that must be borne today when the benefits will not show up 
until 2050,86 let alone in time to claim credit in the next election two or 
four years hence. 87 When pollutants have very long lifetimes, 88 in­
tergenerational equity and additional public choice issues emerge. 
In sum, environmental protection involves a wide range of 
problems demanding an equally diverse set of response strategies. Ar­
guments that decentralization or any other "silver bullet" environmen­
tal reform might set us on the right course misapprehend the nature of 
the policy challenge.89 Environmental problems are complicated and 
messy, as are the best solutions. 
II. DECENTRALIZATION VS. CENTRALIZATION: THE DEBATE To 
DATE 
This Part identifies the origins and current state of the environmen­
tal federalism debate. Section II.A traces the development of centralized 
environmental regulatory initiatives and of the arguments marshaled in 
their support. Section Il.B discusses the second-generation response to 
centralized environmental regulation and examines the five core second­
generation arguments in support of decentralization. 
86. Of course, how sigruficant the problem of climate change will prove to be re­
mains uncertain and thus creates a further reason for politicians to disregard the 
problem. 
87. Jn economic terms, politicians have a high discount rate. The difference be­
tween the discount rates of the public and of political leaders is one of the systemic 
public choice problems associated with environmental regulations. See, e.g., W. Kip 
Viscusi, Equivalent Frames of Reference for Judging Risk Regulation Policies, 3 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. LJ. 431 ,  437 (1995) (arguing that the time lag between asbestos regulation and 
benefits "substantially reduce[s] . . . value and the relative attractiveness of the 
regulation"). 
88. Some CFCs and greenhouse gases persist in the atmosphere for hundreds of 
years, and radioactive wastes may be harmful for thousands of years. See, e.g., Owen 
Davies, Air Repair, OMNI, June 1993, at 62, 94; A.R. Ravishankara et al., Atmospheric 
Lifetimes of Long-Lived Halogenated Species, 259 SCIENCE 194 (1993). 
89. To the academic reader, this point may seem banal. But this article is written 
against the backdrop of a political debate over the proper locus for environmental regu­
lation in which some of the loudest voices are calling, without nuance, for total decen­
tralization. See, e.g., GINGRICH, supra note 1,  at 9 ("We must replace our centralized, 
micromanaged, Washington-based bureaucracy with a dramatically decentralized system 
• • • .  "); see also H.R. 473-480, 104th Cong. (1995) (legislation sponsored by Congress­
man Tom DeLay abolishing wholesale Federal Clean Air regulation). 
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A. First-Generation Thinking: The Development of and Arguments 
for Centralization 
Until quite recently, the banns that accrued from air and water pol­
lution were addressed not by environmental regulation but through the 
most decentralized of control mechanisms: nuisance law.90 Beginning in 
the 1880s and 1890s, a number of cities, including Chicago, New York, 
and Pittsburgh, adopted "smoke abatement" ordinances.91 Garbage 
dumping also became subject to local regulation. 92 These early attempts 
at environmental regulation reflected the recognition that common law 
private nuisance actions could not respond efficiently to the pollution 
problems of an industrial society.93 
Although some states adopted air and water pollution laws as early 
as the end of the nineteenth century, state regulation of environmental 
problems did not begin in earnest until the post-World War Il indus­
trial boom.94 The state regulatory efforts of the 1950s and 1960s, how­
ever, did little to stem the flow of pollution,95 and by the mid-60s, the 
90. Tort-law based, case-by-case, pollution-harm determinations made through pri­
vate nuisance lawsuits represent the ultimate decentralization of "regulation." See, e.g., 
Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 83 S.W. 658 (1904); St Helen's 
Smelting Co. v. Tipping, 35 L.G.Q.B. 66, 1 1  H.L. Cas. 642, 13 Wkly. Rep. 1083 
( 1865); Aldred's Case, 9 Co. Rep. 57 b., 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B. 1611). Public nuisance 
cases involving states rather than individuals represent the first step toward centraliza­
tion of the response to environmental harms. See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 
U.S. 230 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906). 
91. See ROBERT v. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, 
SCIENCE, AND POLICY 103-04 (1992); Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., A Century of Air Pollu­
tion Control Law: What's Worked; What's Failed; What Might Work, 21 ENVTI..  L. 
1549, 1516 ( 1991). 
92. See MARTIN v. MELOSI, GARBAGE IN THE CITIES: REFUSE, REFORM AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT, 1880-1980 (1981); Christopher Niemczewski, The History of 
Solid Waste Management, in THE ORGANIZATION AND EFFICIENCY OF SOLID 
WASTE MANAGEMENT (Emanuel S. Saras ed., 1977). 
93. The difficulty with reliance upon tort remedies as a pollution control strategy 
was remarked upon as early at 1862 by the British House of Lords Select Committee on 
Injury From Noxious Vapours, which noted: "partly in consequence of the expense such 
actions occasion, partly from the fact that where several works are in immediate juxta­
position, the difficulty of tracing the damage to · any one, or of apportioning it among 
several, is [so] great as to be all but insuperable." HousE OF LoRDs SELECT CoMM. 
ON INJURY FROM NOXIOUS v APOURS, 1862 REPORT v (1862), reprinted in [1862) 
14 Parl. Papers l, 3, quoted in Joel Franklin Brenner, Nuisance Law and the Industrial 
Revolution, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 403, 425 (1974). 
94. Oregon created the first state environmental (air pollution control) agency in 
1952. In 1955, the California legislature charged the State Department of Public Health 
with establishing air pollution standards. See Health & Safety Code, ch. 1312, sec. 1, 
§ 425, 1955 Cal. Stat 2385, repealed by ch. 1545, § 1, 1967 Cal. Stat 3679. 
95. See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, NATIONAL AIR POLLUTION 
TRENDS, 1900-1992, at ES-4 (1993) [hereinafter EPA]. 
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demand for more centralized regulation was growing.96 In 1963, Con­
gress adopted the first Clean Air Act,97 authorizing the Secretary of the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, as it was then called, to 
establish advisory air quality "criteria" and to convene "conferences" 
when interstate pollution endangered public health or welfare.98 Simi­
larly, the Water Quality Act of 1965 required states to adopt federally 
approved water quality standards for any body of water that moved 
across state boundaries.99 
These federal efforts to support and prod state-level environmental 
regulation produced unsatisfactory results. Air and water quality around 
the country continued to deteriorate.100 Congressional hearings in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s spelled out three broad reasons for further 
centralizing environmental regulation: interstate spillovers of pollu­
tion; 101 the poor performance of states as environmental regulators; 102 
96. The first federal environmental programs tended simply to support state regu­
lation. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 
Stat 1155 (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1995 & Supp. 1996)) (supporting re­
search on water pollution and providing grants to states to support water pollution con­
trol programs); Air Pollution Control Act of 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat 322 
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1995)) (providing funds for research and technical 
assistance to states); Motor Vehicle Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-493, 74 Stat 162 (fed­
eral research into air pollution from automobiles); Tom Jorling, The Federal Law of Air 
Pollution Control, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1058 (Erica L. Golgin & 
Thomas G.P. Guilbert eds., 1974); Percival, supra note 5, at 1155-57. 
97. Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat 392 (1963) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994)). 
· 
98. See Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat 392, 395-96 (1963) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994)). 
99. See Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (codified at 
33 U.S.C. § 466, transferred to §§ 1151-1160, and subsequently omitted by Pub. L. No. 
92-500, § 2, 86 Stat 816 (1972)). 
100. See EPA. supra note 95; JOHN C. EsPosrro, VANISlilNG Am 1 18-51 
(1970); Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing Imperative (But Only from a National Per­
spective) for Federal Environmental Regulation, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POLY. F. (forth­
coming 1997); see also Frank J. Barry, The Evolution of the Enforcement Provisions of 
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act: A Study of the Difficulty in Developing Effec­
tive Legislation, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1 103 (1970). 
101. See, e.g., Air Pollution, 1967: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Air and 
Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 90th Cong. 993 (1967) (testi­
mony of Lewis C. Green of the Missouri Air Conservation Commission): 
[A]ir pollution is a problem that rarely falls within ready-made political bounda­
ries. In any metropolitan area both the social costs incurred in failing to control it 
and the benefits to be derived from regulation within a single political subdivi­
sion inevitably spill over into other jurisdictions . . . .  The necessity for . . .  uni­
formity is rather generally agreed upon. 
Many other similar remarks can be found in the environmental hearing reports of the 
1960s and 1970s. 
102. See, �.g., id. at 796 (statement of Dr. Ivan L. Bennett, Jr., Deputy Director 
Office of Science and Technology, Executive Office of the President) ("[f]he states 
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and interstate competitiveness effects arising from differing environ­
mental standards.103 Based on the Congressional consensus established 
on these points, the Clean Air Act of 1970104 and the Clean Water Act 
of 1972105 shifted the center of gravity for environmental regulation 
from the states to the federal government. Additional federal statutes 
followed: the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, 106 
the 1974 Safe Drinking Water Act107, the 1976 Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act, 108 and the 1980 Comprehensive Environmental Re­
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act.109 
Other forces also spurred centralization. Elliott, Ackerman, and 
Millian suggest, for example, that the federalization of environmental 
law may have reflected industry preferences for unified national stan­
dards that would preempt varying state requirements.110 Rose-Ackerman 
identifies additional strategic incentives facing a number of actors who 
supported centralized environmental regulation over disjointed state 
processes.1 1 1  Finally, presidential politics - the positioning of the Sen­
ate's leading environmentalist, Ed Muskie of Maine, as a challenger to 
simply have not moved . • . . ff]he incentive of matching grants has not succeeded in 
bringing about the results that it had been hoped would be achieved."). The suggestion 
that states might choose low environmental standards as a matter of policy was not rec­
ognized at all. 
103. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 91-1196 (1970); Air Pollution, 1970: Hearing on 
S.3229, S.3466, S.3546 Before the Senate Subcomm. 'on Air and Water Pollution of the 
Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong. 487 (1970). Rep. Abner J. Mikva of Illinois 
observed, for example, that "[w]hen states are competing daily to attract new industry, 
it is unrealistic to expect that strict enforcement of antipollution regulations - which 
imposes fmancial burdens sometimes higher than taxes themselves - will occur." Air 
Pollution Control and Solid Wastes Recycling: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Public 
Health and Welfare of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st 
Cong. 487 (1970); see also BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 8, at 14-35; Revesz, supra 
note 1.  
104. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat 1676 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1994)). 
105. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat 816 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1994)). 
106. Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat 973 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-
136y (1994)). 
107. Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (codified as amended at 40 U.S.C. 
§§ 300f-300j (1994)). 
108. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1994)). 
109. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994)). 
1 10. See Elliott et al., supra note 69, at 326-27. 
1 11 .  See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Does Federalism Matter? Political Choice in a 
Federal Republic, 89 J. POL. EcoN. 152 (1981); see also Jerry L. Mashaw & Susan 
Rose-Ackerman, Federalism and Regulation, in THE REAGAN REGULATORY STRAT­
EGY 111 ,  122-27, 133-36 (George C. Eads & Michael Fix eds., 1984). 
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President Richard Nixon in 1972 - helped to ensure that a strong fed­
eral Clean Air Act moved through the Congress.112 
The legal literature caught up with the centralization policy trend 
in 1977 with the publication of two seminal articles by Richard Stew­
art.113 Stewart identified four core rationales for centralized environmen­
tal law: (1) to address the tragedy of the commons and achieve national 
economies of scale; (2) to overcome disparities in effective political 
representation; (3) to correct market failures arising from pollution ex­
ternalities (including physical, "psychic," and economic spillovers); 
and ( 4) to obtain the advantages of pursuing moral ideals and the 
"politics of sacrifice" on a national plane.114 
Stewart's argument begins with the prisoners' dilemma dynamic,115 
now better known in the environmental context as the "race to the bot­
tom." He observes as follows: 
Given the mobility of industry and commerce, any individual state or 
community may rationally decline unilaterally to adopt high environmen­
tal standards that entail substantial costs for industry and obstacles to ec­
onomic development for fear that the resulting environmental gains 
would be more than offset by the movement of capital to other areas with 
lower standards.116 
The tendency not to adopt strict environmental controls or to move 
toward lax environmental requirements derives from the fact that gov­
ernments act strategically. Regulators and the politicians who appoint 
them perceive that by cutting environmental standards and stealing a 
march on other jurisdictions in the competition for new investment, 
1 12. See Elliott et al., supra note 69, at 327-28. 
1 13. See Stewart, Pyramids, supra note 7; Stewart, Development, supra note 7. 
Debates over how much to centralize or decentralize government activity in general go 
back much further, particularly in political science literature. See ALExls DE 
ToCQUEVD..LE. DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 163 (Phillips Bradley ed., Henry Reeve & 
Francis Bowen trans., Alfred A. Knopf 1945) (1835) (comparing governance of "cen­
tralized nations" and "confederations"); PAUL E. PETERSON ET AL.. WHEN FEDER­
ALISM WORKS 1-7 (1986); see also ROBERT A DAHL & CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, 
PoLmcs. EcoNoMics AND WELFARE (1953); PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS 3-
38, 66-92 (1981); James Fesler, Centralization and Decentralization, in 2 INTERNA­
TIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 370 (David L. Sills ed., 1968); 
Grodzins, supra note 5; Scheiber, supra note 4. 
1 14. See Stewart, Pyramids, supra note 7, at 1211-19. 
1 15. For more on this dynamic, see Mashaw & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 1 1 1 ,  
at 1 17-18; see also Scott Barrett, Strategic Environmental Policy and International 
Trade, 54 J. PuB. EcoN. 325 (1994) [hereinafter Barrett, Strategic Environmental Pol­
icy]; Scott Barrett, Strategy and Environment, 27 CoLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 202 (1992) 
[hereinafter Barrett, Strategy and Environment]. For a general discussion of prisoners' 
dilemmas and strategic behavior, see DDOT & NALEBUFF, supra note 31.  
1 16. Stewart, Pyramids, supra note 7, at 1212. 
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jobs, and industrial activity, they will increase their constituents' wel­
fare by more than the utility losses inflicted by whatever environmental 
degradation occurs. The knowledge that one's competitors intend to 
lower or already have lowered environmental standards induces parties 
to act preemptively or responsively and to lower their own standards, 
triggering a downward regulatory spiral and nonoptimal results.117 Stew­
art recognizes that national environmental laws facilitate the collective 
action necessary to escape from this race. 118 While parties theoretically 
can negotiate their way out of this prisoner's dilemma, the nature of en­
vironmental problems, involving "recurring technically complex is­
sues," makes ad hoc welfare-optimizing compacts among competing ju­
risdictions improbable and centralized regulation cost-effective.1 19 
Stewart's second focus is the disjunction between the political 
power of polluters and environmental interests.120 He notes that environ­
mental advocates who try to rally the public in support of relatively dif­
fuse and obscure benefits experience difficulty in achieving a critical 
threshold of political activity and influence at local or state levels, 121 
and are more often able to aggregate sufficient resources to be effective 
at the national level.122 Whether an asymmetry of political power be- . 
1 17. The race to the bottom represents a structural failure insofar as competition 
among jurisdictions creates economic externalities. Stewart also folds into his first point 
a discussion of economies of scale in regulatory activities that tracks my technical inad­
equacy category. See id. 
1 18. See id.; see also Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Law in a Global Era: 
Progress, Deregulatory Change, and the Rise of the Administrative Presidency, 73 COR­
NELL L. REv. 1 101, 1 194 (1988); Wtlliam W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regula­
tory Competition, Regulatory Capture, and Corporate Self-regulation, 73 N.C. L. Rav. 
1861 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. 
RBv. 421, 505 (1987); Roger van den Bergh et al., The Subsidiarity Principle in Euro­
pean Environmental Law: An Economic Analysis 20-24 (1995) (paper prepared for 
Conference on the Law and Economics of the Environment at the Norwegian Academy 
of Science and Letters, on ftle with author) (providing European examples of this 
phenomenon). 
1 19. See Stewart, Pyramids, supra note 7, at 1212. As suggested earlier, Coase 
demonstrates that absent transactions costs, efficient outcomes can be negotiated. See 
Coase, supra note 18. 
120. See Stewart, Pyramids, supra note 7, at 1213; see also supra text accompany­
ing notes 79-89. This is the public choice problem in my taxonomy. 
121. See Stewart, Development, supra note 7, at 747. 
122. See, e.g., PHILLIP SHABECOFF, A FIERCE GREEN FIRE 279 (1993). This 
perceived imbalance has deep roots. Nearly a century ago, Gifford Pinchot, President 
Theodore Roosevelt's first director of the National Forest Service, decried the "special 
interests" operating in the political realm that threatened to "nullify the will of the ma­
jority" with regard to conservation and environmental policy. See id,· see also BRUCE 
A ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN CoALIDmTY Am (1981); J. CLAR­
ENCE DAVIES ill & BARBARA S. DAVIES, THE POLITICS OF POLLUTION (1975); 
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. 
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tween environmental and polluting interests continues to exist, and 
more important, whether this asymmetry is greater at the local or state 
level than at the national level, remains an issue today. 
Stewart's third point concerns the widely recognized market failure 
associated with pollution extemalities.123 His final rationale builds on 
the claim that it is easier to carry out policies aimed at establishing 
overarching moral principles on a national level than a state or local 
one. He argues that the fundamental moral obligations of one citizen to 
another and to future generations must be defined nationally and em­
bodied in federal law.124 
B. Second-Generation Thinking: Rationales for Decentralization 
From nearly the day that the ink was dry on Stewart's arguments 
justifying federal environmental regulation, the tides of political think­
ing and legal scholarship have run the other way.125 This second­
generation thinking126 centers on five arguments for decentralization: (1) 
the benefits of diversity and diseconomies of regulatory scale; (2) argu­
ments for regulatory competition and against race-to-the-bottom fears; 
(3) public choice claims regarding the representativeness of decentral­
ized decisionmaking; ( 4) rejection of morality-based arguments for fed­
eral regulation; and (5) an implicit assumption that transboundary pollu­
tion spillovers are insignificant.127 
RE.v. 1669, 1684-87, 1713-15 (1975); Peter H. Schuck, The Politics of Regulation, 90 
YALE LJ. 702 (1981) (book review). 
123. This third line of analysis, concerning physical externalities, would be a mat­
ter of structural failure in my regulatory failure taxonomy. 
124. Just as the advancement of civil rights required federal action, so too does 
environmental progress. Stewart specifically observes that citizens seem more willing to 
make sacrifices for unquantifiable gains if they know that others are doing the same, an 
observation that might support federal policymaking in various environmental areas. See 
Stewart, Pyramids, supra· note 7, at 1264-65. In some respects, Stewart's pyramids-of­
sacrifice argument resembles the "choice of public" question and thus represents a mat­
ter of psychological externalities raising the possibility of structural deficiencies in the 
regulatory regime. 
125. Actually, the decentralization arguments predate Professor Stewart. The semi­
nal article in this field is that of Tiebout, supra note 8. 
126. See supra note 12; see also Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II - Lo­
calism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. RE.v. 346 (1990); Frank H. Easterbrook, Anti­
trust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 23, 33-35 (1983). For a recent 
discussion, see David L. Markell, States as Innovators: It's time for a New Look to Our 
"Laboratories of Democracy" in the Effort to Improve Our Approach to Environmental 
Regulation, 58 ALB. L. REV. 347 (1994). 
127. Although asserted vigorously in political circles, constitutional arguments 
about the limits of U.S. federal regulatory authority bear little on the normative question 
of the best level at which to regulate environmental problems so as to maximize social 
welfare. Moreover, the constitutional polemics have been aired sufficiently elsewhere 
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1. The Benefits of Diversity 
The diversity argument for decentralized regulation represents a 
rich vein in popular and academic analyses of U.S. federalism. The ar­
gument has two separable strands. First, courts, 128 scholars, 129 and politi­
cians130 have long trumpeted the opportunities for regulatory innovation 
provided by the "states as laboratories." A decentralized regulatory 
strategy permits the simultaneous testing of various policy responses.131 
In particular, if the central policy issue is one of regulatory design, the 
opportunity to experiment using state regulatory structures may be espe­
cially welfare enhancing. Second, economics teaches that when environ­
mental background conditions, emissions levels, climate, weather, risk 
and thus will not be dealt with in this article. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 
1624 (1995); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); Na­
tional League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Stewart, Development, supra 
note 7, at 750-56; Stewart, Pyramids, supra note 7; see a/so Akhil Reed Amar, Five 
Views of Federalism: "Converse 1983" in Context, 47 V AND. L. RBv. 1229 (1994); 
Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 CoLUM. L. REV. 1911 
(1995); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Elastic Commerce Clause: A Po­
litical Theory of American Federalism, 47 V AND. L. RBv. 1355 (1994). 
128. See Federal Energy Regulatory Commn. v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788-91 
(1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Connecticut Light & 
Power Co. v. Federal Power Commn., 324 U.S. 515, 530 (1945); New State Ice Co. v. 
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 313 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is one of the happy 
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, 
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments . . • .  "). 
129. See, e.g., FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PuBuc AND ITS GOVERNMENT 49-
50 (1930) ("[O]ur federalism calls for the free play of local diversity in dealing with lo­
cal problems"); see also Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal 
Law, 54 COLUM. L. RBv. 489, 493 (1954). For a more recent discussion, see Markell, 
supra note 126. 
130. As a political argument, decentralization emerged with considerable vigor in 
the "new federalism" of the Reagan administration. See Ronald Reagan, Inaugural Ad­
dress (Jan. 20, 1981), in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE 
UNITED STATES, s. Doc. No. 101-10, at 331 (1989); Exec. Order No. 12,612, 3 C.F.R. 
252 (1987); Gray, supra note 4; see also THE REAGAN REGULATORY STRATEGY, 
supra note 1 1 1. It has had new life breathed into it with the election of a Republican 
Congress in 1994. See GINGRICH, supra note 1, at 9. The very similar arguments for 
"subsidiarity" in the European Union represent the same political thrust. See George A. 
Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and 
the United States, 94 CoLUM. L. RBv. 331 (1994); Trachtman, supra note 3, at 460-63; 
W. Gary Vause, The Subsidiarity Principle in European Union-American Federalism 
Compared, 27 CASE W. RES. J. INTL. L. 61 (1995). 
131. Diversity also might be seen as nature's approach to problem solving. Biolo­
gists often observe that natural systems develop competing approaches to problems with 
preferred solutions emerging through evolution over time. See, e.g., RICHARD 
DAWKINS, BLIND WATCHMAKER (1986); PAUL R EHRLICH, THE MACHINERY OF 
NATURE (1986); STEVEN JAY GOULD, WONDERFUL LIFE: THE BURGESS SHALE 
AND NATURE OF HISTORY (1989) (observing that nature responds to change in a vari­
ety of ways through a process Gould calls "adaptive radiation"). 
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preferences, policy priorities, and income levels diverge, regulations tai­
lored to localized circumstances will improve social welfare.132 Al­
though a centralized regulatory body might be capable of such tailoring, 
the scale diseconomies of centralization argue for local regulation.133 
2. Regulatory Competition Versus Race-to-the-Bottom Theory 
Second-generation theorists suggest that there is little or no reason 
to fear a regulatory race to the bottom.134 More pointedly, the second­
generation literature hypothesizes that far from unleashing a welfare-
132. See Jagdish Bhagwati & T.N. Srinivasan, Trade and Environment: Does Envi­
ronmental Diversity Detract from the Case for Free Trade, in FAIR TRADE AND HAR­
MONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE? 159 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. 
Hudec eds., 1996) [hereinafter FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION]; Robert Mendel­
sohn, Regulating Heterogenous Emissions, 13 J. ENVTL. EcoN. & MGMT. 301, 301-12 
(1986) (asserting that the welfare loss from common standards rises with the heteroge­
neity of the problem at hand); Nordhaus, supra note 28, at 8 ("Efficient policies are 
highly specific to particular sectors, regions, and time periods."). 
133. The second-generation diversity argument corresponds to several categories 
of regulatory failure. First, the arguments about states as laboratories and diseconomies 
of scale speak to technical transaction costs. Second, the prospect that diverse sub­
jurisdictions will not have regulations tailored to their circumstances and needs raises 
the possibility of internalities that appear as a structural failure in my typology but 
could, as noted earlier, be categorized also as a public choice problem. 
134. See Judith M. Dean, Trade and the Environment: A Survey of the Literature, 
in INTER.NATIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 15 (Patrick Low ed., 1992); 
Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Develop­
ments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L. REv. 913 (1982); Patrick Low & 
Alexander Yeats, Do "Dirty" Industries Migrate?, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT, supra, at 89; Revesz, supra note 1, at 1213-27. Others conclude 
that there is no empirical evidence of companies moving to "pollution havens." See, 
e.g., Adam B. Jaffe et al., Environmental Regulation and the Competitiveness of U.S. 
Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?, 33 J. EcoN. LITERATURE 132 
(1995); Joseph Kalt, The Impact of Domestic Environmental Regulatory Policies on 
U.S. International Competitiveness, in INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS 221 (A. 
Michael Spence & Heather A. Hazard eds., 1988). But see U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNT­
ING OFFICE, REPORT ON THE FURNITURE FINISHING INDUSTRY (1990) (finding evi­
dence of industrial migration to Mexico due to environmental costs); Paula M. Block, 
The Allure of Southeast Asia's Chemical Market, CHEMICAL WEEK, Apr. 15, 1987, at 
42. Moreover, the economics literature that casts doubt on the seriousness of competi­
tiveness pressures misunderstands how the race to the bottom plays out. Firms rarely 
move based on environmental standards. Nor do governments overtly change their laws 
to keep businesses from migrating. Thus, the image of a "race" does not really make 
sense. Instead, governments relax their environmental enforcement. Or, even more com­
monly, governments choose not to adopt more stringent standards, even if more vigor­
ous requirements would be welfare enhancing, because economic interests are heard 
while environmental ones are not. Empirical studies to measure this regulatory chill or 
"political drag" would require gathering data on events that did not happen - a diffi­
cult task. See EsTY, supra note 52, at 162-63. 
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reducing race, interjurisdictional competition pressures governments to 
regulate efficiently and effectively. 135 
Regulatory competition theory traces back to Tiebout's revolution­
ary 1956 article arguing that a decentralized governmental system, with 
horizontally arranged jurisdictions trying to attract residents on the basis 
of differing tax and benefit structures, produces a Pareto-superior out­
come.136 Later theorists have tried to extend the reach of Tiebout's anal­
ysis by relaxing some of the many assumptions on which his theory 
rests.137 Fischel, for example, applies Tiebout-type thinking to the envi­
ronmental realm with a model that addresses pollution and industrial lo­
cation.138 He concludes, under still quite restrictive assumptions, that 
environmental externalities can be internalized in a welfare-optimizing 
fashion with polluters compensating residents for their environmental 
harms and thus making interjurisdictional competition desirable.139 Like 
Tiebout, Fischel assumes away any job-loss problem and builds his 
model on an assumption that individuals are perfectly mobile. Oates 
and Schwab try to combat these weaknesses with a model that allows 
for the immobility of labor and wage effects.140 In their two-issue world, 
communities determine tax rates on capital and environmental standards 
with an eye toward attracting an optimal mix of industry and pollution. 
135. The suggestion of a race to the bottom is a bit of a misnomer. The better un­
derstanding of this argument is not that standards will end up literally at the bottom, but 
rather that they will be suboptimally low from a welfare perspective. Revesz and others 
do not reject the possibility that regulatory competition will cause governments to lower 
their standards. They simply suggest that any such lowering will enhance, not diminish, 
social welfare. See Revesz, supra note 1, at 1232; see also Henry N. Butler & Jonathan 
R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 
677 (1988); Ralph K. Wmter, The "Race for the Top" Revisited: A Comment on Eisen­
berg, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1526 (1989) [hereinafter Wmter, "Race to the Top"]; Ralph 
K. Wmter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977) [hereinafter Wmter, State Law]. 
136. While many commentators, including Tiebout, suggest that the proper test of 
welfare is by reference to "Pareto superiority," Kronman and Coleman have demon­
strated the limitations of the Pareto analysis. See Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Ex­
change, and Auction: Philosophical Aspects of the Economic Approach to Law, 68 
CAL. L. REv. 221 (1980); Anthony T. Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative 
Principle, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 227, 228-35 (1980). The more appropriate principle is the 
Kaldor-Hicks test. See JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND nm LAW 98-
105 (1988); Kronman, supra, at 235. 
137. Tiebout's model examines a resident choosing a community that "best satis­
fies his preference pattern for public goods." Tiebout, supra note 8, at 418. Tiebout as­
sumes full individual mobility, a wide choice of communities, full knowledge of each 
community's taxes and services, and that the public goods chosen have no externalities 
such as job or wage effects. See id. at 414. 
138. See Fischel, supra note 8, at 1 19. 
139. See id. at 125-27. 
140. See Oates & Schwab, supra note 4. 
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Oates and Schwab conclude that under these conditions, a rational gov"' 
emment sets a tax rate of zero on capital and then achieves a welfare­
maximizing environmental policy by cutting pollution until lost wage 
income matches the gains from reduced pollution damage. No race to 
the bottom ensues.141 
In what may constitute the central statement of second-generation 
thinking, Revesz builds on the preceding scholarship, the regulatory 
competition literature in the corporate and bank charter contexts, 142 and 
game theory analysis of the race to the bottom143 to conclude that 
"there are no models consistent with race-to-the-bottom claims. "144 In­
terjurisdictional competition, he argues, produces efficient regulatory re­
sults and enhanced social welfare.145 From this theoretical observation, 
Revesz moves to a policy prescription that presumptively favors decen­
tralized environmental regulation.146 Although other commentators, es­
pecially in the political world, do not articulate their claims quite as 
well or as carefully as Revesz, their similar conclusions have made calls 
for devolution a common refrain in the environmental realm. 
3. Public Choice Arguments in Support of Decentralized Regulation 
In addition to efficiency gains, advocates of regulatory devolution 
employ public choice theory to argue against centralized environmental 
regulation. 1\vo arguments are commonly advanced: first, that decisions 
made at higher and more distant levels of government compromise self­
determination and are less "representative" than those made closer to 
141. See id. at 336-49. As Revesz observes, "[t]he central insight of the Oates. and 
Schwab study is that jurisdictions that seek to maximize their welfare will not set 
suboptimally lax environmental standards." Revesz, supra note 1, at 1242. 
142. See Revesz, supra note 1, at 1247-53. 
143. See id. at 1229-47. Although Revesz suggests that his analysis raises doubts 
about the "plausibility of race-to-the-bottom claims," id. at 1233, I think he does the 
opposite. Revesz's payoff matrix shows that under some circumstances centralized regu­
lation will prevent subjurisdictions from being "gamed" into setting suboptimal stan­
dards. Sophisticated adherents to the race-to-the-bottom theory would not argue that a 
race inevitably occurs in the absence of federal regulation, but rather that it sometimes 
will - exactly as Revesz's game theory analysis indicates. 
144. Id. at 1244. Revesz further observes that if races to the bottom occur, ad­
dressing the environmental policy race with federal governmental intervention will only 
drive state-versus-state competition into other realms such as worker safety, minimum 
wage laws, or fair labor standards. As a result, all regulation would have to be central­
ized. See id. at 1245-47. 
145. See id. 
146. See id. at 1253. 
610 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 95:570 
home; 147 and second, that interest group distortions of political decision­
making become more severe at higher levels of government. 
Environmental problems often have important local dimensions 
that are more likely to be captured by giving decisionmaking authority 
to those close to the issue.148 Cleanup standards for a toxic waste dump 
should, for example, tum on what the future land use of the site is 
likely to be. Similarly, how much money to spend to remove ra­
dionuclides from drinking water depends heavily on the potential com­
peting financial needs and risk exposures of the community in question. 
This information is likely to be lodged at the local level. Of course, de­
cisions made directly by the common citizen avoid altogether the risk 
that elected representatives might not accurately reflect the public's 
will. This longing for direct democracy often emerges with particular 
force in the environmental domain because choices are being made 
about public health and land use, and they evoke strong feelings and a 
deep distrust of the elite decisionmaking implied by any form of repre­
sentative government. '49 
The second strand of the public choice argument against federal­
ized environmental programs relates to the distortion of governmental 
decisions by interest group politics. Some second-generation commenta­
tors suggest that the asymmetries of political power between industrial 
and environmental interests have been exaggerated.150 Others indicate 
that even if there ever were a perceivable gap in interest group access 
and influence between the federal and state-local levels, it now has been 
closed with the emergence of many environmental groups operating at 
147. The "representativeness" argument discussed here is not wholly distinct from 
the "diversity" claims outlined above. 
148. As Newt Gingrich suggests: "We must replace our centralized, 
micromanaged, Washington-based bureaucracy with a dramatically decentralized system 
more appropriate to a continent-wide country . . . .  'Closer is better ' should be the rule 
of thumb." GINGRICH, supra note 1, at 9. 
149. See Soderbaum, supra note 20 (observing that changes in what constitutes 
harm often emerge from elite analysis with public acceptance and understanding lag­
ging). See generally DANIEL A FARBER & PHn..IP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBuc 
CHOICE (1991); THE THEORY OF PuBLIC CHOICE II (James M. Buchanan & Robert 
D. Tollison eds., 1984); Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure 
Groups for Political Influence, 98 QJ. EcoN. 371 (1983); William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpre­
tation, 74 VA. L. REv. 275 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Pub­
lic Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29, 32 (1985). 
150. See, e.g., JAMES Q. WILSON, THE PoLmCS OF REGULATION 357-94 
(1980); Schuck, supra note 122; Richard B. Stewart, Madison's Nightmare, 51 U. Cm. 
L. REv. 335, 340-42 (1990). 
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these levels.151 In addition, some second-generation theorists argue that, 
irrespective of whether environmental interests are underrepresented at 
the state and local levels, they are overrepresented at the national 
level.152 
More dramatically, some commentators argue that Madison's fed­
eral architecture, designed to reduce the influence of economic fac­
tions, 153 has given way to a special-interest-dominated federal govern­
ment in which regulatory powers are often captured by rent-seeking 
interests or other narrowly focused groups.154 In this world of 
"Madison's nightmare,"155 environmental groups run amok inflicting 
huge costs on society because their misguided actions play out with 
magnified significance on the national or international stages.156 
4. Moral Arguments 
Second-generation critics flatly reject the morality of forcing sub­
jurisdictions to pay for levels of environmental protection other than 
those that they choose. They argue that the welfare loss inflicted on the 
subjurisdiction cannot be justified. Butler and Macey, for example, ob­
serve that Stewart's pyramids-of-sacrifice argument depends on "the 
151. See JONATHAN H. ADLER, ENVIRONMENTALISM AT THE CROSSROADS: 
GREEN ACTIVISM IN AMERICA (1995). 
152. See, e.g., Stewart, Pyramids, supra note 7, at 1218 (discussing the "ratchet" 
effect); see also Peter H. Schuck, Regulation, Non-Market Values, and the Administra­
tive State: A Comment on Professor Stewart, 92 YALE LJ. 1602, 1609 (1983). 
153. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 77-78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961). 
154. See Stewart, supra note 150, at 340-42; see also ANTHONY DOWNS, AN Ec­
ONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957); WU.SON, supra note 150, at 390-94; 
Becker, supra note 149, at 371-74; Robert Crandall, Air Pollution, Environmentalists, 
and the Coal Lobby, in THE POLITICAL EcONOMY OF DEREGULATION 84 (Roger 
Noll & Bruce Owen eds., 1983); B. Peter Pashigian, Environmental Regulation: Whose 
Self-Interests Are Being Protected?, 23 ECON. INQUIRY 551-84 (1985). 
155. See Stewart, supra note 150, at 342; see also WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR. & 
PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LEGISLATION 53-61 (1995). 
156. See, e.g., Arlie Schardt, Alar Again, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 7, 1995, at H18 (dis­
cussing the Natural Resource Defense Council's ballyhooing over Alar); U.S. Court of 
Appeals Dismisses Final Appeal on Alar, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Oct. 3, 1995, National 
Desk; see also Nathaniel C. Nash, A Humbled Shell is Unsure on Disposal of Atlantic 
Rig, N.Y. TIMEs, June 23, 1995, at D2; Nathaniel C. Nash, Oil Companies Face Boy­
cott Over Sinking of Rig, N.Y. TIMEs, June 17, 1995, at A3. Of course, special interest 
lobbying by industry can have an equally broad impact on national policymaking. See, 
e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1257 (1994) (prescribing special treatment of mining 
wastes); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1994) (establishing coke-oven preferential 
treatment); Identification and Listing of Hazardous Waste, 40 C.F.R. § 261.4 (1980) 
(enumerating the various special interest exclusions from the Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act (RCRA) definition of waste); see also ACKERMAN & HASSLER, 
supra note 122. 
612 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 95:570 
flawed presumption that it is moral for the federal government to force 
people to pay for goods they don't want."157 In brief, this line of think­
ing defmes the relevant political community narrowly and rejects the 
claims of right by larger governmental entities to dictate environmental 
standards. 
5. The Insignificance of Externalities and the Nirvana Fallacy 
Many second-generation theorists acknowledge that externalities 
justify centralized regulation but then proceed with environmental pol­
icy prescriptions that implicitly dismiss the problem of interjurisdic­
tional pollution spillovers.158 Other second-generation theorists claim 
not that transboundary externalities do not exist, but rather that govern­
mental reaction is not worth the bother. Although externalities or other 
market failures may arise, they argue, the capacity of government to 
regulate effectively is so limited that welfare losses are minimized by 
letting unregulated market forces operate.159 Doubts about the ability of 
government to design and implement regulatory policies that counteract 
market failures in a manner that improves social welfare have been 
called the Nirvana Fallacy.160 Adherents to this line of argument reject 
157. Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Prin­
ciple: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, Symposium, Con­
structing a New Federalism, YALE J. ON REG. AND YALE L. & POLY. REV. (forth­
coming 1996). 
158. Revesz, for example, acknowledges that interjurisdictional externalities re­
quire federal regulation, but then proceeds to offer policy prescriptions as though such 
externalities do not exist. See Revesz, supra note 1. Others ignore the interstate spill­
over problem altogether. See, e.g., GINGRICH, supra note 1. 
159. Even if a let-the-harms-fall-where-they-may approach maximizes welfare, it 
violates the protect-property-rights principle of good environmental policy. In fact, in 
any case in which the costs of regulating (or of vindicating property rights) exceed the 
value of the harms inflicted by pollution, nonintervention will optimize welfare. This ef­
ficiency, however, is achieved at a cost, in terms of equity, as the polluter's welfare 
gain comes at the expense of the pollutee's rights. Moreover, to the extent we accept a 
nonintervention principle whenever the costs of regulation exceed the value of the 
harms to be addressed, we create a serious moral hazard problem. In such a case, pol­
luters have a significant incentive to drive up transaction costs and thereby avoid having 
to pay compensation for their actions. · 
160. See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. 
& EcoN. l, 1 (1969); Maxwell L. Steams, The Misguided Renaissance of Social 
Choice, 103 YALE LJ. 1219, 1229 n.33 (1994); see also Butler & Macey, supra note 
157 (discussing the Nirvana Fallacy in the environmental federalism context); Peter S. 
Menell, Institutional Fantasy/ands: From Scientific Management to Free Market En­
vironmentalism, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY. 489 (1992). 
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not just federal regulation but all regulation. This makes their claims 
not truly relevant in the centralization versus decentralization debate.161 
ill. TEsTING THE SECOND GENERATION 
This Part examines whether and how decentralized environmental 
regulation addresses each of the categories of regulatory failure identi­
fied in Part I. It seeks to determine: (1) at which governmental level 
technical issues are likely to be best resolved; (2) whether the structural 
impediments to achieving least-social-cost environmental policies will 
be ameliorated or aggravated by a more decentralized regulatory ap­
proach; and (3) whether decentralization reduces or worsens the public 
choice problems associated with environmental policymaking. The anal­
ysis is grounded in the reallties of environmental problems and regula­
tion because general regulatory theory, on which much of the existing 
literature relies, often fails to capture the unique features of the ecologi­
cal domain. 
A. Decentralization and Technical Welfare Loss 
Decentralization appears likely to minimize technical transaction 
costs in some cases, particularly when "on the ground" information 
matters. But devolution may impede other more truly technical or scien­
tific dimensions of the regulatory process. In many respects, the techni­
cal adequacy issue boils down to a question of whether regulatory econ­
omies or diseconomies of scale are salient. Generalizations in this 
regard are not easy to make. Some issues (how to handle toxic waste 
sites, for example) are local-information intensive; others (determining 
safe levels of pesticide residues, for example) have only limited dimen­
sions that vary geographically. Perhaps more important, every regula­
tory decision represents a conglomeration of various policy activities, 
some of which will benefit from decentralized processes and others of 
which will be optimized under a centralized regime. The following tax­
onomy of regulatory activities highlights the difficulty with sweeping 
presumptions. 
161. The Nirvana Fallacy is really about how to regulate. The fact that our current 
regulatory approaches are inefficient does not mean that no regulation is ultimately the 
preferred answer. By the same logic, just because today's federal regulation is flawed 
does not mean that state or local regulation is preferred. As stipulated at the outset, 
more efficient regulatory tools and strategies are undeniably needed, and such policy 
advances represent the best response to Nirvana Fallacy concerns. Some Nirvana Fal­
lacy proponents argue that federal regulation is particularly likely to be counterproduc­
tive. This suggestion, however, generally collapses into claims about diseconomies of 
regulatory scale or public choice distortions. 
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1 .  Problem Identification 
Initial awareness of an ecological or public health issue or harm 
often emerges from actual observation of physical change. Since many 
pairs of eyes spread across the land are more likely to see environmen­
tal anomalies before a few observers in a centralized location, the dis­
economies of scale in problem identification will often be significant. 
Of course, certain environmental problems are better detected by some · 
eyes than by others.162 Complex scientific interactions such as the de­
pletion of the ozone layer by chlorine compounds (CFCs) offers one 
such example. Problem identification in these cases depends more on 
technical sophistication than on geographic coverage. Under these con­
ditions, an optimal environmental policy concentrates technical re­
sources in a small number of places to amass sufficient expertise and 
equipment to track the otherwise invisible problem.163 Because of the 
diversity of environmental harms that governments seek to regulate, a 
mix of decentralized and centralized, governmental and nongovernmen­
tal problem-identification structures is likely to be useful. 
2. Data Collection and Analysis 
Beyond the problem-identification function, technical capacity gen­
erally will be weakened by devolution. It makes no sense to ask every 
state, city, or town to measure the level, size, and type of particulates in 
its air, determine their connection to respiratory failure and other health 
problems, identify the safe level of emissions, and design cost-effective 
policy responses. Data collection and quality control, fate and transport 
studies, epidemiological and ecological analyses, and risk assessments 
all represent highly technical activities in which expertise is important 
· and scale economies are significant. In addition, the core variables 
within these functions do not vary spatially, and thus diversity claims 
hold little sway.164 Absent centralized functions, independent state regu-
162. Not only will some problems require technical skill or equipment to "see," 
but some patterns and anomalies also can only be perceived on a broad-scale level. 
163. Still, total centralization of technical functions in a single entity rarely will 
make sense. Several competing facilities are likely to spur more rapid scientific ad­
vances. Moreover, given the significant degree of uncertainty that pervades environmen­
tal decisionmaking, it is important that the prevailing wisdom constantly be challenged 
and that new perspectives on problems regularly be explored. In this regard, research di­
versification helps to guard against putting all one's analytic eggs in the wrong basket. 
Nevertheless, a single research entity might be optimal if a problem is unusually expen­
sive to address (space exploration, for example) such that multiple efforts fragment 
funding and leave all efforts inadequate to the task. 
· 
164. Specifically, while dose responses vary from person to person, animal to 
animal, and plant to plant, these variations generally do not occur spatially. If 3 in 100 
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lators will either duplicate each other's analytic work or engage in time­
consuming and complex negotiations to establish an efficient division of 
technical labor. The poorer the jurisdiction, moreover, the more likely 
its regulators will lack basic technical competence. Likewise, the 
smaller the regulating entity, the more likely it is to suffer from the ab­
sence of scientific scale economies. Both of these dimensions of techni­
cal failure are recognized as significant obstacles to good regulation in 
many states. 165 
Despite the prospect of scientific diseconomies of scale, decentral­
ized policy structures still might be worthwhile if multiple approaches 
to a problem were likely to improve the quality of regulation, the 
chances of identifying more effective policy tools, or the efficiency of 
the regulatory process. Fifty state laboratories might come up with the 
"right" regulatory answer more often than one centralized body. There 
are two ways in which the states might be thought to have a better 
chance of getting this right answer than the federal government The 
first involves an environmental problem that does not vary much across 
the country, such as determining the safe level of pesticide residues. In 
such a case, fifty efforts to establish this variable might be thought 
more likely to generate a "correct" result, just as fifty throws of a dart 
are more likely to yield a bullseye than a single toss. 
residents of Connecticut will get sick from a certain level of toxic exposure, 3 in 100 
Louisianans will as well. There is no need for both Connecticut and Louisiana to estab­
lish this same correlation independently. In the rush to highlight the diversity of the 
human experience, we often seem to forget the unvarying essence of Homo sapiens as a 
species and, accordingly, the potential for regulatory economies of scale from centrali­
zation. This principle is well established in the field of public health. See, e.g., James A. 
Merchant et al., Byssinosis and Chronic Bronchitis Among Cotton Textile Workers, 76 
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 432, 433 (1972) (showing that cotton dust exposure of 
American millworkers created the same respiratory disease problems for them as for 
British cotton millworkers). Of course, in some cases, widespread cultural patterns 
(smoking and drinking, for example) may sufficiently shape the background levels of 
risk so that responses will vary across jurisdictions. 
165. See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REPORT OF THE TASK 
FORCE TO ENHANCE STATE CAPACITY (1993). Governmental regulatory capacity 
likely will evolve over time and so too will the optimal mix of regulatory authority be­
tween and among levels of government. In fact, devolving environmental responsibili­
ties to the states makes much more sense than it would have 30 years ago insofar as 
state regulatory capacity has improved dramatically over the intervening years. Simi­
larly, issues evolve in ways that may justify changes over time in the level of govern­
ment that regulates them. When a problem first emerges, the scientific uncertainties sur­
rounding it may be so predominant that the technical advantages of a centralized 
governmental response call for federal regulation. As the issue matures and becomes 
better understood, the salience of the technical economies of scale may recede, which 
argues for devolution of primary regulatory responsibility to the states and permitting 
policies more tailored to localized interests. 
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Against this hope, however, weigh several countervailing consider­
ations. Will states-as-laboratories really mean more dose-response ex­
perimentation? Will the state efforts be serious experimentation or sim­
ply guesswork? How many states have the scientific infrastructure, 
interest, and resources to fund rigorous analytic efforts? Most U.S. 
states suffer from serious capacity problems in environmental regula­
tion.166 Outside the United States, the number of regulating jurisdictions 
capable of establishing regulatory programs built on even modest scien­
tific and analytic underpinnings is even more limited. The theoretical 
argument for diversity and decentralization thus runs very quickly into 
practical capacity constraints in the technical domain.167 When complex 
science is required, states are not the best laboratories; laboratories are 
the best laboratories. 
Another dimension of the states-as-laboratories argument relates to 
the notion of "�·egulatory competition" and addresses the question of 
whether competition among decentralized jurisdictions will improve 
governmental efficiency. Without denying the need to eliminate slack in 
governmental operations, there is neither empirical evidence to support 
nor any theoretical reason to believe that state-level bureaucrats work 
more efficiently than federal ones because they perceive themselves to 
be in competition with other states.168 Moreover, nongovernmental orga­
nizations, able to draw on outside experts and to achieve scale econo­
mies by "selling" their ideas in many jurisdictions simultaneously, may 
be better positioned to provide technical-competition. Environmental 
groups, in particular, have an incentive to hustle and to seek quick dif­
fusion of their scientific and policy advances because this is how they 
win credibility and financial support.169 
166. See EPA, supra note 165, at 5; see also Leslie Fuller Secrest et al., Seep No 
Evil, AMER. CITY & COUNTY, May 1993, at 34. 
167. The suggestion that decentralization allows for improved political judgments 
in regulation (that is, better judgements about how much value a localized community 
would place on a particular policy) may be correct but misses the point. Specifically, 
the crucial welfare losses with regard to problems like food safety derive not from polit­
ical miscalculations, but from technical errors in which the regulators misunderstand 
causal relationships and thus make directionally incorrect policy interventions or miscal­
culate risks by orders of magnitude. Of course, the technical-inadequacy argument 
against environmental policy decentralization may not be generalizable as it turns on the 
particular technical complexity of making good environmental regulatory decisions. 
168. To the contrary, it is the author's experience, having visited dozens of state 
Departments of Environmental Protection as well as numerous federal EPA offices, that, 
as a general rule, federal officials are better trained, work longer and harder, and have 
higher productivity than their state counterparts. 
169. See Daniel C. Esty, "Why the World Trade Organization Needs Non­
Government Organizations" (paper presented at University of Michigan Conference, 
Nov. 8, 1996) (on file with author) (making the argument that the best "competition" in 
December 1996] Environmental Federalism 617 
The second aspect of the states-as-laboratories argument involves 
environmental problems that are geographically heterogenous, such as 
how much money to spend cleaning up a toxic waste dump. The 
"right" answer to such problems depends on locality-specific factors 
such as on what chemicals are in the waste, whether the waste is mi­
grating off-site, the likelihood that groundwater is affected, the depen­
dence of those in the community on groundwater for drinking, the rela­
tive scarcity of land, the likely future use of the site, the wealth of the 
community in question, and other circumstances. In such cases, on-the­
ground knowledge is of central importance, and the diversity of circum­
stances is salient. Thus state-by-state or even community-by-community 
regulation makes sense. Smaller jurisdictions can tailor their regulatory 
solutions according to the exact, location-specific ,parameters of a given 
hazardous waste problem.110 
Yet even when a problem is largely localized, substantial technical 
questions, susceptible to economies of scale, remain. How big are the 
risks posed by the chemicals present? What cleanup technologies are 
available? How much will various policy alternatives cost? Ultimately, 
diversity of circumstances argues primarily against regulatory uniform­
ity, not necessarily against centralization - and certainly not against a 
hybrid policy structure that is centralized in part. 171 
environmental policy comes from environmental groups and businesses). In the environ­
mental realm, nongovernmental entities already make substantial contributions to the 
data and information bases upon which regulations are based - and in so doing pro­
vide considerable intellectual competition to the government See, e.g., MARK DORF­
MAN, ENVIRONMENTAL DIVIDENDS: CUITING MORE CHEMICAL WASTE (1992) 
(spelling out "pollution prevention" ideas); PROJECT 88: HARNEssING MARKET 
FORCES TO PROTECT OUR ENVIRONMENT 30-34 (Robert Stavins ed., 1988) [herein­
after PROJECT 88] (adv�cing the idea of S02 emissions-trading to address acid rain, a 
concept that was adopted in the 1990 Clean Air Act); DAVID J. SAROKIN ET AL., CUT­
TING CHEMICAL WASTE: WHAT 29 ORGANIC CHEMICAL PLANTS ARE DOING TO 
CUT CHEMICAL WASTE (1985). 
170. EPA's traditional one-size-fits-all approach to Superfund site remediation rep­
resents a classic example of inappropriate centralized regulation. Decentralized informa­
tion gathering, analysis, and decisionmaking in hazardous waste cleanup cases almost 
certainly would improve the technical content of the regulatory process. 
171. Indeed, many U.S. federal environmental laws, although centrally adopted, 
permit states to implement more stringent requirements than the national standard or 
otherwise to tailor the regulatory program to their own needs. See, for example, the va­
rying "non-attainment" standards of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 751 1-13 (1994). 
Nevertheless, there appears to be some tendency of centralized regulatory structures to 
enact more or less uniform standards. See James E. Krier, On the Topology of Uniform 
Environmental Standards in a Federal System - and Why It Matters, 54 MD. L. REv. 
1226, 1228-38 (1995); see also Richard 0. Zerbe, Optimal Environmental Jurisdictions, 
4 EcoLOGY L.Q. 193, 222 (1974) (noting that local strategies do not require the "juris­
dictional choice of local government"). 
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3. Policy Design 
A decentralized regulatory structure offers a mechanism for testing 
multiple policy alternatives simultaneously with the promise that better 
approaches will emerge and be adopted broadly. But such gains derive 
largely from avoiding uniformity and not from avoiding decentralization 
per se.172 Moreover, the administrative advantage of local implementa­
tion does not speak to the question of the optimal level of governmental 
activity in environmental standard setting. Indeed, given economies of 
scale in technical work and the risk of structural failure from pollution 
spillovers and strategic behavior unleashing welfare-reducing races to­
ward the bottom or top, the best solution may be nationally adopted, lo­
cally implemented, nonuniform standards. Such a solution entails opti­
mizing both the scale of standards and the scale of institutions.173 
In some circumstances uniform standards may be welfare enhanc­
ing.174 When environmental regulations are focused on products (as op­
posed to production processes), harmonization across jurisdictions can 
create important economies of scale for the businesses selling these 
products175 and for the states administering environmental controls. For 
example, national automobile tailpipe standards allow Detroit to pro­
duce vehicles from a single production line, thus lowering both average 
and marginal costs.176 National standards also spare the fifty states the 
172. See Zerbe, supra note 171, at 215-21 (discussing losses from uniformity). 
173. See E-mail from Jonathan Wiener, Professor, Duke Law School, to Daniel C. 
Esty, Professor, Yale Law School (Aug. 27, 1996). 
174. See supra note 47 (discussing optimal specificity). As noted in Part I, the tai­
loring of regulations to smaller and smaller subgroups achieves welfare gains by match­
ing policies with local values, but this comes at the cost of increased administrative bur­
den. There is a further question about what level of government is best positioned to 
determine the optimal level of regulatory activity for any specific problem, particularly 
in light of the fact that answering optimal-specificity questions consumes resources and 
involves deliberation costs. The economies of scale in analytic methods argue for hav­
ing the metaquestion of optimal scale answered nationally. See Wiener, supra note 173. 
175. For example, some champions of decentralization also will be strong advo­
cates of federal regulation when the scale economies of the national market are at issue. 
In fact, 91 preemption statutes, substituting uniform federal standards for diverse state 
regulations, were enacted into law during the Reagan era. See SUSAN RosE­
Ac:KEkMAN, RETinNKING THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA: THE REFORM OF THE 
AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE 162 (1992). 
176. To this day, U.S. automakers are striving to maintain a commitment to a "49-
state car" in the face of a thrust from a number of Northeastern states to set tailpipe 
standards that match the more stringent California requirements. See Jake Brown, EPA 
Proposes 49-State-Car Option, But Automakers, States Continue Talks, BNA, Oct. 2, 
1995, available in 1995 WL, BNA-SED Database; Matthew L. Wald, E.P.A. Backs Plan 
to Allow Cleaner Cars in Most States, N.Y. TIMBS, Sept 28, 1995, at A16; Adrian 
Walker, World Considers Deal on Phase-In of Electric Cars, BOSTON GLOBE, July 31,  
1995, at 13. 
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expense of trying to determine and enforce their own standards.177 
Uniformity with regard to production-process pollution controls 
also may be beneficial in some instances: following common ap­
proaches to a common problem may be particularly welfare enhancing 
if "network" effects are significant.178 Even if the pollution policies of 
one jurisdiction are not perfectly aligned with the needs of another ju­
risdiction, the latter rationally might adopt the farmer's standards to 
avoid the considerable expense of creating a regulatory program from 
scratch with all of the attendant development costs vis-a-vis data, risk 
analysis, policy mechanisms, control technologies� training, and en­
forcement.179 These costs will be especially large for small jurisdictions 
that will have difficulty persuading producers of pollution-control goods 
and services to tailor products to their jurisdiction's unique specifica­
tions. Network effects may be particularly important in the environmen­
tal realm because of the technical complexity of the requisite policy 
analysis and design functions and the relative incapacity of many juris­
dictions singularly to bear the costs associated with that complexity. 
Uniform standards also may stimulate innovation in pollution-con­
trol technologies. Notably, the larger the market, the bigger the potential 
payoff to investors and the more likely it is that innovators and entre­
preneurs will be able to acquire venture capital. Fragmented markets are 
unattractive to potential investors.180 In fact, the relatively decentralized 
environmental regulatory structure of the United States has already 
177. See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 175, at 165; Elliott et al., supra note 69; 
Mashaw & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 111 ,  at 1 13-34; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Envi­
ronmental Policy and Federal Structure: A Comparison of the United States and Ger­
many, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1587, 1592 (1994). 
178. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 118, at 24-26; Philip Dybrig & Chester 
Spatt, Adoption Externalities As Public Goods, 20 J. PuB. EcoN. 231 (1983); Michael 
L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM.. 
EcoN. REV. 424 (1985); Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Net­
works of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REv. 757 (1995) (spelling out network benefits to com­
mon contract terms). 
179. The classic example of network effects is the QWERTY typewriter keyboard. 
The layout of the keys is demonstrably nonoptimal, but changing the standard has 
proven to be impossible because huge investments in training and knowledge would be 
lost by a shift to another keyboard layout. See Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics 
of QWER1Y, 97 AM.. EcON. Assoc. PAPERS & PROC. 332 (1985); Steve Lohr, Busi­
ness Often Goes to the Swift, Not the Best, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1995, § 4, at 3; see 
also Klausner, supra note 178, at 792-808 (discussing network effects in legal interpre­
tations in the corporate contract context). 
180. As a general partner in a California venture capitalist firm testified in a writ­
ten statement presented at a U.S. Senate hearing, the lack of centralization in U.S. envi­
ronmental regulation "penalizes innovation and repels capital." Hearings on S. 978 
Before the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 103d Cong. 79 (1993) 
(statement of Dag Syrrist). The statement went on to decry the current regulatory struc-
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proven to be a serious obstacle to entrepreneurs seeking venture capi­
tal.181 Further devolution promises to exacerbate the difficulty of achiev­
ing scale economies sufficient to promote innovation, bring new tech­
nologies to bear on U.S. environmental problems, and lower the cost of 
environmental protection.182 
Multiple jurisdictions could settle upon common policy approaches 
that would allow the scale economies identified above to be achieved 
without centralized regulation. Indeed, Alan Sykes argues that consumer 
demand and the workings of the market will yield optimal compatibility 
in standards across jurisdictions.183 But while such market-driven har­
monization has emerged in some realms (VCRs and computers, for ex­
ample), the coordination record in the environmental domain appears 
far more spotty.184 
Centralized environmental regulation, moreover, need not mandate 
fixed uniform standards. One important alternative is minimum stan­
dards that provide a limited common goal, ensuring that all parties meet 
a basic level of environmental protection. For some jurisdictions, base­
line standards may be the most appropriate endpoint for their environ­
mental programs given their level of economic development and other 
specific circumstances. In other jurisdictions, more stringent standards 
ture, which "effectively partitioned a national market into several hundred regional and 
local markets each with unique permitting requirements." Id. at 81. 
181. Far less venture capital flows into environmental goods and services compa­
nies than into other economic sectors of comparable size. See Internal Memorandum 
from the Executive Office of the President, Office of Science and Technology .Policy, 
Environment Division (1995) (on file with author). 
182. As Howard Kunreuther has reminded me, a standardized regulatory structure 
also facilitates development of the insurance market - which could be quite useful as a 
policy response to environmental risks. 
183. See ALAN SYKES, PRODUCT STANDARDS FOR INTERNATIONALLY INTE­
GRATED GOODS MARKETS (1995) (focusing on computer software and other products, 
not processes such as environmental production standards); see also DAVID VOGEL, 
TRADING UP 189-91 (1995) (observing that in product markets, environmental stan­
dards are often harmonized upwards). 
184. T he Organization for Economic and Community Development (OECD) has 
had some success in getting its member countries to coordinate their chemical testing 
protocols. But efforts to harmonize pesticide regulation, basic environmental data col­
lection, and other aspects of environmental regulation have proven far less successful, 
even when the promise of scale economies are substantial. See OECD, THE OECD 
CHEMICALS PROGRAMME (1993). Whether the actual environmental standards should 
be uniform depends on the intersection of a number of factors including: (1) how much 
the problem at hand varies spatially (which will be affected by the nature of the prob­
lem, geography, climate, weather, and other factors); (2) how heterogeneous the af­
fected population is in its values, including wealth (which shapes preferred tradeoffs be­
tween income and environmental protection), risk preferences, and other variables; and 
(3) how the size of welfare gains from scale economies in production and regulatory ad­
ministration compare with potential welfare losses from diminished diversity. 
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will be appropriate given higher levels of available resources and 
greater public demand for environmental protection. Under a system of 
minimum standards, governments remain free to adopt a higher level of 
environmental protection.185 
Many of the benefits of a decentralized regulatory structure also 
could be achieved by using more flexible regulatory tools.186 Rather 
than mandating specific uniform control technologies, pollution stan­
dards can be peiformance-based - setting, for instance, an allowable 
effluent limit per hour or day.187 While the pollution-control goal is cen-
. trally determined, the individual factory decides how to meet the goal. 
Even greater flexibility and efficiency can be achieved through ambient 
standards that allow the regulatory system to reflect background pollu­
tion levels and differences in physical conditions. Thus, for example, 
companies operating in open windy areas may be allowed to emit more 
than those operating in geographically enclosed areas.188 
Further flexibility and efficiency can be built into both effluent and 
ambient standards through a system of differentiated requirements. By 
varying the goals or the timetables for reaching goals for diverse areas, 
differences in circumstances can be accommodated within centrally de­
vised regulatory programs. For example, particularly challenging air 
pollution problems, such as those facing Los Angeles, can be given spe­
cial consideration within a national clean air program. In fact, the Clean 
185. The Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) art. 130T provides for 
such a scheme. See Damien Geradin, Trade and Environmental Protection: Community 
Harmonization and National Environmental Standards, 13 Y.B. EUR. L. 151, 178-86 
(1994). 
186. In fact, much of the welfare loss in environmental policy today appears to 
come neither from diseconomies of regulatory scale nor the related problem of stan­
dards being set at too high a level of aggregation and hence overriding the particular­
ized circumstances and values of smaller scale communities. Rather, the loss comes 
from the weakness of the scientific-technical bases for regulation and the vagaries of the 
existing set of environmental tools and strategies. See, e.g., Revesz, supra note 9. 
187. Many Clean Water Act standards take this form. See Clean Water Act 
§§ 301-304, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1314 (1994). Unfortunately, the translation of these ef­
fluent standards into specific obligations of dischargers shifts the regulatory focus from 
performance standards to various "Best Available Technology" requirements. See Clean 
Water Act §§ 301 (b)(l), 306, 33 U.S.C. §§ 13ll(b)(l), 1316 (1994). 
188. The nonattainment and the National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
(NAAQS) provisions for criteria air pollutants of the Clean Air Act could work in this 
fashion, setting the pollution control goal centrally, but allowing local officials to deter­
mine how to meet the standards through State Implementation Plans (SIPs). See Clean 
Air Act Amendment of 1970 § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1994). But the promise of na­
tional ambient standards has not been achieved. See John P. Dwyer, The Practice of 
Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REv. 1183, 1 198 (1995); William F. 
Pederson, Why the Clean Air Act Works Badly, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1059, 1071-93 
(1981). 
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Air Act seeks to differentiate among extreme, severe, serious, and mod­
erate "nonattairunent" areas, giving those with greater problems up to 
seventeen extra years to come into compliance with the national 
goals.1s9 
The use of economic-incentive-based regulatory tools can further 
loosen the grip of federal regulators and give broad scope to private ac­
tors to determine how best to meet environmental goals. The use of ef­
fluent fees, pollution trading systems, and ecolabels or other public in­
formation strategies permit considerable differentiation among locales 
and even among individuals with different preferences within the same 
locale. In addition, fees or emissions allocations can be adjusted to re­
flect particular circumstances. Moreover, the trading that occurs explic­
itly under systems like the acid rain control program of the 1990 Clean 
Air Act and implicitly in any pollution-fee-based regulatory regime al­
lows for efficient market-determined pollution-control programs, 
thereby maximizing the benefits from any dollar invested in pollution­
prevention or -abatement programs and minimizing the welfare losses 
imposed by the regulatory constraints.190 
Ultimately, diseconomies of scale and diversity arguments do not 
argue for state regulation but simply for flexible and efficiency-minded 
regulatory tools and strategies. Likewise, the promise of technical econ­
omies of scale does not necessarily argue for a centralized environmen­
tal regime in any strong sense. Specifically, one could envision an envi­
ronmental policy structure that obtained scale economies in the 
technical aspect of the regulatory process without centralizing other 
dimensions of the environmental control system. In fact, the optimal 
policy response to the problems of technical inadequacy is probably the 
creation of a National Institute for the Environment (NIE). An NIE, like 
the National Institutes of Health (NIH), would serve as a centralized 
data gathering and analysis mechanism. It would offer scientific support 
to regulating jurisdictions that would use the data and information pro­
vided to set their own standards. An NIE also could develop model leg­
islation as one way of consolidating diverse information into a form 
that would be useful to regulating jurisdictions. Such a mechanism 
189. See, for example, ozone (smog) requirements under the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 181(a)(2), 104 Stat 2423 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
751 l(a)(2)). 
190. See PROJECT 88, supra note 169; Daniel J. Dudek et al., Technology-Based 
Approaches versus Market-Based Approaches, in GREENING INTERNATIONAL LAW 
182 (Phillipe Sands ed., 1994); Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Market-Based 
Environmental Regulation: A New Era From An Old Idea, 18 EcOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1991); 
Richard B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks Through Economic Incentives, 13 
CoLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 153 (1988). 
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would go a considerable distance toward addressing the capacity prob­
lem that historically has plagued state-based environmental 
regulation. 191 
Decentralization generally fails to minimize technical environmen­
tal regulatory costs. While diseconomies exist in a few parts of the reg­
ulatory process, most aspects of environmental research and analysis 
show significant economies of sca1e. The strength of diversity argu­
ments thus must be seen essentially not as technical, but either as struc­
tural (smaller jurisdictions empowered to establish their own standards 
will reduce the intema1ities associated with uniform standards, thereby 
increasing socia1 welfare) or as related to public choice (decentralized 
political processes are more likely to track localized citizen prefer­
ences). In either case, to achieve the goa1 of minimizing technical wel­
fare loss, technical and scientific responsibilities should not be devolved 
to state govemments.192 
4. Implementation, Enforcement, and Policy Evaluation 
The implementation and enforcement of environmental policy is 
done best on a relatively decentralized basis to ensure that the regulat­
ing entity is aware of loca1 circumstances and is accessible to the regu­
lated community. There is, however, an important caveat to this genera] 
principle: enforcement against large companies may be accomplished 
better by the federal government. At the very least, the need to protect 
states from especially powerful economic and political forces argues for 
a system of federal oversight of state environmental programs.193 More-
191. It is ironic that the Congress, which is pushing regulatory devolution so 
strongly, is not advancing efforts to address the state capacity problem. Efforts to create 
a Bureau of Environmental Statistics have failed and the Office of Technology Assess­
ment was abolished. See House Expected to Act on Rescissions Bill; Senate to Continue 
on EPA Cabinet Status, BNA, Apr. 26, 1993, available in 1993 WL, BNA-BWI 
Database; Greg Pierce, Study Advises Devolving EPA Powers, WASH. T!MEs, Apr. 12, 
1995, at A9; Senate Bill would Elevate EPA to Cabinet, BNA, May 20, 1994, available 
in 1994 WL, BNA-BWI Database. Moreover, data-gathering efforts such as the Na­
tional Biological Survey have faced sharp budget cuts. See Tom Kenworthy, By Any 
Name, Biological Service Appears To Be Endangered Species, WASH. POST, June 27, 
1995, at A15. 
192. By extension, the technical advantages of centralization argue for increased 
international scientific and analytic cooperation. W hy, for example, does the United 
States spend $100 million per year testing pesticides, some of which already have un­
dergone exhaustive analysis in Europe or Japan? Common testing protocols and data 
exchange would allow the United States to incorporate risk analyses done elsewhere, 
thereby improving the speed and cutting the cost of U.S. regulation. 
193. Many state officials privately observe that the threat of unleashing the "go­
rilla in the closet" - the federal EPA - makes it much easier for them to do their job. 
See National Clean Air Coalition Press Conference Concerning the President's Clean 
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over, when problems are transboundary in scope, and especially when 
the jurisdictions are separate countries, decentralized enforcement 
breaks down entirely.194 
The evaluation and refinement of environmental policy strategies 
benefits from comparative analysis and therefore from some degree of 
centralization. Nevertheless, because each subjurisdiction has an incen­
tive to cooperate in drrrying out evaluation procedures and in sharpen­
ing its own programs, there is no need for rigid or coerced centraliza­
tion of policy evaluation activities. 
B. Decentralization and Structural Welfare Loss 
It is well established that intemalities should be avoided, externali­
ties should be internalized, and efficiency in the provision of a collec­
tive good requires the jurisdiction of the government that provides it to 
match the boundaries of the good.195 There seems, however, to be some 
confusion over the type and pervasiveness of jurisdictional mismatches 
in the environmental realm.196 To determine what level of government 
Air Proposals, Federal News Service, June 12, 1989, available in LEXIS, News Li­
brary, FEDNEW File; see also David R. Hedas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in 
a Triangular Federal System: Can Three Not Be a Crowd?, 54 MD. L. REv. 1552, 1574 
(1995). 
194. See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, Customary (And Not So Customary) International 
Environmental Law, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 105, 1 10-11 (1995) (observing 
that uncontrolled transboundary pollution is the rule rather than the exception); Edith 
Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson, Why Do States Comply With International Agree­
ments?, 1 HUMAN DIMENSIONS Q. 1, 4 (1996) (reporting on a study finding that inter­
nationally decentralization does not improve compliance); David Wrrth, Climate Chaos, 
74 FOREIGN POLY. 3 (1989); see also DUNCAN BRACK, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
AND THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL 99-114 (1996) (discussing widespread noncompli­
ance with the Protocol and illegal trade in CFCs). See generally LAKSHMAN D. 
GURUSWAMY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND WORLD OR­
DER 31-43 (1994), 
195. See OLSON, supra note 40, at 42-43; see also BAUMOL & OATES, supra 
note 8, at 287 (arguing that jurisdictions need to be sufficiently large to encompass the 
benefits and costs associated with the pollutant and its control); Butler & Macey, supra 
note. 157 (advancing a Matching Principle). 
196. Although some commentators suggest otherwise, concern about interstate ex­
ternalities has provided a driving force for the adoption of national environmental laws 
in the United States. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1 175 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 95-294 (1977) 
(discussing Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977). But see Revesz, supra note 1, at 1212 
(arguing that "interstate externalities explain only isolated parts of the federal environ­
mental statutes"). Concern about transboundary externalities also represents the corner­
stone of centralized environmental regulation in the European Union. See, e.g., van den 
Bergh et al., supra note 118. A related question is how well federal laws address inter­
state externality issues. That many federal laws do not perform this task particularly 
well is undeniable; however, this inadequacy is more an argument for federal legislative 
reform than for broad policy devolution. 
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should set environmental policy to minimize structural welfare losses, 
the critical variables are the prevalence and magnitude of externalities 
and internalities. 
1. Physical Externalities 
Given the widespread theoretical acceptance of externalities as a 
rationale for centralized environmental regulation, policy conclusions in 
favor of decentralization depend on an implicit assumption that inter­
state externalities are not significant. Such a dismissive attitude toward 
pollution externalities does not, however, square with environmental 
reality. 
a. Empirical evidence. While a few environmental harms (some 
waste problems, for example) are geographically localized, many forms 
of pollution (surface water contamination and most air pollutants, for 
example) spread across the land. Because state boundaries often do not 
fully encompass airsheds and watersheds, interjurisdictional externali­
ties arise. Given a fixed extent of pollution, it is axiomatic that decen­
tralization will create more borders and therefore more transboundary 
spillovers. Moreover, advances in environmental science over the last 
two decades have resulted in the discovery of a number of previously 
unrecognized externalities. These include, most notably, global concerns 
such as ozone layer depletion and possible climate change due to the 
accumulation of greenhouse gases.197 In addition, recent scientific work 
has broadened the acknowledged geographic scope of the impact of pre­
viously identified problems. For example, DDT - long banned in the 
United States and Canada - has been discovered in the Great Lakes, 
demonstrating, scientists believe, that high-level winds can transport air­
borne chemicals thousands of miles, in this case from Mexico.198 Simi­
larly, recent studies have discovered significant trans boundary spillovers 
of S02 and acid rain, heavy metals, and bioaccumulative toxics.199 We 
will probably continue to find additional linkages and elements of inter-
197. See Adrienne C. Brooks, NASA Identifies Cause of Ozone Depletion, SCI­
ENCE NEWS, Dec. 24, 1994; Richard A. Kerr, Antarctic Ozone Hole Fails to Recover, 
SCIENCE, Oct 14, 1994, at 422; Richard A. Kerr, Studies Say - Tentatively - That 
Greenhouse Warming is Here, SCIENCE, June 15, 1995, at 1567; Richard Monastersy, 
Dusting the Climate for Fingerprints: Has the Greenhouse Warming Arrived? Will We 
Ever Know, SCIENCE NEWS, June 10, 1995, at 362. 
198. See, e.g., R.A. Rappaport et al., "New" DDT Inputs to North America: At­
mospheric Deposition, 14 CHEMOSPHERE 1 1 67 {1985); Andrew Lawler, NASA Mission 
Gets Down to Earth, SCIENCE, Sept. l ,  1995, at 1208. 
199. See, e.g., William F. Fitzgerald, Mercury as a Global Pollutant, WORLD & I 
(Oct. 1993) at 192; Carrie Levine, Arctic as Polluted as Europe 100 Years Ago -
Study, Reuters North American Wire, Mar. 3, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, 
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dependence and thus additional extemality-based reasons to consider 
centralized environmental regulation. 
b. What Form of Centralization? The presence of a transboundary 
harm demands some form of overarching governmental action across 
the scope of the harm. Lack of a mechanism to facilitate collective ac­
tion among jurisdictions whose fates are ecologically linked leads to a 
tragedy-of-the-commons dynamic that promises market failure, alloca­
tive inefficiency, welfare loss, and infringements on property rights. At 
the very least, the jurisdictions sharing an environmental resource or 
problem must establish a process for clarifying the scope of the prop­
erty rights in question as well as rules and procedures for allowing 
these rights to be traded (and, if necessary, vindicated at law) at low 
cost. Such a structure requires some degree of centralization. Thus, the 
question is not whether to have centralized regulation, but rather what 
kind of centralization to pursue. 
As discussed in Part I,200 how far one moves from cooperative pol­
icies toward more full-blown centralization is simply a matter of de­
gree. If environmental property rights are clear and mechanisms for 
trading and vindicating these rights are available at a reasonable cost, 
centralized regulation is not needed. But often these conditions are not 
met.201 Beyond this theory, empirical observation supports the conclu­
sion that collaboration among decentralized jurisdictions often yields 
unsatisfactory results in response to externalities. Even among the U.S. 
states, collaboration in response to interstate pollution is minimal.202 Be­
yond federal mandates, states take little account of the harms that their 
industries cause to downriver or downwind jurisdictions. 203 Internation-
Txtnws File (finding mercury, PCPs, and insecticides in Arctic fish); R.A. Rappaport et 
al., supra note 198. 
200. See supra text accompanying notes 57-62. 
201. As noted in Part I, every time we move from a single jurisdiction (with a 
fully centralized regulatory regime) to a multijurisdictional world, we reopen the "why 
regulation" question. 
202. The struggles of the Ozone Transport Assessment Group demonstrate this 
fact. See Anthony Jewell, Utilities Group Says Federal Ozone Rules May Be Unfair to 
State, CoURIER-J. (Louisville, Ky), Feb. 7, 1996, at 2B; Proposed Ozone Transport 
Plan Would Fall Hard on Utilities, ENERGY REP., Feb. 26, 1996, available in 
WESTLAW, 1996 WL 8375588; Doug Sword, Midwest Fights Dirty Image, Blame for 
Pollution Called Unfair, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), Mar. 17, 1996, at 17A. 
203. See GERRARD, supra note 73, at 98 (noting prevalence of locally undesirable 
land uses (LULUs) on state boundaries); Richard E. Ayres, Enforcement of Air Pollu­
tion Controls on Stationary Sources Under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 4 
EcOLOGY L.Q. 441, 452-53 (1975); Revesz, supra note 186, at 16 (noting that states 
encourage tall stacks, pushing pollution downwind). Maine's independent governor 
Angus King recently demanded that tlte EPA take action to stop pollution from other 
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ally, efforts to internalize pollution externalities are even more crude.204 
Countries often assert their "sovereignty" over their resources and en­
vironmental policy as though this mantra provides immunity from re­
sponsibility for transboundary pollution spillovers.205 Ultimately, though 
the difficulty of coordinating across jurisdictions - which is undoubt­
edly greater internationally than among national subjurisdictions -
speaks to the question of what sort of regulatory regime will be possi­
ble; it does not change the need for overarching governmental interven­
tion to avoid market failure and property rights infringements. 
2. Economic Externalities: The Race to the Bottom 
The prisoner's dilemma dynamic inherent in circumstances of eco­
nomic interdependence and the resulting risk of economic externalities 
and welfare loss long have been understood. To respond to 
noncooperative "beggar-thy-neighbor" tariff and currency policies that 
led to global economic chaos in the 1930s, the architects of the post­
World War II international order recognized the need to erect an elabo­
rate worldwide regulatory regime for international trade.206 The prospect 
states blowing into Maine. See John Milne, Maine Blames Massachusetts, Others For 
Polluting Air, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 2, 1995, at 20. 
204. See generally Bodansky, supra note 194. But see INSTITUTIONS FOR THE 
EARTH: SOURCES OF EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
(Peter M. Haas et al. eds, 1993) (identifying some examples of international coopera­
tion). For specific case reports, see Christopher Babinski, Survey of the Baltic Basin 
States, FIN. TIMEs, Dec. 16, 1992, at 14 (discussing northern Europe acid rain 
problems); Jane Shaw, Debate Over Acid Rain Will Intensify in 1981, CHEM. ENGI­
NEERING, Feb. 1981, at 435. More recently, Japan has become alarmed at China's pol­
lution spillovers across the Sea of Japan. See Geoffrey Murray, Massive Environmental 
Cleanup Urged in China, Japan Economic Newswire Plus, Nov. 12, 1994, available in 
DIALOG, File No. 612. 
205. There is, in fact, no sovereign right to pollute. On the contrary, both Principle 
21 of the Stockholm Declaration of 1972 and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration of 1992 
establish the opposite principle, that states have a "responsibility to ensure that activi­
ties within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment or other 
States or areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction." Declaration on the Human 
Environment: Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 
supra note 42, at 10; Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, supra note 42, 
at 2. Thus, it is the victims of transboundary pollution that suffer an affront to sover­
eignty. But see Marc Pallemaerst, International Environmental Law from Stockholm to 
Rio: Back to the Future?, in GREENING INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 ,  5 (Phillippe Sands 
ed., 1993) (noting that the responsibility for spillovers is juxtaposed with a "sovereign 
right" to exploit one's own resources). 
206. For a complete history of the GATI', see JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD 
TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969). See also EsTY, supra note 52, ch. 4. For a 
further history of other parts of the "Bretton Woods" regime, see ROBERT SOLOMON, 
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM, 1945-1976, at 10, 13, 31-32, 211-13 
(1977). Similar "commons" problems in the context of governmental redistributive 
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of economic spillovers in the environmental domain entails a similar 
situation: horizontally arrayed jurisdictions competing for economic ad­
vantage through beggar-thy-neighbor environmental policies. 
Fears of a welfare-reducing race to the bottom represent one of the 
central underpinnings of federal environmental regulation in the United 
States.207 Competitiveness concerns also have been at the heart of the 
debate about the appropriate scale of environmental regulation in the 
context of liberalized international trade.208 Yet it has become a key 
tenet of second-generation thinking that such fears are unjustified and 
even counterproductive from a social welfare perspective.209 
There is little controversy about the dynamic that underlies such 
fears. Whenever a jurisdiction's industries are in competition with com­
panies from other locales that have lower environmental compliance 
costs, governmental officials face pressures either to reduce the regula­
tory burden or to risk lost sales for their industries, reduced future in­
vestment, job displacement, and even industry migration.210 The ques­
tion is whether this strategic dynamic enhances or reduces social 
welfare. Second-generation theorists refer to these pressures as "regula-
functions also have been identified. See DAVID L. SHAPmo, FEDERALISM 46 (1995) 
(arguing that redistributive governmental activities must be centralized); see also PE­
TERSON, supra note 1 13, at 76-77. 
207. See supra note 66. 
208. See EsTY, supra note 52, at 155-80; Stewart, supra note 64; see also Owen 
Lomas, Environmental Protection, Economic Conflict and the European Community, 33 
McGn.L LJ. 506 (1988); Max Baucus, Protecting the Global Commons: The Nexus 
Between Trade and Environmental Policy (Oct. 30, 1991) (address before the Institute 
for International Economics). 
209. Many economists speak out of both sides of their mouths on this issue. On 
the one hand, they recite the economic orthodoxy that finds no empirical evidence of a 
race to the bottom. See ROBERT REPETTO, JOBS, COMPETITIVENESS, AND ENVmON­
MENTAL REGULATION: WHAT ARE THE REAL IssUES? 9 (1995); Jaffe et al., supra 
note 134; Kalt, supra note 134; Low & Yeats, supra note 134. On the other hand, they 
endorse the basic theory of comparative advantage, which suggests that we should ex­
pect (and desire) pollution-intensive operations to move to jurisdictions with lower en­
vironmental standards. See, e.g., The Freedom To Be Dirtier Than the Rest, ECONO­
MIST, May 30, 1992, at 7 (explaining the economic logic for having more polluting 
industries located in developing countries); Let Them Eat Pollution, EcONOMIST, Feb. 
8, 1992, at 66 (discussing Harvard economist and now Treasury Deputy Secretary Larry 
Summers's infamous World Bank memo advocating migration of dirty industries to de­
veloping countries). 
210. See Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Compet­
itiveness, 102 YALE LJ. 2039, 2041, 2084-86, 2098 (1993); Kym Anderson, Environ­
mental Standards and International Trade 7 (April 1996) (unpublished paper prepared 
for the World Bank's Annual Conference on Development Economics, Washington, 
D.C., Apr. 25-26, 1996) (maintaining that one country's environmental policy choice is 
not independent of the choices of other countries). But see REPETTO, supra note 209 
(arguing that competitiveness effects are not serious). 
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tory competition" and believe that the results are presumptively effi­
cient and welfare optimizing.211 Revesz not only proffers the welfare­
enhancing promise of the regulatory competition dynamic but also dis­
parages the logic of the race to the bottom. He declares that race-to-the­
bottom arguments in the environmental area have been made "with es­
sentially no theoretical foundation" and that interstate regulatory com­
petition should be seen as "presumptively beneficial. "212 Race-to-the­
bottom theorists obviously disagree on both counts. 
a. Regulatory Competition Versus the Race to the Bottom. The two 
theories can be distinguished by their assumptions. If the environmental 
policy process resembles a prisoner's dilemma, then suboptimal results 
may ensue,213 but if the market for location rights is relatively competi­
tive and the environmental standard-setting process parallels pricing 
under perfect competition, then there is no reason to fear a race to the 
bottom.214 Standards may be reduced, but governments will not pursue 
suboptimal environmental policies just to obtain economic gains.215 
Thus, the central question is: Does the "market" for environmental 
policymaking look more like perfect competition, in which efficiency 
gains can be anticipated from the competitive forces unleashed, or im­
perfect competition, in which market failures will reduce welfare?216 
Revesz acknowledges distinctions between the market for location 
rights and a widget market, but he finds the differences unimportant.217 
For him, as for other regulatory competition theorists, the law is a 
21 1.  See Revesz, supra note 1, at 1253. Even Stewart, the original proponent of 
federal regulation to respond to the race to the bottom, now seems to believe that state­
against-state regulatory competition will often lead to better results. See Stewart, supra 
note 64, at 1341 n.36. 
212. Revesz, supra note 1, at 1244, 1253. 
213. Revesz himself demonstrates this logic. See Revesz, supra note 1, at 1229-
33; see also Alvin K. Klevorick, Reflections on the Race to the Bottom, in FAm. TRADE 
AND HARMONIZATION, supra note 132, at 459. 
214. See Revesz, supra note l, at 1233-35. 
215. Suboptimality might, moreover, arise in the form of standards that are "too 
high." Indeed, in some industries, locational decisions may tum on employee amenities 
such as a clean environment, in which case governments might "overspend" to attract 
the facility, producing a "race to the top." See EDWIN S. Miu.s & BRUCE W. HAMIL­
TON, URBAN EcONOMICS 38 (4th ed. 1989) (observing that higher amenities may al­
low a company to pay lower wages). 
216. As Klevorick notes, if the prisoner's dilemma is an accurate picture of com­
petition among governments, then those who argue that there is a race to the bottom are 
on firm ground, but if the regulatory market is not subject to failure, then interjurisdic­
tional competition will enhance and not harm welfare. See Klevorick, supra note 213, at 
461. 
217. See Revesz, supra note l, at 1234-35. 
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"product," like any other.218 Just as price competition disciplines com­
panies in the private marketplace, regulatory competition forces govern­
ments to compete for citizens and companies under conditions that 
closely resemble competition among producers of other goods.219 Thus, 
Revesz asks rhetorically: "If one believes that competition among sell­
ers of widgets is socially desirable, why is competition among sellers of 
location rights socially undesirable?"220 
The answer to this question is straightforward: states act strategi­
cally.221 Competition in the regulatory market does not work like prod­
uct competition. Unlike firms in perfect competition, states in their reg­
ulatory mode are not pure price takers.222 They cannot ignore the fact 
that a slight reduction in environmental standards (the price of their lo­
cation rights) might bring economic welfare gains in excess of any 
218. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 1 18, at 1 ("The law as a product anal­
ogy invites a prediction that the governments producing law will compete for custom­
ers, rent-producing citizens, firms, and transactions - if given the freedom to do so."). 
See generally Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation 
Puwe, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985). 
219. When governments act in other ways, for example, in their redistributive role, 
we know that races will be triggered and that such functions must be done centrally. 
See, e.g., PETERSON, supra note 1 13, at 76-77 ("The more a local community engages 
in redistribution, the more the marginal benefit/tax ratio for the average taxpayer de­
clines, and the more the local economy suffers."). Thus, to the extent that environmen­
tal policies are redistributive, they must be centralized. "Environmental justice" goals, 
for example, should be pursued on a national basis. Similarly, addressing certain indi­
visibly national environmental problems (cleaning up Department of Energy weapons 
factories or other defense-related contamination, for example) is also redistributive, and 
requires a centralized regime at least to raise the necessary funds if not to manage the 
details of each cleanup effort. 
220. Revesz, supra note 1 ,  at 1234. Revesz assumes that citizens are immobile. In 
his analogy to the widget market, he assumes that firms are the only consumers of loca­
tion rights. 
221. See Barrett, Strategy and Environment, supra note 1 15. For evidence that 
states (and Indian tribes) in fact do seek to attract industry on the basis of their rela­
tively lax environmental standards, see GERRARD, supra note 73, at 135-38; High De­
sert Regional Economic Development Authority, Advertisement, EXPANSION MGMT., 
Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 16 (promising "flexible air standards"); Healdsburg Redevelopment 
Agency, Advertisement, CAL. STRATEGIES, Autumn 1995, at 22 (offering "environ­
mental problem-solving"); see also DAN McGOVERN, THE CAMPO INDIAN LAND­
FILL WAR (1995) (discussing waste companies' interest in low-standard Indian reserva­
tions as the site for new facilities). 
222. Revesz elides this critical point. Indeed, while much of the early part of his 
article, see Revesz, supra note 1, at 1213-18, focuses on the environmental policy chal­
lenge as a prisoner's dilemma and implies strategic behavior and imperfect competition, 
he then shifts abruptly to a discussion of regulatory competition, see id. at 1234-35, 
which implies a model of perfect competition and assumes away the problem of strate­
gic behavior. See Brian Langille, "A Day at the Races": A Reply to Professor Revesz 
on the Race to the Bottom (June 15, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the 
Michigan Law Review). 
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losses from the resulting environmental degradation. In contrast, per­
fectly competitive firms face no such incentive because they can sell 
any quantity that they choose at the market-clearing price.223 Moreover, 
they will lose, not gain, by lowering their price. 
Differences between the markets for widgets and location rights 
need not always produce a race to the bottom.224 Yet there are a host of 
factors suggesting that the market for environmental-policy-driven loca­
tion rights is relatively imperfect and thus that untrammeled regulatory 
competition produces suboptimal outcomes. These factors are not uni­
versally or uniformly present, but their frequency in the real world is 
such that the benefits of regulatory competition cannot be presumed.225 
First, environmental regulation operates in a realm where quantita­
tive welfare comparisons are difficult. The "hard" variables in any 
cost-benefit calculus dwarf the "soft." Thus, while the logic of regula­
tory competition in the tax or corporate-control realms may be strong 
because the "consumers" can see, evaluate, and appreciate the "prod­
uct" that they are buying, no such transparency exists with regard to 
environmental regulation. Tangible, demonstrable, and plainly apparent 
economic benefits of reduced environmental regulation overwhelm the 
uncertain, intangible, future costs associated with environmental degra­
dation. The assumption of perfect information that undergirds perfect 
223. For a discussion of basic Marshallian welfare theory, see RICHARD A. BI­
LAS. MICROECONOMIC THEORY: A GRAPmCAL ANALYSIS 67-80 (1967); Gerald D. 
Jaynes, Economic Theory and Land Tenure, in CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS, EM­
PLOYMENT, AND w AGES IN RURAL LABOR MARKETS IN AsIA 43 (Hans P. Bin­
swanger & Mark R. Rosenzweig eds., 1984); Jerry A. Hausman, Exact Consumer's Sur­
plus and Deadweight Loss, 71 AM. EcoN. REV. 662 (1981). 
224. However, a beneficial regulatory competition process is likely to occur only 
under a narrow set of circumstances. See Truman F. Bewley, A Critique of Tiebout's 
Theory of Local Public Expenditures, 49 EcONOMETRICA 713, 714 (1981); Brian R. 
Copeland & M. Scott Taylor, Trade and Transboundary Pollution, 85 AM. EcoN. REv. 
716 (1995); James R. Markusen et al., Competition in Regional Environmental Policies 
When Plant Locations are Endogenous, 56 J. OF PUB. EcoN. 55 (1995) (finding subop­
timal "Nash" equilibriums under many circumstances when i:he assumption of perfect 
competition is put aside); Martin C. McGuire, Regulation, Factor Rewards, and Inter­
national Trade, 17 J. PUB. EcoN. 335, 354 (1982). But see FISCHEL, supra note 19 
(spirited defense of the realism of the Tiebout model); William A. Fischel, Property 
Taxation and the Tiebout Model: Evidence for the Benefit View from Zoning and Voting, 
30 EcoN. LIT. 171 (1992). 
225. See Ian Ayres, Supply-Side Inefficiencies in Corporate Charter Competition: 
Lessons from Patents, Yachting, and Bluebooks, 43 KANs. L. REv. 541, 543 (1995); 
Klevorick, supra note 213, at 460 (stating that race to the bottom is "highly contex­
tual"); James R. Markusen et al., Environmental Policy When Market Structure and 
Plant Locations are Endogenous, 24 J. ENVTL. EcoN. & MGMT. 69, 84 (1993); Stew­
art, supra note 210, at 2059 (concluding that races to suboptimal outcomes will some­
times occur). 
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competition theories cannot be squared with the reality of environmen­
tal policymaking: the invisibility and lag times of many environmental 
harms; threshold effects that produce unpredictable discontinuities in 
dose-response functions; and the natural political tendency to discount 
unknown and uncertain future harms.226 Revesz's theory can bear more 
weight if one assumes away technical transaction costs, but to do so is 
to distance oneself from environmental reality and to diminish the pol­
icy relevance of the work. 
Second, politicians do not make environmental policy choices by 
equating the marginal costs and marginal benefits of lowering standards 
to gain a factory or to avoid losing one. Instead, industrial investments 
are "lumpy." Thus, the image generated by regulatory competition the­
ory of governments carefully calibrating the price of their location 
rights (that is, the stringency of their environmental controls) to get the 
optimal level and kind of industry seems farfetched. 227 In addition, in 
the bidding for capital investments, there may well be a "winner's 
curse" that results in a systematic overvaluation of the benefits of a 
new factory and a simultaneous undervaluation of its environmental 
costs.228 This tendency to overbid arises because in the competition for 
a new facility, the winner will be the jurisdiction most optimistic about 
the net value of the project and thus willing to bid the highest (by low­
ering its environmental standards the most).229 Finally, governments 
may lower environmental standards230 generally to signal their interest 
in attracting business and jobs.231 In such circumstances, when policy is 
set in the abstract and without any direct connection to the cost of ac­
quiring the marginal firm, there may well be a tendency to overdo the 
signal and loosen standards too much.232 
226. Revesz dismisses such results as "errors" in the policy process and argues 
that any race to the bottom that ensues is a function of the "state's failure to act in an 
economically rational manner." Revesz, supra note 1 at 1243. But this is an example of 
where theory and policy intersect. It is not clear that politicians are making an "error." 
Perhaps they are acting economically irrationally, but they certainly are not acting polit­
ically irrationally. If one's theory depends on assuming away noneconomic elements of 
political reality, the policy relevance of the analysis becomes quite limited. 
227. See Markusen et al., supra note 224, at 69. 
228. See Peter B. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Ex­
plaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, Sympo­
sium, Constructing a New Federalism, YALE J. ON REG. & YALE. L. & POLY. REV. 
68, 98 (1996). 
229. See id. 
230. "Lowering" environmental standards may not entail voting in lax rules but 
may simply involve less strict enforcement of existing rules. 
231. There are many examples of such signals in states' or countries' advertise­
ments about their business climates. See supra note 221. 
232. See Swire, supra note 228. 
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Third, governmental bodies are relatively weak instruments of 
market discipline.233 Compare a hypothesized corporate charter race to 
the bottom with environmental regulatory competition. The original the­
ory in this regard, advanced by Cary, is that company executives will 
seek to incorporate in Delaware because of the advantages that that 
state's laws provide in protecting managers' positions at the expense of 
shareholder welfare.234 Winter disputes this theory and argues that mar­
ket forces constrain managers.235 Specifically, he observes that manag­
ers who routinely seek to protect themselves at the expense of the 
shareholders will become targets for takeovers or will drive their firms 
into bankruptcy. 
In the environmental field, the "electoral market" constraining 
government "managers" works less directly. Political decisionmakers 
often are free to accept money and other benefits from polluters in re­
turn for advantageous regulatory decisions. Unifying the mass of voters 
who are negatively, but indirectly, affected as a result is extremely diffi­
cult.236 Thus, there is no comparable control on suboptimal political de­
cisions about environmental regulation of the sort that exists in the mar­
ket for corporate control.237 
The study of races to the bottom in the bank charter context sup­
ports a similar conclusion.238 Bank regulation, like environmental rules, 
233. Although Revesz acknowledges this weakness in his analogy to perfect com­
petition, he dismisses the concern as simply one arising from governmental undervalua­
tion of environmental benefits and "not a consequence of the competition among 
states." Revesz, supra note 1,  at 1235. But this cursory treatment of the public choice 
problem is insufficient. It is the very prospect of systematic undervaluation of environ­
mental benefits by politicians that renders the analogy to a perfectly competitive market 
ini.tpt. 
234. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Del­
aware, 83 YALE LJ. 663, 663-84 (1974). 
235. See Ralph K. Wmter, Jr., Shareholder Protection and the Theory of the Cor­
poration, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251,  262-73 (1977); see also Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federal­
ism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 
105 HARV. L. REv. 1435 (1992); Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in 
Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709 (1987). 
236. See supra notes 51-52. Even Wmter acknowledges that states should not be 
allowed to set their own rules regarding takeovers because the managers will not be 
good agents for the shareholders. See Wmter, supra note 235, at 251-92; see also 
Mashaw & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 1 1 1, at 118-21 .  
237. Again, Revesz could argue that the inefficiency arises here not because of 
regulatory competition but rather because of public choice failures. As a matter of pure 
theory, this might be correct, but to ignore the realities of the political marketplace 
reduces the strength of any policy conclusions that might be drawn from such 
theorizing. 
238. See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the 
Dual Banking System, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 677, 713 (1988). 
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represents a public good that is not purely local. The bank charter race 
arises because bankers protected by FDIC insurance can obtain above 
average returns through risky lending, confident that success will yield 
handsome rewards and that a significant portion of the costs of failure 
will be borne by others. As one state relaxes its regulatory control to 
enable its bankers to take advantage of this risk-spreading opportunity, 
other welfare-maximizing states will be tempted to follow suit to avail 
their own bankers and depositors of the opportunity for high rates of 
return.239 
This race might be triggered, even in the absence of the FDIC risk­
spreading scheme, by pressure on politicians to avoid disadvantaging 
local bankers. Even if all of the downside risk is borne locally, the 
structure of the bank charter problem, like pollution harms, entails un­
certain future risks that might lead a welfare-maximizing politician to­
ward lax regulation given that the benefits of high returns will accrue 
immediately while the costs will arise in the future (perhaps even on 
someone else's watch) if at all. When some of the costs clearly will be 
spread to others (through �IC insurance or pollution spillovers), the 
calculus favoring lax regulation and tending to create a race to the bot­
tom becomes overwhelming.240 
Finally, even if one assumes that the technical analysis of one's 
own jurisdiction is perfect and that no physical pollution spillovers or 
public choice distortions exist, one cannot be assured of a welfare­
maximizing process of regulatory competition if any other jurisdiction 
suffers from either technical inadequacies or public choice flaws. Once 
any party moves off its "true" optimal level of environmental regula­
tion - to a standard that is either too high or too low - others cannot 
be assured, under the Theory of Second Best, that staying with their 
own "island jurisdiction" optimization strategy will continue to maxi­
mize welfare.241 The conclusion I draw is a modest one: the scope for 
failure in the market for environmental-policy-determined location 
rights is significant enough to make untenable a presumption that regu­
latory competition in this domain will be welfare enhancing. 
239. This analysis relaxes the assumption that there are no interjurisdictional spill­
overs, reflecting the reality of both national insurance schemes and many pollution 
problems. 
240. Revesz again could argue that the bank-charter-policy failure arises because 
of either externalities or public choice problems - not the dynamics of competition. 
Once again, this rests the theory on very narrow and counterfactual assumptions. Note, 
furthermore, that Butler and Macey's solution to the bank charter race - risk-adjusted 
FDIC rates - relies on more refined central regulation, not state-based control. 
241. See Anderson, supra note 210, at 12 (arguing that when there is more than 
one distortion, optimizing any particular policy dimension may not increase welfare). 
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b. Economic Models. A second strand of regulatory competition 
theory consists of extensions of the Tiebout hypothesis.242 Early models, 
Tiebout's included, are based on problematic assumptions.243 But 
Revesz and other regulatory competition theorists rely on the latest re­
finement of the hypothesis by Oates and Schwab, which aims to over­
come these shortcomings.244 Ironically, Oates and Schwab can be read 
to corroborate race-to-the-bottom fears, as they find interjurisdictional 
competition efficiency enhancing only under tightly defined circum­
stances.245 If governments rely - as they all do - on "inefficient tax 
instruments," including nonzero taxes on capital, welfare-diminishing 
levels of pollution result. Oates and Schwab further note that other 
"distortions," such as policy decisions that deviate from the will of the 
electorate or the existence of "conflicts of interest within a heterogene­
ous community," also lead to suboptimal results.246 
Recognizing the pervasiveness of positive tax rates on capital,· 
Revesz strains to rescue his argument by claiming that these suboptimal 
results are "due to an 'error' on the part of state regulators rather than 
to a structural failure of state autonomy in a federal system. "247 In the 
end, Revesz's theoretical dismissal of the race to the bottom depends on 
heroic assumptions, including perfect governmental rationality, a point 
of departure not unlike the Tiebout and Fischel models with which he 
himself finds fault. 
242. See supra text accompanying notes 136-37. 
243. Tiebout's model assumes that (1) individuals are entirely mobile and choose 
to live where the taxes imposed and the services provided best match their own "prefer­
ence patterns"; and (2) everyone lives on dividend income and therefore is immune to 
job loss concerns. As the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) debate 
made clear, in the real world jobs are an issue. In addition to their restrictive assump­
tions, the work of Tiebout and Fischel can be criticized on a number of other grounds. 
In particular, their models fail to address the problems of shifting majorities, agenda 
manipulation, and strategic behavior. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Tiebout Models and 
the Competitive Ideal: An Essay on the Political Economy of Local Government, in 
PERSPECTIVES ON LoCAL PuBuc FINANCE AND PuBuc POLICY 23, 36-41 (John 
M. Quigley ed., 1983). 
244. See Revesz, supra note 1, at 1242. 
245. See Oates & Schwab, supra note 4, at 350. 
246. See id. at 351; see also Susan Rose-Ackerman, Beyond Tiebout: Modeling the 
Political Economy of Local Government, in LoCAL PROVISION OF PuBuc SERVICES: 
THE TIEBOUT MODEL AFraR TwENTY-FIVE YEARS 55, 59-65 (George R. Zodrow 
ed., 1983) (demonstrating that if the assumption of homogeneity within each commu­
nity is dropped so that majority positions outvote minority ones, new voting instabilities 
emerge). 
247. Revesz, supra note 1,  at 1243. As Richard Stewart notes, one does not even 
have to assume extreme myopia on the part of governments, but simply standard setting 
under conditions of uncertainty. See .Stewart, supra note 210, at 2045-56. 
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More significantly, Revesz does not leave the argument at this 
point. Rather than offering the conclusion that under some circum­
stances interjurisdictional competition may not lead to a race to the bot­
tom,248 he talces two further steps. From the shaky ground of his analy­
sis of Tiebout and regulatory competition theory, and seemingly in 
contradiction of himself,249 Revesz dismisses the theoretical possibility 
of races to the bottom and makes the additional leap to a policy pre­
scription presumptively favoring decentralized regulation.250 It is here 
that his logic most seriously falters. 
First, the suggestion that there is no theoretical foundation for the 
race-to-the-bottom dynamic either rests on too narrow a set of assump­
tions to be of much interest, or overstates the conclusions that can be 
drawn from Oates and Schwab and their progeny. Models demonstrat­
ing the logic of a race to the bottom under certain circumstances 
abound. 251 That other models premised on other assumptions show that 
competitiveness-driven suboptimal environmental policies need not en­
sue does not support the claim that there is no theoretical basis for the 
248. Revesz tries to bolster his dismissal of race-to-the-bottom concerns with the 
observation that states sometimes exceed federal standards. See Revesz, supra note 1, at 
1228. But his anecdotal examples only further prove the difficulty of making sweeping 
conclusions, since for every example of states exceeding federal standards that Revesz 
cites, a recent example of states reducing their environmental controls to reestablish 
their competitiveness can be identified. See, e.g., Joel Stashenko, NY Eases off Lake 
Pollution Agreements, Run.AND HERALD, July 28, 1995, at 1 (explaining New York's 
decision to back away from phosphorus emissions controls in Lake Champlain); James 
P. Sweeney, Environmental Bloc Holds Its Own, But Wait till Next Year, SAN Dmoo 
UNION-TRIB., Sept. 22, 1995, at A6 (reporting on the scaling back of environmental 
regulation in California); James Rusk, Ontario Proposes Environmental Law Overhaul, 
TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, Aug. 1, 1996, at B13 (reporting on Ontario's "sweeping 
overhaul" of its provincial environmental regulations that would relieve pulp mills from 
eliminating chlorine, reduce testing for toxics, and other pollution reducing "burdens"). 
Whether a particular environmental issue will engender a competitiveness-inspired race­
to-the-bottom or a NIMBY-induced race to the top depends on the structure of the par­
ticular problem. See John Douglas Wilson, Capital Mobility and Environmental Stan­
dards: Is There a Theoretical Basis for a Race to the Bottom?, in FAIR TRADE AND 
HARMONIZATION, supra note 132, at 393. 
249. Revesz's own analysis reveals a race if the structure of the relevant game is a 
prisoners' dilemma. See Revesz, supra note 1, at 1230-33. 
250. See id. at 1253. 
251 .  See Eric W. Bond & Larry Samuelson, Bargaining With Commitment, Choice 
of Techniques and Direct Foreign Investment, 26 J. INTL. EcoN. 77 (1989) (finding a 
race to the bottom under a pure property tax scenario); Sam Bucovetsky & John Doug­
las Wiison, Tax Competition with Two Tax Instruments, 1991 REGIONAL SCIENCE AND 
URBAN EcoNOMICS 333, 349 (showing that public goods are underprovided when 
wages are taxed, even capital is not); Markusen et al., supra note 224, at 82-84 (show­
ing "lumpy" investments result in a race to the bottom); Oates & Schwab, supra note 
4, at 342-45 (illustrating a race in which capital is taxed); Wilson, supra note 248 (dis­
cussing a race to the bottom under varying conditions). 
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race to the bottom unless Revesz can demonstrate that his picture of the 
environmental policy process more closely resembles reality than do 
competing views. This he cannot do. 
Second, just because a race to the bottom need not occur does not 
mean that it will not occur. In fact, to the extent that the no-need-to­
worry viewpoint depends on numerous, and often counterfactual, as­
sumptions, the theoretical existence of a world where races to the bot­
tom do not arise provides little basis for optimism that welfare­
. enhancing regulatory competi�on will emerge broadly in the real world. 
Indeed, Revesz's greatest misstep derives from his attempt to draw pol­
icy conclusions. He lays down the gauntlet early by challenging envi­
ronmental federal regulation as "likely to produce results that are unde­
sirable. "252 While we might all agree that the current structure of 
regulation produces undesirable results, Revesz does next to nothing to 
show that the source of the problem is the federalness of the 
regulations. 
Ultimately, Revesz's argument that a race to the bottom is not in­
evitable cannot support the weight he puts on it. Having knocked a 
brick out of the foundation of federal environmental regulation, Revesz 
could have asserted that centralized regulation is not justified in all cir­
cumstances. He could have then provided examples of cases in which 
regulatory competition might be preferable. But this is not his claim, as 
he makes no attempt to delimit the sphere in which his argument holds. 
From a policy perspective, the key question is not whether, theo­
retically, we could design a world without races to the bottom, but 
whether we now live in one. Interstate pollution spillovers are perva­
sive, as are public choice distortions of the political process. The fact 
that politicians set environmental standards strategically with an eye on 
potential job losses and the investment effects of their policies should 
not be surprising.253 The view that we can avoid races to the bottom by 
getting governments to adopt more sophisticated taxation schemes and 
otherwise acting in a manner that represents perfect economic rational-
252. Revesz, supra note 1 ,  at 1212. 
253. See, for example, reports on the 1990 Clean Air Act debate, such as: Mar­
garet E. Kriz, Politics in the Air, 21 NATL. J. 1098 (1989); Robert Kasten, Jr., Why 
Reich is Wrong on Jobs, WASH. T!MEs. June 8, 1993, at Fl  (discussing Clean Air Act 
job effects). See also EsTY, supra note 52, at 21-23. The European Union's inability to 
implement a proposed carbon-BTU tax offers further evidence of the salience of com­
petitiveness concerns in environmental policymaking. See Electricity Companies Con­
firm Opposition to EC Carbon Tax Proposals, Press Assn. Newsfile, July 2, 1993, 
available in LEXIS, News Library, Panews File; Colin Moynihan, Changing Stars For 
Energy's Direction, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Feb. 21, 1993, at 39. 
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ity and public representativeness may be correct.254 Yet in the realm of 
practice rather than theory, environmental policymakers remain justified 
in fearing the dynamic of a regulatory race to the bottom.255 
3. Psychological Externalities, Internalities, and the 
"Choice of Public" 
From a pure welfare maximization perspective, nonuse or exis­
tence values of environmental resources should be taken into account in 
setting environmental policy. For example, the value Americans place 
on African elephants should be reflected in African elephant conserva­
tion policy decisions. The ethereal nature of psychological spillovers 
casts doubt, however, on the substantiality of these welfare claims. 
Even if the utility gains or losses from such spillovers can be docu­
mented, another question must be asked: Do the claims rise to the level 
of a property right? If not, they may not need to be factored into the 
regulatory cost-benefit analysis.256 
a. Choice-of Public Issues. In important respects, nature and geog­
raphy define the optimal scope of governmental intervention in the en­
vironmental realm. While regulatory strategies generally are established 
along political boundaries such as cities, states, and countries, ecologi­
cal problems almost never conform to these often artificial borders.257 
Thus a regulatory response conforming to political boundaries will 
often be suboptimal. Moreover, a second dimension to the optimal regu-
254. See Revesz, supra note 1 ,  at 1243; Wilson, supra note 248, at 36. 
255. Revesz suggests that even if there exists a race in the environmental domain, 
federal regulation may still not be called for because halting the environmental policy 
race will simply drive state-versus-state competition into other arenas, such as worker 
safety or minimum wages. See Revesz, supra note 1 ,  at 1244-45. This suggestion makes 
little sense. Fundamentally, this line of analysis fails to recognize the technical com­
plexity of environmental policymaking as well as the irreversible nature of some envi­
ronmental harms. Thus, driving interstate competition out of the inherently obscure 
realm of environmental policy and into that of other governmental activities, where the 
costs and benefits of various policies are more easily compared, will be beneficial. 
256. One might argue that such interests represent only a conditional right, that is, 
one that can be enforced only if it is paid for. Thus, Americans with an interest in Afri­
can elephants or the Amazonian rain forest might be entitled to have their desires fac­
tored into the Kenyan or Brazilian policy process only to the extent they were willing to 
pay. But some commentators argue that certain resources (forests supporting biodivers­
ity, for example) are global public goods creating property rights and not merely condi­
tional interests for which payment must be made. See Christopher D. Stone, What to do 
About Biodiversity: Property Rights, Public Goods, and the Earth's Biological Riches, 
68 S. CAL. L. REv. 577, 583, 619 (1995). But see EsTY, supra note 52, 125-26 (argu­
ing that extrajurisdictional beneficiaries should pay). 
257. Ironically, political boundaries defined by nature, such as a river establishing 
a state border, tend to divide ecosystems in ways that are unhelpful from an environ­
mental policy point of view. 
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latory jurisdiction is defined by the concept of citizenship, and therefore 
bounded by the reach of the "community." Because citizenship implies 
duties to fellow citizens, those within the community are . entitled to 
have their views factored into the policy process; those outside are not. 
Decisions about the management of the Grand Canyon, for example, 
properly include the value placed on this resource by all Americans.258 
The physical bounds of an environmental resource or pollution harm 
should determine the choice of public question and the optimal jurisdic­
tion for environmental regulation unless the relevant community is big­
ger, in which case the community defines the proper scope of govern­
mental activity. 
Identifying the community vis-a-vis environmental issues can pres­
ent a serious challenge. In some circumstances, political boundaries de­
limit communities of shared values and thus prove useful in defining 
the optimal regulatory unit. In many cases, however, environmental in­
terests and values are not coterminous with existing jurisdictional lines. 
What happens, for instance, when "others" mismanage environmental 
resources from which "we" derive some benefit? Some legal scholars 
intimate that this question is trivial and that "we" can only legitimately 
be concerned about our own political jurisdiction's policies and have no 
business worrying about the "mistakes" that others make.259 Many 
economists also implicitly accept the division of the world into a "we" 
about whose utility we care and a "they" about whom we do not care. 
Nordhaus, for example, argues that if other jurisdictions set suboptimal 
environmental policies, we should not worry and might even have cause 
for celebration.260 Low standards in other jurisdictions will shift "dirty" 
industries to their territory, sparing us from pollution and providing us 
with goods at lower prices. In effect, such jurisdictions subsidize our 
consumption of certain goods that otherwise would be more expensive 
because of our pollution control costs. 
But "we" may not be better off when a neighboring jurisdiction 
makes an environmental regulatory mistake, even one in which the 
physical harm is confined to that jurisdiction. Nordhaus is right . to be 
concerned with the utility of a defined "us," but the meaning of that 
term now has broadened for many environmental issues such that a dis-
258. The community is defined here by the fact that the resource is a national 
park, acquired in the name of all Americans. Communities also may be defined by a 
sense of shared values, common traditions, or other linkages. 
259. See Richard Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LE­
GAL STUD. 103 (1979). This line of thinking does not help us answer the question of to 
what jurisdiction - town, county, state, nation, or world - we are to look for answers. 
260. See Nordhaus, supra note 28. 
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tinct "they" is no longer identifiable. Interest in distant environmental 
harms may derive from a sense of community identity that exceeds nar­
row jurisdictional bounds. Simultaneously, our sense of community may 
be broadened by an expanded interest in environmental issues. In some 
cases, the utility of people in other places, even other countries, may 
become subsumed within our own utility calculus, and to that extent 
"they" become a part of "us. "261 
It seems doubtful, for example, that many Americans exposed to 
stories about horrendous environmental conditions in China would, as 
economists might forecast, react with glee at the prospect of obtaining 
products subsidized by a Chinese willingness to absorb environmental 
insults considered unconscionable here. Instead, the informed public re­
acts with revulsion, even outrage.262 Beyond the threat of physical spill­
overs that might harm America,263 I suspect that Americ�s feel some 
identity, despite all their political differences, with the Chinese people 
who must breathe acrid air.264 
In other cases, the health of ecosystems to which we have no phys­
ical connection may enter directly into our utility calculus. Americans 
who will never visit Yellowstone National Park value its preservation.265 
After the Exxon Valdez oil spill, tens of thousands of school children 
261. In such circumstances, "our" welfare is linked to "their" welfare, or, in 
other words, our utility functions are interdependent. 
262. Consider the recent high degree of outrage over the importation into the 
United States of products made in sweatshops. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, A 
Crusader Makes Celebrities Tremble, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1996, at B4; Steven Green­
house, Labor and Clergy are Reuniting to Help the Underdogs of Society, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 18, 1996, at Al; Hany F. Rosenthal, Manufacturers Agree on No-Sweatshop 
Guarantees for Shoes, Clothes, AP. Aug. 2, 1996, available in 1996 WL 4434191.  
263. China is the world's second largest emitter of greenhouse gases, and it  is 
forecast to be the world's largest emitter by early in the next centwy. 
264. Part of this connection may derive from a sense that the Chinese authorities' 
indifference to the suffering caused by environmental damage borders on a violation of 
human rights. In the realm of natural rights, "we-they" distinctions do not exist. See, 
e.g., I U.N. WORLD CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS: VIENNA DECLARATION AND 
PROGRAMME OF ACTION, U.N. Doc. NConf.157/24 (1993), reprinted in 32 lNTL. LE­
GAL MATERIALS 1661, 1665 (1993) ("All human rights are universal, indivisible, in­
terdependent and interrelated."). Interestingly, Adam Smith argued that the destruction 
of all of China would not cause a man of humanity in Europe to lose a moment's sleep, 
whereas the loss of his own finger would cause him to sleep not a wink. See ADAM 
SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 136-37 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie 
eds., Clarendon Press 1976). 
265. There is a growing literature on "existence values" and "contingent valua­
tion" that tries to measure these welfare gains and losses. See, e.g., ROBERT CAMERON 
MITCHELL & RICHARD T. CARSON, USING SURVEYS TO v ALUE PUBuc Goons: 
THE CONTINGENT v ALUATION METHOD 64-67 (1989); Frederick R. Anderson, Natu­
ral Resource Damages, Superfund, and the Courts, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFP. L. REv. 405, 
407-08, 408 n.5 (1989); Jeffrey C. Dobbins, The Pain and Suffering of Environmental 
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sent the EPA letters and pictures expressing distress over the fate of sea 
lions, birds, and other wildlife. Although only a tiny fraction of those 
students ever will visit Prince William Sound, one cannot doubt the 
sincerity of their identification with the environmental injury that oc­
curred there. 
The extent of our interest in a distant environmental harm is also 
likely to be determined by the scope and severity of the harm itself and 
by our confidence, or lack thereof, that those on the scene are handling 
the problem appropriately. When other jurisdictions reveal themselves 
to have no effective means for addressing environmental harms, our po­
litical identity may expand to encompass even very remote injuries.266 
Just as human rights violations matter to those whose rights are not vio­
lated, so too a total disregard for the impact of pollution on human 
health or ecosystems may lead others to conclude that the failing state 
has forfeited its claim to sovereign environmental policy judgments. In 
the context of our current national debate over environmental federal­
ism, this "state failure" argument is hardly an academic concern be­
cause some U.S. states simply lack the regulatory capacity to respond 
adequately to all environmental problems.267 
For present purposes, I make this political identity argument solely 
as a matter of fact. I do not advocate greater popular sensitivity to phys­
ically distant environmental harms, but merely observe that such harms 
increasingly figure into our utility and disutility assessments. The il)ter­
connectedness of modem life is much more extensive and complex than 
is suggested by a simplistic focus on pollution impacts within immedi­
ately shared physical space or narrowly defined political borders. As 
people regard themselves as part of an ecologically defined community, 
they come to define themselves as a political community as well, often 
to a greater extent than mere physical interdependence would demand. I 
grew up, for instance, in Western Connecticut alongside the Naugatuck 
Loss: Using Contingent Valuation to Estimate Nonuse Damages, 43 DUKE LJ. 879, 
880-81 (1994). 
266. China's runaway pollution may evolve in this direction. Concern about mis­
management of the rainforests of the developing world may also reflect such 
sensibilities. 
267. See Sam Schuchat, Unfit Stewards, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept 20, 1995, at A21 
(identifying examples of weak state environmental protection efforts); see also supra 
note 165 (discussing weaknesses in state "capacity"). A number of existing federal en­
vironmental programs seem to reflect, moreover, a national ecological and political 
identity that spans the fifty states. One could argue, for example, that the Clean Water 
Act's construction grants program, providing federal funds to build wastewater treat­
ment facilities, represents a commitment that no American should live in a community 
where untreated sewage flows into nearby rivers. See Clean Water Act §§ 201-219, 33 
u.s.c. §§ 1281-1299 (1994). 
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River, which flows from Massachusetts to Long Island Sound. Those 
living in the area of the river often describe themselves as being from 
the Naugatuck Valley. This is not simply because downstream residents 
may be polluted by upstream users of the river, but because the pres­
ence of a shared resource creates a political community.268 Why else 
would upstream users identify with downstream users, from whom they 
do not anticipate direct physical spillovers? Similarly, many people 
have important aspects of their political identity established by their 
proximity to the Chesapeake Bay, the Gulf of Mexico, the Mississippi 
River, the Great Plains, the Rocky Mountains, Puget Sound, or the Cen­
tral Valley.269 Nature defines our sense of community an� makes us 
more cosmopolitan. More fundamentally, we live in an era in which po­
litical boundaries matter but do not uniquely describe community iden­
tity.270 Our analysis of the optimal scale of environmental regulation 
should reflect this fact. 
This choice of public analysis also should be seen as an extension 
of the learning of international law over the past fifty years. Specifi-
268. From the transcendentalism of Thoreau to Aldo Leopold's admonition to 
"think like a mountain," Americans have long recognized the role nature plays in trans­
forming man's understanding of himself. But my argument here is a little different. I see 
man's relationship to man as defined by nature. Geography - the fault lines of natural 
resources and ecosystems - shapes people's sense of identity in important ways and 
thus establishes the relevant community for governmental activity in the environmental 
realm. Those who see themselves as residents of the Gulf Coast, for instance, care not 
only about how their own community and state affect the quality of life on the Gulf; 
they also care about how neighboring cities and states respond to the environmental 
challenges that the· Gulf presents - and even how neighboring countries such as Mex­
ico and those of the Caribbean Islands manage their portions of this shared space. Obvi­
ously, environmental policy errors in the next town over matter much more than ones 
thousands of miles away. Nevertheless, people have a nontrivial interest in environmen­
tal policies being made much farther afield. Echoes of this geography-and·nature­
defines-the-community theory actually run deep in American history. For example, 
Thomas Paine argued that the physical distance from Great Britain made rule of the col­
onies inappropriate. See THOMAS p AINE, COMMON SENSE 90 (Isaac Kramnick ed., 
Penguin Books 1982) (1776); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Some New World Lessons for 
the Old World, 58 U. Cm. L. REv. 483, 485-97 (1991) (stressing the importance of ge­
ography in defining the optimal physical scale of a political jurisdiction). 
269. Interestingly, some of the EPA's most successful recent initiatives have been 
"geographically defined" - focused on the Chesapeake Bay, the Great Lakes, etc. -
and have tapped into this nature-detennined sense of political identity. 
270. Most people see themselves as part of a variety of communities, with geo­
graphically defined political identities being only one - and perhaps not even the most 
important - of the units around which their lives are organized. When it comes to en­
vironmental problems, people are particularly unlikely to define themselves merely on 
political-jurisdictional lines, especially if these are narrowly local or state-based. See 
Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. Cm. L. REv. 253, 262-63 (1993) (ob­
serving that few people have a sense of community defined by local political 
jurisdictions). 
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cally, interdependence in many forms mutes territorial sovereignty.271 
Cuius regio, eius religio, the 350-year-old axiom of the Peace of West­
phalia establishing a strict principle of national territorial domain as the 
foundation for relations among states, cannot be counted upon to maxi­
mize social welfare in a world of pervasive economic and ecological 
linkages.272 The current devolutionary mood ignores this complex inter­
dependence.273 In doing so, it puts at risk some of the important benefits 
that accrue from having a broader political identity. 
Broad-scale regulatory decentralization, for instance, threatens to 
disrupt the free movement of goods and services across the fifty states. 
Suppose, for example, that labor standards were deregulated entirely, 
and Idaho chose to abandon all limitations on child labor. California 
then might seek to block goods from Idaho as morally subpar, just as 
today Americans object to the importation of goods produced by Ban­
gladeshi child laborers or Chinese prison workers. In the U.S. context, 
such threats would be constrained by the constitutionally mandated in­
terstate customs union, but the level of political outrage might be con­
siderable. In fact, in an earlier era, President Franklin Roosevelt argued 
that federal labor standards were needed for just this reason. In striving 
to protect the national free trade regime, he declared that "[g]oods pro-
271. See generally ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW 
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH lNTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 
(1995); MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGIITS AND WORLD PUBLIC OR­
DER 367-449 (1980); Ernest S. Easterly ill, The Rule of Law and the New World Order, 
22 S.U. L. REv. 161 (1995); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 
100 YALE LJ. 2347 (1991). 
272. The concept of territorial sovereignty emerged, moreover, in response to the 
very specific problem of Europe's seventeenth-century religious wars and worked to 
control intolerance in a world of religious diversity. Today's environmental situation is 
not parallel. In an ecologically interdependent world, what others do within their sover­
eign borders cannot be ignored. Tolerance is not necessarily a virtue in the environmen­
tal domain. If Pennsylvania and New Jersey foul the Delaware River, the downriver cit­
izens of Maryland pay the price. If China releases CFCs, the whole world's ozone layer 
deteriorates, not just the part over China. In the environmental domain, a principle of 
"you do what you want in your territory and I will do what I want in mine" does not 
work. 
273. Recognition of the economic interdependence and other interconnections of 
modem American society served to underpin the centralization of government advanced 
during the New Deal. See, e.g., NATURAL REsoURCES COMMITTEE, THE STRUC­
TURE OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (1939), cited in HENRY M. HART, JR. & AL­
BERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND 
APPLICATION OF LAW, at Ix.ii (rev. ed. 1994). The understanding that law provided the 
"conditions of continuity" needed to facilitate complex human interactions of the sort 
that are commonplace in a national economy emerged at this time and provided the 
foundation for the prosperity the United States has achieved as the world's largest uni­
fied market See id.; see also THE RELEVANCE OF lNTERNATIONAL LAW (Karl W. 
Deutsch & Stanley Hoffman eds., 1968). 
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duced under conditions which do not meet rudimentary standards of de­
cency should be regarded as contraband and ought not to be allowed to 
pollute the channels of interstate trade. "274 In effect, Roosevelt recog­
nized the need to respond to the regulatory demands of the political 
community created as a result of the free trade regime itself. The same 
logic applies to baseline environmental standards. 
Maintaining a free trade area requires a core set of accepted com­
mon norms to guide behavior within the community.275 Indeed, many 
would argue that the existence of shared values is what defines a com­
munity. Because those in the community have a legitimate interest in 
the terms on which commerce is conducted by others in the community, 
they must be able to establish guidelines for behavior that all will fol­
low.276 Centralized ground rules for commerce, including environmental 
conditions, are part of the bargain that makes liberalized trade possi­
ble.m Without centrally determined moral baselines for economic inter­
actions, parties to free trade agreements face constant temptations to 
disregard the principle of nondiscrimination278. and to breach their obli­
gations to keep their markets open to others whenever another party 
conducts its affairs in a manner that could be deemed unacceptable.279 
274. President's Message to Congress on The Fair Labor Standards Act (May 24, 
1934), reprinted in S. REP. No. 75-884, at 2 (1937); see also id., quoted in Powell v. 
United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 516 (1950). 
275. In addition, "shallow" integration (lowering of tariff barriers) often leads to 
"deeper" integration (across regulatory policies, etc.). See ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE ET 
AL., A VISION FOR THE WORLD EcONOMY 5 (1996). 
276. Of course, there always exists a risk that the baseline rules will be manipu­
lated by rent-seeking interests whose goal is not "fair" trade but protectionism. See 
EsTY, supra note 52, at 45-46. 
277. The threat of trade disruptions from differences over environmental policy are 
very real, as can be seen from the steady stream of "trade and environment" disputes 
that have recently faced the international trading regime. See EsTY, supra note 52, Ap­
pendix C (listing recent disputes). The prospect of California imposing trade penalties 
on Idaho in the same way that the United States has imposed them on Mexico and other 
countries seems remote given the protection afforded by the .Constitution's Commerce 
Clause. But the lack of past state-versus-state efforts to impose trade penalties over per­
ceived moral failings provides no guarantees against future tensions, especially if a radi­
cally decentralized regulatory structure were to emerge. 
278. The "nondiscrimination principle" that compels the parties to treat foreign 
goods and producers as they treat their own goods and producers is the heart of any free 
trade agreement. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (Commerce Clause); General Agree­
ment on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, arts. I, ill, 61 Stat. A3, 
A12-A13, A18-Al9, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, 196-200, 204-08 [hereinafter GATT]. 
279. One of the core problems with Revesz's regulatory competition analysis and 
the arguments of others seeking to decentralize all regulation is that they implicitly as­
sume that trade policy will not be decentralized and that the considerable benefits of 
liberalized trade will be preserved despite environmental policy devolution. If, however, 
� decentralization is preferable in the environmental realm, why not in trade? The answer 
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At the very least, total regulatory decentralization puts stress on 
the free trade regime as states express revulsion at the prospect of keep­
ing their markets open to ethically suspect imports and of losing jobs 
and investment to other states whose standards seem to dip below a 
moral minimum.280 In fact, decentralization may expose the parties to a 
free trade agreement to the potentially high costs of adjudicating moral 
claims on a case-by-case basis, and to the regular disruptions of trade 
that unilateral moral judgments inflict. The alternative is to recognize 
that in return for the welfare gains of being part of a free trade commu­
nity, one must surrender a measure of sovereignty and accept at least a 
core set of centrally determined baseline behavioral rules, including en­
vironmental standards.281 
Interdependence, moreover, may be self-reinforcing. As interde­
pendence in one dimension becomes recognized and the political com­
munity is redefined accordingly, that same redefinition will create addi­
tional dimensions of interdependence. For example, "shallow" 
economic integration such as agreement on a free trade zone creates a 
"thin" community that may thicken over time as people recognize 
other aspects of their common enterprise. The strengthening of the po­
litical community leads to common noneconomic projects like environ­
mental protection that make possible "deeper" economic integration.282 
The progress ·of European unification demonstrates this phenomenon. 
Focused initially only on coal and steel, the European Union has grown 
to encompass a broad set of economic issues, and more recently envi­
ronmental issues as well.283 The process of further integration now de-
is obvious: If decentralized jurisdictions are given sovereignty over their trade policies, 
there can be no guarantee that markets will be kept open. The world's experience with 
"beggar thy neighbor" behavior is long and sordid. See Jmrn H. JACKSON, WORLD 
TRADE AND THE LAW OF GA'IT 9-10, 37-39 (1969). 
280. Ironically, many of those who seek decentralization - which implies accept­
ance of the ethical standards others choose to set for themselves - are also sharp critics 
of moral relativism when it comes to international affairs. 
281. The GATI also recognizes the need, in some areas, for minimum thresholds 
for behavior that establish the minimal sense of community required to support eco­
nomic integration. Products of prison labor, for example, are not entitled to nondiscrim­
inatory treatment See GA'IT, supra note 278, art X:X.I(e), 61 Stat at A61, 55 U.N.T.S. 
at 262. This moral and political dimension of the argument for some degree of central­
ized environmental regulation echoes the pyramids of sacrifice rationale for federal reg­
ulation articulated by Professor Stewart See Stewart, Pyramids, supra note 7, at 1217-
19. 
282. The demand for labor and environmental side agreements to the NAFrA may 
reflect the same dynamic. See LAWRENCE ET AL., supra note 275. 
283. See ANDRE SAPIR, THE HARMONIZATION OF SOCIAL PouCIES: LESSONS 
FROM EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (1994). The limits of Europe's political redefinition, 
however, currently are being tested as certain members of the Union resist the efforts of 
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pends on the development of a stronger European identity and sense of 
community, which will result in greater interdependence.284 As interde­
pendence grows, so too does the need for new areas of cooperation to 
allow states more flexibility in making the policy trade-offs that collec­
tive action inevitably demands.285 Adding the environment to the list of 
community ventures serves this purpose.286 How far this process will 
continue is hard to predict. Indeed, there is no reason to suppose that 
community redefinition - both expansion and contraction - moves in­
eluctably toward any particular end. 
In sum, there exists no clear line between "us" and "them" in the 
environmental realm. In certain important respects the biosphere cannot 
be subdivided. Despite the current devolutionary climate, ecological in­
terdependence is a fact.287 A Kantian cosmopolitan perspective in which 
each person defines himself politically at least in part as a citizen of the 
world is an inescapable reality in the realm of environmental policy.288 
This universality demands, at some level and to some degree, integrated 
environmental protection programs across state and even national 
boundaries. 
To the extent that we have a worldwide political identity, we need 
a set of global environmental norms to guide our behavior as citizens 
on this scale. Similarly, to the extent that we have a national political 
identity as Americans, there will be another (probably more numerous 
and more specific) set of environmental rules that represents the moral 
other members to broaden the European policy agenda to encompass an ever-growing 
number of issues. The extent to which environmental issues are within the ambit of this 
new European community remains to be seen. 
284. This need for a European political community lies behind the current debate 
about the EU's "democratic deficit." See, e.g., J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of 
Europe, 100 YALE LJ. 2403, 2466-74 (1991). 
285. See ERNST B. HAAs. THE UNITING OF EUROPE: PoLmCAL, SocIAL, AND 
ECONOMIC FORCES 486-527 (1958). 
286. See JOHN G. ·RuGGIE, THE FUTURE OF INTER.NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
(1981); see also JOHN EASTBY, FUNCTIONALISM AND INTERDEPENDENCE (1985) 
(discussing and synthesizing the work of Ernest Haas). 
287. In fact, the impetus behind devolution may well be an increasing awareness 
(and dislike) of interdependence. Devolution, in other words, may be an isolationist re­
sponse to an integrating world. 
288. This is true even if Kant's own policy prescription, a "Union of Nations," 
seems hopelessly idealistic. See IMMANuEL KANT, Idea for a Universal History with 
Cosmopolitan Intent, in THE PmLosoPHY OF KANT 1 16 (Carl J. Friedrich ed., 1949); 
see also JOHN LocKE. Two TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT 397 (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1698) (describing all mankind as part of "this great and 
natural Community"); John Dunn, The Nation State and Human Community: Life 
Chances, Obligation, and the Boundaries of Society 37 (1993) (unpublished manuscript, 
on file with author) (discussing "the collective ecological imperative to save a habitat 
for the human species as a whole"). 
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behavioral minimum that each citizen owes to his fellow citizens. Given 
these elements of community identity, a presumption in favor of decen­
tralized environinental regulation cannot be justified because it 
prejudges the critical question of the relevant political community vis-a­
vis the environmental problem at hand. The existence of resource man­
agement and environmental problems of different scales and of commu­
nities of interest of varying sizes makes manifest the case for a corre­
sponding hierarchy of regulatory structures. 
b. Internalities. Broader jurisdictions, of course, increase the risk 
of internalities.289 Sensitivity to this type of structural regulatory failure 
lies behind much of the recent political momentum for environmental 
devolution.290 Admittedly, the welfare losses from less accurate central­
ized representation can be serious. Yet internalities do not make the 
case for total decentralization, given the presence of technical scale 
economies or transjurisdictional externalities; selective or partial devo­
lution makes more sense. 
Federal law should facilitate such devolution.291 National standards, 
for example, should be either true baselines or tailored to varying local 
conditions. When communities want to exceed federal standards, they 
generally should be free to do so.292 Policymakers must recognize, fur­
thermore, that there exists a trade-off between devolution designed to 
address internalities and centralization that minimizes the welfare loss 
from externalities. The jurisdiction that is of optimal size for one prob­
lem will not be right for another. Even within a single policy area, the 
physical externality argument may point to one scale for intervention, 
while the scope of the community might argue for another, and the risk 
of a race to the bottom yet a third. Hybrid regulatory systems capable 
289. As the previous section indicates, some internality claims reflect a constricted 
sense of community and should not be accepted. 
290. See, e.g., GINGRICH, supra note 1 ,  at 9; see also Butler & Macey, supra note 
157, at 31-33. 
291. In general, it will be easier to devolve appropriate degrees of authority from a 
central base than to coordinate among initially decentralized jurisdictions because inter­
nalities generally do not present a zero-sum game. Pure internalities can be fixed by let­
ting a subjurisdiction go its own way at no cost to those in the broader jurisdiction. In 
the externality case, if the costs thrown onto "outsiders" are to be internalized, the "in­
siders" who have not been paying to address the harm must do so. To internalize posi­
tive externalities, the outsiders must be asked to pay for benefits that previously have 
accrued to them for free. 
292. This freedom makes unequivocal sense in the case of production process 
standards. When product standards are at issue, the benefits of having a national market 
with econoinies of scale for producers must be weighed against the benefits of locally 
tailored product requirements. 
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of addressing various problems and parts of problems at different levels 
of aggregation therefore make sense. 
Minimizing structural welfare losses requires a case-by-case juris­
dictional matching principle. Problems that are by-and-large local in 
scope (waste site cleanups, drinking water quality, and spending on 
playgrounds, for example) should be regulated at the local level. 
Problems that arise on a regional scale (controlling pollution in a river 
system or an airshed, for example) should be managed on an ecosystem 
basis across states or even countries when necessary. To the extent that 
an environmental problem, such as acid rain, spans a great number of 
states, a national regulatory structure may be required. When problems, 
such as depletion of the ozone layer by CFCs are worldwide in scope, 
regulation on a global scale will be optimal from an environmental 
perspective. 
C. Public Choice 
Ensuring that environmental regulation reflects local knowledge 
and local priorities makes sense. Bureaucrats in Washington (or even in 
regional offices of the federal EPA) cannot know the future land use of 
a contaminated waste site as well as those in the community where the 
site is located. In deciding "how clean is clean enough," local judg­
ment is essential. Similarly, while the sandstone buttes of Utah may 
look remarkable to an Easterner (and thus worthy of national park sta­
tus or similar protection), citizens of Utah will know that this geogra­
phy is relatively commonplace in their area and thus that not every 
butte deserves federal protection.293 In such cases, decentralization im­
proves the decisionmaking process. Broad-based participation in the 
policy process, moreover, serves an important educational function294 
and may yield outcomes that are perceived as more fair.295 But the goal 
of giving people control over their own environmental destinies pro­
vides no basis fqr a sweeping presumption in favor of decentralized en­
vironmental decisionmaking. 
293. I am indebted to my colleague Robert Ellickson for this example. 
294. One of the sources of tension in the environmental policy process derives 
from the fact that what is understood to be hannful evolves over time. Elites often per­
ceive and understand the changed circumstances first, but their judgment may be disre­
garded as unrepresentative. Education is therefore important to help build popular sup­
port for efforts to internalize new externalities. 
295. In fact, there may be fewer opportunities for "exit" and "voice" at the state 
and local levels as well as reduced opportunities to recoup losses in some other policy 
domain. See Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the 
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 CoLUM. L. REV. 473, 509 (1991). 
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Images of spirited New England town meetings where well­
informed citizens debate the destiny of their community bear little re­
semblance to today's state and local decisionmaking in general or envi­
ronmental policymaking in particular. Generally, only those with a di­
rect stake in local land use decisions appear at planning and zoning 
board meetings. On occasion, an issue will generate enough controversy 
for a public meeting to draw a crowd. But far more often decisions are 
made with little or no public participation or discussion. Similarly, at 
the state level, very few environmental issues generate sufficient media 
attention to produce any real public debate. Thus, decentralized deci­
sionmaking may exclude from representation, albeit passively, the 
views of significant numbers of citizens. 
Technical complexity may intersect with public choice issues to 
cast further doubt on the prospect that decentralization will produce bet­
ter matches between environmental policy and citizen needs. In particu­
lar, knowledge of the existence of an environmental problem must be 
separated from knowledge of what to do about the harm. People often 
have the former without the latter. With regard to the deeper sort of 
knowledge relating to appropriate policy responses, the American citi­
zenry often appears to be better informed about national environmental 
issues that have received widespread media coverage than state or local 
ones.296 . In addition, it is useful to separate "first order" preferences 
(the desire that drinking water be safe to drink, for example) from "sec­
ond order" preferences (benzene should be reduced to a level of seven 
parts per million, for example). People cannot be wrong about their first 
order preferences as these are value judgments. But there is no guaran­
tee that members of the public will select optimal policy prescriptions 
in pursuit of their broader desires. In fact, the technical complexity of 
the regulatory process and the need to put competing values on a com­
mensurate basis makes environmental decisionmaking especially ob­
scure to the average citizen. 
As a result of these complexities, environmental decisionmaking is 
particularly susceptible to special interest distortion.297 Rent-seeking be-
296. For example, a discussion of toxic contamination frequently makes little 
sense until described as a Love Canal-type problem. 
297. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Con­
gress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 CoLUM. L. REv. 
1001, 1013 (1995) (describing state interests contributing to passage of Radioactive 
Waste Act); Stewart, Pyramids, supra note 7, at 1213-15; Michael C. Blumm, Public 
Lands: The Case Against Transferring BLM Lands to the States, NRLI NEWS (W'mter 
1995), at 13 (stating that while "capture by the organized describes much federal land 
decisionmaking, it would reign unrestrained if the individual states were the 
decisionmakers "). 
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havior undoubtedly affects national as well as state environmental poli­
cymakfug, but there is no evidence that public decisionmaking is sys­
tematically more distorted at the federal than at state and local levels.298 
Indeed, given general popular indifference to many state and local envi­
ronmental decisions, as well as greater media attention to federal-level 
activities, one might suggest precisely the opposite.299 
Federal interest group excesses tend to engender a corrective back­
lash300 and spawn countervailing forces.301 In contrast, state and local 
environmental policy manipulation often goes unnoticed. Localized dis­
tortion is no doubt smaller and more incremental; but it is no less sig­
nificant when summed, and perhaps is more insidious for its relative in­
visibility. Moreover, the interest group structure of these issues 
(environmental resource users concentrated on one side and a diffuse 
public on the other, for example) offers at least theoretical support for 
the suggestion that centralized decisionmaking will provide a more bal­
anced playing field for the contending interests.302 The difficulty of mo-
298. But see Stewart, supra note 150, at 340-42 (arguing that these distortions at 
the federal level become magnified). 
299. Even Business Week, hardly an apologist for a big federal government, re­
cently suggested that "local bodies can be as bureaucratic and inefficient as the feds -
and often far more corrupt" Kevin Kelly et al., Power to the States, Bus. WK., Aug. 7, 
1995, at 48, 50; see also FISCHEL, supra note 19, at 139 (arguing that local regulation 
is easiest to distort in support of special interests and against individual property own­
ers); Robert Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning, supra note 19, at 702 ("Studies have 
documented the lawlessness of zoning variance decisions in most communities."). Or as 
Robert Percival more modestly observes: "[H]istory demonstrates that state and local 
officials generally are too vulnerable to local economic and political pressures favoring 
development to be given exclusive responsibility for environmental protection." Perci­
val, supra note 5, at 1178; see also Oliver A. Houck & Michael Rolland, Federalism in 
Wetlands Regulation: A Consideration of Delegation of Clean Water Act Section 404 
and Related Programs to the States, 54 Mn. L. REv. 1242, 1309 (1995) (noting that, 
with regard to adequate wetlands protection, "state and local governments were not do­
ing the job"). 
300. For example, a tremendous amount of criticism has been leveled at the Natu­
ral Resources Defense Council (NRDC) over Alar and at Greenpeace over the Brent 
Spar incident. See Better to Blunder than to Lie, THE INDEPENDENT, Sept. 6, 1995, at 
16; Dwight Lee, Eco-hype Working Against the Cause?, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1992, 
at F3; Thomas Gale Moore, Environmental Kooks Dream Up Crises, S.F. CHRON., 
Sept. 14, 1992, at B3; Judith Perera, Greenpeace Faces Honesty Backlash, Inter Press 
Service, Sept 5, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, INPRES File; Joseph Per­
kins, False Alarms: 'Environmentally Correct' Policies Often Are Based on Distorted 
Science, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRm., July 2, 1993, at BS. 
301. Consider the emergence of the Wise Use Movement in response to environ­
mental groups. See also GREGG EASTERBROOK, A MOMENT ON THE EARTH (1995). 
302. At the centralized level, environmental groups find it easier to reach critical 
mass and thereby to compete on more equal footing with industrial interests. See IN­
TEREST GROUP PoLmCS IN THE AMERICAN WEST (Ronald J. Hrebenar & Clive s. 
Thomas eds., 1987); INTEREST GROUP POLmCS IN THE SOUTHERN STATES (Ronald 
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bilizing the public in many separate jurisdictions is well established.303 
The technical complexity of environmental issues exacerbates the usual 
asymmetry because concentrated interests find it easier to assemble the 
data, information, and scientific analysis that carry great sway with reg­
ulators who are short on facts. Thus, whatever the asymmetry at the 
federal level, it is magnified at the state level. 
Insofar as uninformed citizens do participate in making technically 
complex environmental regulatory judgements, their participation is of 
dubious value, and it cannot be assumed that their real interests are ulti­
mately represented. In fact, popular indifference to the details of envi­
ronmental policy debates may be rational. Ecological and public health 
issues are in many cases sufficiently complex that average voters rea­
sonably conclude that the investment of time necessary to participate 
meaningfully in such debates exceeds any return that might be obtained. 
If this is the case, decentralized decisionmaking, which would entail 
more environmental voting, will be welfare reducing even if it is more 
democratic in some formalistic way. Given the _nature of environmental 
policy questions, the answer to public choice problems may not be de­
centralized democracy, but rather expert resolution with vigorous legis­
lative oversight.304 At the extreme end of the devolutionary spectrum, 
one could envision a system wherein citizens voted every night by re­
mote control from their homes on environmental regulatory decisions. 
But seeking public guidance on how many parts per million of EBDC 
residue to permit on com simply produces chaos and, as Justice Breyer 
argues, " [ c ]haos is not democracy. "305 Representative democracy need 
not be undemocratic and may translate into decisions that better reflect 
the public's interest than purer or more direct forms of democracy.306 
J. Hrebenar & Clive S. Thomas eds, 1992). Of course, when costs are concentrated and 
benefits diffuse, NIMBY concerns may predominate, leading to distortions in the oppo­
site direction. Land use decisions in particular, in which neighbors are often close at 
hand and well organized, are susceptible to NIMBY distortions because those who 
might benefit from a new land use (by having a shopping mall built, for example) have 
a less direct interest and therefore less incentive to participate in the decision process. 
303. See supra note 79 (describing the abundant public choice literature on this 
point). 
304. Justice Breyer, among others, has argued for expantled expert decisionmaking 
in the environmental realm. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS Cm.CLE: 
TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 61-64 (1993); see also GRAHAM & Wm­
NER, supra note 74. 
305. BREYER, supra note 304, at 73. 
306. Whether every individual votes on every decision or policies are set at the 
most centralized level by the President, the critical issues remain the same: (1) How 
well infonned is the decisionmaker? Are the technical inadequacies of the policy pro­
cess minimized? (2) Does the decisionmaker take into account all of the relevant costs 
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Doubt about the virtues of an entirely decentralized environmental 
regulatory regime does not imply that all decisions should be left to 
centralized experts. As a theoretical matter, however, the recent sweep­
ing claims about the value of decentralization as a mechanism for im­
proved self-determination in the environmental domain must be ques­
tioned. The better answer is a multitier regulatory structure capable of 
mixing and matching decision levels depending on the issue at hand. 
CONCLUSION 
This article should not be read as an argument in favor of central­
ized environmental regulation. It is intended simply to give pause to 
those who are driving for decentralized environmental regulation across 
the board. If this article accomplishes its purpose, it will lead to a reex­
amination of the presumption in favor of decentralized environmental 
regulation and to a recognition that the diversity of environmental 
problems we face demands a range of regulatory response strategies and 
levels of governmental activity. I hope, furthermore, that it will refocus 
the environmental policy reform debate from where we regulate to how 
we regulate. Policy progress depends on atte!ltion being concentrated on 
the real issues that create welfare losses: shaky scientific and analytic 
foundations for regulatory decisions, jurisdictional mismatches that 
skew cost-benefit calculations, and public choice distortions of the poli­
cymaking process. 
Regulatory theory in the environmental domain must rest on an un­
derstanding of the unique nature of environmental problems and envi­
ronmental regulation. Examined in light of the particular characteristics 
of ecological and public health harms - technical complexity, time 
lags, threshold effects, problems that overlap jurisdictional boundaries, 
and special interest policy distortions - and the specific regulatory fail­
ures that produce welfare losses, the hypothesized advantages of decen­
tralization often diminish. In particular, while decentralization may in 
some circumstances improve the technical content of environmental 
policy decisions, frequently it will not. Devolution will help to improve 
environmental policymaking if it better aligns public values and regula­
tory outcomes, but the welfare losses from creating new interjurisdic­
tional externalities and exposing the technical incapacity of many de­
centralized governmental units may overwhelm any representativeness 
gains obtained. Moreover, the prospect of public choice distortions of 
and benefits? Is the regulatory calculus structurally sound? (3) Do the citizenry's views 
get faithfully translated into policy outcomes? Are public choice distortions minimized? 
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the policymaking process appear as severe or more severe at a decen­
tralized level. 
My call is not, however, for across-the-board centralization. In­
stead, I seek a middle road between the centralizers and the localizers in 
favor of a spectrum of regulatory entities. This diversity is structurally 
isomorphic to and simultaneously driven by the diversity of scales on 
which public health and ecological harms arise. While implicating a 
more complicated regulatory process, my argument for multiple tiers of 
governmental activity in the environmental domain (from local to inter­
national) responds to the fact that centralization, even if it allows juris­
dictional externalities to be corrected, will not prove to be optimal in all 
cases. Sometimes the externalities corrected will be relatively small in 
comparison to the representativeness losses incurred by moving to a 
higher level of government. In other cases, regulatory failures arising at 
the more centralized level - internalities, diseconomies of scale, public 
choice distortions, the absence of competent authorities, and so on -. 
will outweigh the gains obtained by correcting a · jurisdictional 
externality. 
Ultimately, a regulatory approach that minimizes welfare loss for 
one type of governmental activity and one type of environmental prob­
lem may well lead to greater welfare losses in other regulatory activities 
or may exacerbate regulatory failures for other issues. The understand­
ing that the appropriate level of environmental regulation fundamentally 
must be determined issue by issue, guided by nature and the geographic 
scope of the problem in question, also leads to a presumption against 
any presumption about the correct level of governmental intervention. 
The varying dimensions of community identity in the environmental 
realm add to the importance of having regulatory structures at local, 
state, national, and international levels. We can and should take advan­
tage of hybrid environmental policy mechanisms that permit more sub­
tle and refined forms of regulation capable of systematically minimizing 
the sum of the welfare losses from technical, structural, and public 
choice regulatory failures. 
